Helmedach v. Comm'r of Corr., SC 19836
| Decision Date | 14 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | SC 19836 |
| Citation | 329 Conn. 726,189 A.3d 1173 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jennifer HELMEDACH v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION |
Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Adrienne Russo, assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, for the appellant (respondent).
Conrad Ost Seifert, assigned counsel, for the appellee (petitioner).
Daniel M. Erwin and Christopher Duby filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D'Auria, Mullins and Kahn, Js.*
D'AURIA, J.
In this certified appeal, we consider whether the attorney for the petitioner, Jennifer Helmedach, rendered ineffective assistance when, during trial, he delayed presenting to the petitioner a favorable plea offer from the prosecutor, an offer the prosecutor later withdrew before it could be accepted. We agree with the habeas court and Appellate Court that counsel's delay amounted to deficient performance pursuant to Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and, in light of the fact that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, does not contest that the petitioner was prejudiced, we therefore affirm the Appellate Court's judgment.
The following facts, as found by the habeas court, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The charges in this case stem from the murder of Faye Bennett. The state alleged that the petitioner had helped her romantic partner, David Bell, lure the victim to an apartment in Meriden where Bell robbed and murdered her. The state further alleged that the petitioner helped Bell flee the scene in the victim's vehicle. They were later apprehended in New York.
The state charged the petitioner with felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the third degree.1 The trial court appointed Richard Reeve to represent the petitioner. The petitioner denied participating in the crime or having prior knowledge of Bell's intention to rob or to murder the victim, and she claimed that she fled with him under duress.
The petitioner and prosecutor discussed the possibility of disposing of the case pursuant to a plea agreement. During a pretrial conference, the prosecutor offered to agree to a sentence of fifteen to twenty years incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea on the charge of robbery or conspiracy to commit robbery, thus having the petitioner avoid the twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence for felony murder. Reeve stated that he would discuss the offer with the petitioner, and the prosecutor indicated his intention to review the offer with the victim's family. Reeve later replied to the prosecutor that the petitioner wanted to accept the offer, but the prosecutor withdrew the offer because the victim's family opposed it. The petitioner moved the trial court to enforce specific performance of that plea agreement, but the trial court denied the motion.
The case proceeded to trial. During jury selection, the prosecutor made a second offer of twenty-two years incarceration, execution suspended after seventeen years, which the petitioner declined. The prosecutor made a third offer, near the start of the trial, of fourteen years to serve, which the petitioner once again rejected. The petitioner rejected the second and third offers because the state's case had been weakened when a critical witness recanted an earlier oral statement to the police establishing that the petitioner had spoken to that witness about helping to arrange for the robbery of the victim. The witness' testimony was the only evidence the state had to directly tie the petitioner to the robbery.
The prosecutor made a fourth and final plea offer after resting the state's case. The state rested its case on a Friday, and the trial was set to resume with the defense's case on the following Tuesday. Reeve spent substantial time during the weekend with the petitioner, who was incarcerated pending trial, preparing her for her anticipated testimony. On Tuesday morning, the day the petitioner was expected to take the stand, the prosecutor called Reeve and offered a plea agreement of ten years to serve. Reeve thought the offer was "a great offer" for his client, but he was concerned about relaying it to her right before her testimony. According to the habeas court, Reeve thought that because the petitioner was young and "flustered" about testifying, hearing the offer would negatively impact her testimony. Reeve asked the prosecutor if he could convey the offer to the petitioner after she testified, and the prosecutor replied " ‘that's okay.’ "
On his way to court, Reeve discussed the offer with his law partner. His partner agreed that the offer of ten years was favorable and advised Reeve not to delay in telling the petitioner about the offer. Because the prosecutor had indicated he would leave the offer open, however, the habeas court found that Reeve decided to follow "his instincts" and wait to tell her.
Reeve presented the offer to his client, but he had waited to do so until after her testimony concluded two and one-half days later. The petitioner indicated that she wanted to accept it but first wanted to discuss it with her mother and Reeve together. Reeve then informed the prosecutor that his client was interested in accepting the offer. The prosecutor, however, responded that the offer was withdrawn. Reeve did not attempt to specifically enforce that plea agreement.
The trial proceeded and, after the close of evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to all charges. The trial court rendered judgment of conviction according to the verdict and sentenced the petitioner to thirty-five years incarceration.
The petitioner later filed this habeas action, alleging, among other things, that Reeve rendered ineffective assistance under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution as a result of his delay in informing the petitioner of the plea offer until after her testimony, which ultimately led the prosecutor to withdraw it before it could be accepted. According to the petitioner, Reeve had a duty to promptly inform her of the prosecutor's offer, irrespective of his thoughts about the potential impact to her emotional state in advance of her testimony. The petitioner asserted that Reeve's delay in presenting the offer to her, despite having the opportunity to present and to discuss it with her before her testimony, breached this duty and caused her prejudice because she would have accepted the offer.
The habeas court agreed with the petitioner. It determined that "Reeve's failure to relay the favorable offer in a timely manner before it was withdrawn fell below the objective standard of reasonableness required by attorneys under the state and federal constitutions."
The court further found that the petitioner was prejudiced by Reeve's deficient performance because, had the offer been presented sooner, the petitioner would have accepted the offer, and the trial court would have agreed to sentence the petitioner accordingly. The habeas court then ordered that the matter be returned to the criminal trial docket for a determination of the appropriate remedy. See Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction , 307 Conn. 342, 361–62, 53 A.3d 983 (2012), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone v. Ebron , 569 U.S. 913, 133 S.Ct. 1726, 185 L.Ed.2d 802 (2013).
The habeas court granted permission for the respondent to appeal from the judgment to the Appellate Court, which affirmed. Helmedach v. Commissioner of Correction , 168 Conn. App. 439, 441, 148 A.3d 1105 (2016). We granted the respondent's petition for certification to appeal.2 Helmedach v. Commissioner of Correction , 323 Conn. 941, 151 A.3d 845 (2016). Although, on appeal, we will defer to the habeas court's factual findings and not disturb them unless they are clearly erroneous, we review de novo whether the facts found by the habeas court establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction , 306 Conn. 664, 677, 51 A.3d 948 (2012).
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to have counsel for their defense in state prosecutions. Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Horn v. Commissioner of Correction , 321 Conn. 767, 775, 138 A.3d 908 (2016). Implicit in this guarantee is the right to have effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington , supra, at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
A defendant seeking habeas relief for ineffective representation must prove two elements. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed. 2d 389 (2000), quoting Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
The parties in the present case agree that the delay in conveying the offer to the petitioner caused the petitioner prejudice in light of the habeas court's findings that the petitioner would have agreed to the offer for a ten year sentence of incarceration, had the offer been presented to the petitioner before her testimony, and that the court would have accepted it. Because the parties do not contest whether counsel's performance harmed the petitioner, or whether the habeas court ordered the appropriate remedy, the only issue presented for our resolution is whether counsel's delay amounted to constitutionally deficient representation.
The defendant's right to effective representation applies to all "critical stages" of a criminal prosecution, which extends to any plea...
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