Helmert v. Biffany, 2001-CA-01690-SCT.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
| Citation | 842 So.2d 1287 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001-CA-01690-SCT.,2001-CA-01690-SCT. |
| Parties | John C. HELMERT, Jr. v. Tara J. BIFFANY. |
| Decision Date | 17 April 2003 |
842 So.2d 1287
John C. HELMERT, Jr.v.
Tara J. BIFFANY
No. 2001-CA-01690-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
April 17, 2003.
Richard J. Smith, Gulfport, attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
DIAZ, J., for the Court.
¶ 1. At issue in this case is whether the youth court of Harrison County has jurisdiction to modify a visitation and support order rendered in a family court that has since been abolished by statute. Finding jurisdiction improper, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. On October 17, 1994, Tara J. Biffany (Biffany) filed a paternity proceeding in the family court of Harrison County, Mississippi, First Judicial District. Biffany alleged that John C. Helmert, Jr., (Helmert) was the natural father of her minor child, T.J.B. On October 2, 1995, the family court entered a judgment adjudicating Helmert to be the natural father of T.J.B. and setting forth child support obligations and a visitation schedule for the minor child.
¶ 3. In July 1996, Helmert filed a Petition for Contempt of the Judgment and Modification seeking, inter alia, to cite Biffany for contempt and to modify the visitation schedule set forth in the previous judgment. Biffany counter-claimed. On August 21,1997, the family court entered a judgment citing both parties for contempt and modifying the previous child support obligation and the visitation schedule.
¶ 4. During the 1999 legislative session, the Mississippi Legislature abolished the Family Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. 1999 Miss. Laws Ch. 423. On March 31, 2000, Helmert filed a complaint with the Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, alleging, inter alia, that Biffany had interfered with his visitation. Helmert also sought modification of the previous family court orders in regard to his child support obligation and to enlarge his visitation schedule. Biffany answered and moved to dismiss the complaint.
¶ 5. Based upon the recent abolishment of the family court of Harrison County, the Chancellor found that all matters formerly before that court were transferred to the youth court and that the chancery court had no jurisdiction of family court matters, unless the youth court specifically approved the transfer of a matter to chancery court. Thus, the Chancellor instructed Helmert to re-file in youth court. No order reflecting these instructions appears in the record.
¶ 6. Helmert filed a Motion to Transfer to Chancery Court with the youth court of Harrison County, First Judicial District, Mississippi on March 20, 2001. However, the youth court judge concluded that in the absence of an agreement between the parties to transfer the matter, he had no authority to transfer and the matter had to remain in youth court. Therefore, the motion to transfer to chancery court was denied by the youth court on May 30, 2001. Aggrieved by this ruling, Helmert appeals to this Court, presenting one issue for resolution:1
I. After the Family Court of Harrison County was abolished by statute, was it error for the Youth
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7. Jurisdiction is a question of law. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So.2d 1202, 1204-05 (Miss.1998). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Saliba v. Saliba, 753 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Miss.2000).
ANALYSIS
¶ 8. During the 1999 legislative session, the Mississippi Legislature abolished the Family Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. The law repealing the family court stated, in part, as follows:
From and after the effective date of this act, all Family Courts are abolished. All matters pending in any Family Court abolished shall be transferred to the County Court of the County wherein the Family Court was located without the necessity for any Motion or Order of the Court for such transfer.
1999 Miss. Laws Ch. 432, § 1(emphasis added). The youth court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this post-judgment paternity proceeding by virtue of the above law authorizing the transfer of all "pending" cases of the family court to the youth court via the county court.
¶ 9. Helmert argues that the youth court had no jurisdiction because the action was no longer "pending" within the meaning of the law repealing the family court. He points out that the initial judgment and an order of contempt of that judgment were rendered by the family court before it was abolished and neither party had filed for any further relief at the time that the Legislature abolished the family court. Though he acknowledges that a court retains jurisdiction over child custody, support, and visitation matters, and may modify those matters upon proper petition,2 Helmert argues that the retaining of jurisdiction does not mean a case is "pending" as that term is used in Chapter 432, § 1.
¶ 10. In further support of this argument, Helmert points out that a new filing fee is required to reopen cases subject to modification and a new civil cover sheet must be filed with the clerk of the court. He argues that "[u]nless a case is properly reopened by one of the parties, it is clear that the matter is closed with the Court and is not a `pending' case."
¶ 11. One dictionary defines "pending" as "[n]ot yet decided or settled; awaiting conclusion or confirmation." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 969 (10th ed.1981). While another defines "pending" as:
Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; unsettled; undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment. Awaiting an occurrence or conclusion of action, period of continuance or indeterminancy. Thus, an action is pending from its inception until the rendition of final judgment. An action is "pending" after it is commenced by either filing a complaint with the court or by the service of a summons.
Black's Law Dictionary 785 (abr. 6th ed.1991).
¶ 12. This Court has held that "[g]enerally, when prior proceedings conducted by another court determined the custody of
¶ 13. We conclude that the original action in the case sub judice was not "pending" within the meaning of the law abolishing the family court. No motions or other formal proceedings seeking to modify that final judgment were pending and the litigation had ended at the time § 432 was passed, despite the right of both Helmert and Biffany to petition the court for modification or to appeal the judgment itself. Had neither of the parties' circumstances changed, this action would never have been re-opened and the family court judge's ruling would never have been disturbed. Moreover, the initial judgment in the case sub judice was entitled to full faith and credit in sister states. U.S. Const. art. 4, § 1.
¶ 14. The Mississippi Code does not specifically address this situation. Statutes grant both the chancery court and the youth court jurisdiction over the adjudication of minors. One difference, however, is that the general jurisdiction of chancery court encompasses that of youth court, whereas youth court jurisdiction is limited to specifically delineated matters, to-wit, abused, neglected, or delinquent children.
¶ 15. The chancery court has historically had full jurisdiction in divorce, alimony, and custody matters. See Miss. Const. art. 6, § 159. In the case sub judice, Helmert is seeking modification of the previous family court orders in regard to his child support obligation and enlargement of his visitation schedule—matters within traditional chancery jurisdiction. That jurisdiction has been increased and expanded by statute. Section 2743 states:
When a divorce shall be decreed from the bonds of matrimony, the court may, in its discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case, as may seem...
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