Helman v. Alcoa Global Fasteners Inc.
Decision Date | 14 March 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 09–56501.,09–56501. |
Citation | 637 F.3d 986 |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Parties | Tonya HELMAN, individually and as Personal Representatives of and Successors–In–Interest to the Successor Estate of Cory Helman, deceased; Jim Helman, individually and as Personal Representatives of and Successors–In–Interest to the Successor/Estate of Cory Helman, deceased; Sandy Helman, individually and as Personal Representatives of and Successors–In–Interest to the Successor/Estate of Cory Helman, deceased; B.W., a female minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, Victoria Will; B.W., male minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, Victoria Will; Victoria Will, individually and as Personal Representatives of and Successors–In–Interest to the Successor/Estate of Christopher Will, deceased; Craig Will, individually and as Personal Representatives of and Successors–In–Interest to the Successor/Estate of Christopher Will, deceased; David Dyer, individually and as Personal Representatives of and Successors–In–Interest to the Successor/Estate of Adam Dyer, deceased; Stephanie Dyer, individually and as Personal Representatives of and Successors–In–Interest to the Successor/Estate of Adam Dyer, deceased, Plaintiffs–Appellants,v.ALCOA GLOBAL FASTENERS, INC., a California Corporation; Pacific Scientific, a Corporation; Hi–Shear Corporation, a California Corporation; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, a Corporation; Sikorsky Support Services, Inc., a Corporation; Parker–Hannifin Corporation, a Corporation; General Electric, a Corporation, Defendants–Appellees. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James Paul Collins, John P. Kristensen, Terry O'Reilly, Nina Shapirshteyn, Gary Lynn Simms, O'Reilly Collins, San Mateo, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.Kevin Sutherland, Michael A. Hession, Clyde and Co US, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Stephen Brunk, Law Office of Stephen K. Brunk, La Jolla, CA, Timothy J. Ryan, Rebekka Martorano, The Ryan Law Group, Sacramento, CA, Gregory L. Anderson, Dwyer Daly Brotzen & Bruno, James W. Hunt, Mark R. Irvine, Darrell M. Padgette, Fitzpatrick & Hunt, Tucker, Collier, Pagano, Aubert, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Christopher R. Christensen, Richard A. Lazenby, Anthony U. Battista, Condon & Forsyth, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:09–cv–01353–SVW–FFM.Before: BETTY B. FLETCHER, MARSHA S. BERZON, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Appellants bring this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss and a motion for judgment on the pleadings in Appellees' favor based on its conclusion that Appellant's state law claims are preempted by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). On September 16, 2009, we granted the petition for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), giving us jurisdiction to consider this issue. We now affirm.
Appellants are the personal representatives and successors in interest to three United States Navy crewmen killed in a helicopter crash. In 2007, while performing training exercises from the USS Bonhomme Richard, the helicopter lost control and crashed into the Pacific Ocean approximately 9.5 nautical miles off the coast of Catalina Island, California.
Appellants filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, alleging that defects in the helicopter and its component parts caused the accident, and seeking damages for wrongful death. The complaint asserts causes of action for strict products liability, negligence, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and wrongful death and survival under California law and general maritime law. The case was then removed to federal court by Appellees Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and Sikorsky Support Services, Inc. (collectively “Sikorsky”). Sikorsky filed a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that DOHSA preempts certain causes of action brought by Appellants because the accident occurred “on the high seas beyond three nautical miles from the shore of the United States.” See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c). The remaining Appellees filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, alleging that certain of Appellants' claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted based on DOHSA preemption.
The district court issued a ruling granting these motions, holding that DOHSA preempts Appellants' state law and general maritime causes of action for wrongful death. More specifically, the district court held that DOHSA applies to noncommercial aircraft accidents “beyond three nautical miles from shore,” and that Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed.Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988) (“Proclamation 5298”), which extended the territorial sea of the United States from three to twelve nautical miles from shore, did nothing to alter DOHSA's applicability. In its holding, the district court relied on then-Judge Sotomayor's dissent in the seminal case of In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200 (2d Cir.2000) (hereinafter the “ TWA Flight 800 Case ”), and declined to follow the majority opinion. Pursuant to Appellants' request, the district court certified the decision for interlocutory appeal, as a case of first impression in our circuit.
We review the district court judgment de novo. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.2005) ( ); Dunlap v. Credit Protection Ass'n, L.P., 419 F.3d 1011, 1012 n. 1 (9th Cir.2005) ( ).
DOHSA provides a federal statutory remedy for wrongful death occurring at sea. The current version of the statute reads:
When the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible. The action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's spouse, parent, child, or dependent relative.
The parties do not dispute that, under this provision, any accident occurring within three nautical miles from the shore of the United States is not subject to DOHSA's remedial scheme. Nor do the parties dispute that DOHSA is applicable to all accidents occurring more than twelve nautical miles from the shore of any State. The parties disagree, however, as to whether DOHSA applies to the intermediate area between three and twelve nautical miles from United States shores, where the helicopter accident in this case occurred.2 Because DOHSA has been held to preempt all other remedies for wrongful death occurring on the high seas, Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 118 S.Ct. 1890, 141 L.Ed.2d 102 (1998), this issue is of considerable importance to future victims of accidents occurring in this area.
Only one of our sister circuits has squarely addressed the issue of DOHSA's applicability to this area. In the TWA Flight 800 Case, the Second Circuit held that “high seas” as used in DOHSA refers to “those waters that lie beyond United States territorial waters, that is, international waters,” 209 F.3d at 205, and that Proclamation 5928, by extending U.S. territorial waters from three to twelve nautical miles from shore, effectively changed the inner-boundary of DOHSA's applicability to twelve nautical miles from shore. Id. at 202, 215. Then–Judge Sotomayor, however, dissented, reasoning that Congress had no intention of imputing the definition of “high seas” as it was used for purposes of international law into the statute, but rather used the term in connection with “beyond a marine league” to make clear the geographical boundary (three nautical miles from shore) beyond which DOHSA should apply. Id. at 224. Under then-Judge Sotomayor's reasoning, DOHSA's scope was unaffected by Proclamation 5928, and its boundary remains at three nautical miles from U.S. shores.
The issue on which the TWA Flight 800 Case majority mainly relied, and which primarily divides the parties in our case, is the definition of the term “high seas” as it is used in DOHSA's text. Appellants argue that “high seas” is a political term that excludes all United States territorial waters. Appellees, on the other hand, argue that “high seas” is a geographical boundary referring to all waters beyond the low-water mark.
Unfortunately, the text of DOHSA does not reveal how “high seas” is defined for purposes of the statute, leaving it subject to different interpretations. Indeed, both sides find support for their proffered definition in the relevant, pre-enactment case law. Compare U.S. v. Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29, 26 L.Ed. 1001 (1881) ( ); Deslions v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 210 U.S. 95, 115, 28 S.Ct. 664, 52 L.Ed. 973 (1908) (same); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398, 403, 28 S.Ct. 133, 52 L.Ed. 264 (1907) ( ); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826 (1909) ( ) with Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 471, 11 S.Ct. 897, 35 L.Ed. 581 (1891) ( ); The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U.S. 254, 271, 23 S.Ct. 415, 47 L.Ed. 463 (1903) (same).
We conclude that we need not resolve this disagreement and...
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