Helme v. Philadelphia Life Insurance Co.

• Citation: 61 Pa. 107
• Parties: Helme <I>versus</I> The Philadelphia Life Insurance Company.
• Decision Date: 11 May 1869
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

61 Pa. 107

Helme versus The Philadelphia Life Insurance Company.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 16, 1869.

May 11, 1869.

February 16th 1869.

Before THOMPSON, C. J., AGNEW, SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, JJ. READ, J., at Nisi Prius

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia: No. 295, to January Term 1868.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

R. P. White (with whom was G. H. Earle), for the plaintiff in error.—Provisions in a contract may be explained by known customs: Bateman on Com'l. Law, § 154; Chaurand v. Augustein, Peake's N. P. § 154; Noble v. Kennoway, Dougl. 492; Buckley v. U. S. Insurance Co., 18 Barb. 541. Where an injury under a contract can be compensated, equity will prevent the enforcement of a forfeiture: Peachy v. Somerset, 3 L. C. in Equity 669, 675; 2 Story's Eq. J., §§ 777, 1314-1316, and notes; Ins. Co. v. Jenks, 5 Indiana (Porter) 96. If parties have previously dealt according to a particular custom, such custom may be given in evidence to interpret the intention: Loring v. Gurney, 5 Pick. 15; Carroll v. Ins. Co., 38 Barb. 402; Trustees v. Ins. Co., 18 Id. 69; Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 18 Ill. 553; Goit v. Ins. Co., 25 Barb. 189; Ins. Co. v. Stauffer, 9 Casey 397.

C. Gibbons, for defendants in error.—Evidence of usage may be admitted to explain what is doubtful, but not to contradict what is plain: 3 Kent's Com. 260; 1 Greenleaf Ev. §§ 292, 295, and note; Coxe v. Heisley, 7 Harris 243.

The opinion of the court was delivered, May 11th 1869, by THOMPSON, C. J.

The plaintiff below offered on the trial to prove a custom among life insurance companies, to allow thirty days' grace for payment of premiums due, even where a clause of forfeiture for non-payment on the day exists. The rejection of the offer by the court forms the first bill of exceptions and assignment of error, to be considered in this case.

It might have been a difficult thing to prove such a custom, but that was not a good ground on which to refuse the offer. It was the plaintiff's right to prove it if she could, and we are to take it, for the purposes of this investigation, that she could have proved it. Would it have been efficient proof for any purpose, had it been admitted? We think it would, although generally a contract is the law of the transaction in which it exists, and is not to be affected by any thing but its terms; that is to say, it cannot be abridged or enlarged in itself by anything else; yet there are many cases in which its execution is materially curtailed by usage or custom. A familiar instance are days of grace on commercial paper. By a custom grown into law, it is not due until the expiration of three days after it purports to be, or rather the remedy is suspended against parties for that period. So in agriculture; although the lease may fix the duration of the term, and when it is to end, yet the tenant by custom has rights in the premises after it is ended, to harvest and carry away his share of what the custom calls the way-going crop: 5 Binn. 295; 2 S. & R. 14; 1 Dallas 201; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 6th ed. 470. This custom seems to do more than curtail the remedy, it in fact enlarges the contract. But no custom is more perfectly established, or more thoroughly stands on a solid foundation as law. There are customs which interpret marine contracts to the extent of apparent changes in them. In Peake's Nisi Prius 43, in the case of Chaurand v. Augustein, it was shown that by custom a stipulation in a policy of insurance, that a vessel was to sail in October, meant that she was to sail between the 25th of the month and the 1st or 2d of November. While a custom as a general rule, may not be heard to affect the terms of a statute, nor a contract, to the extent of enlarging or abridging the force of it, yet it may interpret either: Rapp v. Palmer, 3 Watts 178.

The offer in this case was to curtail the generality of the clause of forfeiture in the policy in case of non-payment of the premiums at the day, and to show that a forfeiture was not demandable at the day, nor at all, if paid within thirty days. If the plaintiff could have established this as a custom, her case would on this point have been clear of difficulty, for the testimony was, that she had tendered the premium for the non-payment of which the forfeiture was claimed, once, and perhaps twice, within thirty days after it was due by the terms of the policy. We...