Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1122,88-1122
• Citation: 45 Ohio St.3d 131,543 N.E.2d 1212
• Parties: , 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1554, 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,365, 115 Lab.Cas. P 56,302, 4 IER Cases 1249 HELMICK et al., Appellees, v. CINCINNATI WORD PROCESSING, INC. et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 131

45 Ohio St.3d 131

543 N.E.2d 1212, 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1554,

51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,365,

115 Lab.Cas. P 56,302, 4 IER Cases 1249

HELMICK et al., Appellees, v. CINCINNATI WORD PROCESSING, INC. et al., Appellants.

No. 88-1122.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 7, 1989.

Decided Aug. 23, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

1. R.C. Chapter 4112 was intended to add protections for victims of sexual harassment rather than reduce the protections and remedies for such conduct.

2. Allowing a plaintiff to pursue common-law remedies in lieu of the relief provided under R.C. Chapter 4112 creates no conflict and serves to supplement the limited protection and coverage of that chapter.

3. Standing alone, praise with respect to job performance and discussion of

future career development will not modify the employment-at-will relationship. A demonstration of detrimental reliance on specific promises of job security can create an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. (Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. [1985], 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150, approved and followed.)

Holly Helmick, Linda Eichenlaub, and Brenda Evans filed a complaint against Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. ("CWP"), and its employees Charles Bray, Margaret Alderson, and Terry Theye. The complaint alleged intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, defamation of character and tortious interference with and breach of their employment contracts by the defendants. The complaint was subsequently amended to add defendants Joseph E. Driscoll and Cincinnati Insurance Company, against whom was asserted a claim alleging violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Section 1381, Title 15, U.S.Code. These additional claims were apparently settled by the parties, and these two defendants were dismissed by agreed entry.

Helmick was employed as a customer support representative by CWP from June 1984 until she was discharged on October 17, 1984. Eichenlaub worked as a sales representative from October 1982 until she was fired in June 1983. Evans was employed as an administrative assistant from February 1983 until she left her job in September 1984. Plaintiffs alleged that throughout the course of their employ at CWP they were each subjected to a pattern of sexual abuse by defendant Bray, the sales manager at CWP's Columbus office. This abuse was not confined to mere oral statements but allegedly involved conduct that would be subject to a criminal prosecution for sexual imposition.

The remaining defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment against all three plaintiffs. The trial court ruled that there was no genuine issue of fact regarding the status of plaintiffs as employees at will and accordingly granted summary judgment in regard to the breach of contract claims. Likewise, the remaining claims, with the exception of the assault and battery claim against Alderson asserted by Helmick, were disposed of by the trial court on the premise that the plaintiffs' failure to timely file charges of sex-based discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission precluded these other causes of action. Only on the assault and battery claim noted above was summary judgment denied. The court further noted that there was "no just reason for delay."

Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. Concerning the claims for breach of employment contract, the court of appeals held that it was erroneous for the trial court to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff Helmick, but that such ruling was not error as to plaintiffs Evans and Eichenlaub. The court also reversed the trial court's finding that the existence of relief under R.C. Chapter 4112 precludes an aggrieved employee from seeking damages for sexual misconduct under common-law tort theories. The court of appeals held that the General Assembly intended to supplement the common-law causes of action by creating statutory rights and remedies to eliminate sexual discrimination pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112. The court of appeals ruled that R.C. 4112.02 makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discriminate against any person because of sex with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or any matter directly or indirectly relating to employment, including discharge without cause. Citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Lysyj (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 217, 67 O.O.2d 287, 313 N.E.2d 3, the court held that R.C. Chapter 4112 is remedial legislation which should be construed liberally, and that when passed by the General Assembly it established only a very limited preemption area referring only to statutes inconsistent with R.C. 4112.02. The court held that the legislature has fashioned a "special remedy" under R.C. 4112.02 to deal with sexual harassment on the job and that it was the legislative purpose to create a range of remedies by which an employee could combat pervasive sexual discrimination.

This court allowed a motion to certify the record in this case and the matter is here for review.

Spater, Gittes & Terzian, Frederick M. Gittes and John S. Marshall, Columbus, for appellees.

Lane, Alton & Horst, John M. Alton and D. Wesley Newhouse, Columbus, for appellants.

Law Offices of Andrew J. Ruzicho and Louis A. Jacobs, Columbus, urging affirmance for amici curiae, Columbus Chapter of Nat. Organization for Women and the Committee Against Sexual Harassment.

Ohio State Legal Services Assn., Eugene R. King, Columbus, and Michael R. Smalz, urging affirmance for amici curiae, David A. Gault, Regina Bergmann, Vincent Irizarry, Jr., and Ohio State Legal Services Assn.

Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Marc D. Mezibov and Edmund J. McKenna, Cincinnati, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Employment Lawyers Assn.

Kramer & Tobocman Co., L.P.A., and Dennis J. Niermann, Cleveland, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 9 to 5, Nat. Assn. of Working Women.

WRIGHT, Justice.

This case requires us to resolve two issues. The first involves an issue of law. The second involves a mixture of law and fact. Appellants assert that the General Assembly abolished common-law tort actions premised upon sexual misconduct by way of preemption when it enacted R.C. Chapter 4112. Appellants also argue that the doctrine of employment at will bars Helmick's breach of contract action, said action being premised upon her discharge without just cause. We reject appellants' positions as aforesaid and affirm the court of appeals.

I

On the first point there appears to be little question that R.C. Chapter 4112 is comprehensive legislation designed to provide a wide variety of remedies for employment discrimination in its various forms. Appellees agree that claims for employment discrimination must be asserted under the aegis of R.C. Chapter 4112. The issue here is whether appellees' intentional tort claims have been preempted and abolished by the General Assembly. We hold that they have not been abolished, as there is nothing in the language or legislative history of R.C. Chapter 4112 barring the pursuit of common-law remedies for injuries arising out of sexual misconduct.

Our review of R.C. Chapter 4112 reveals only one limitation and that provision bars any law which would be inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the chapter. ¹ Appellants suggest that pursuit of common-law claims would be inconsistent with the various remedies provided by the General Assembly under the statute. However, analysis of the pertinent case law in this area belies such an assertion. Appellees accurately point out that redress under the statute differs significantly from that under the common law. First, the burden of proof for discrimination under the statute is quite different from any existing common-law tort and has its own elements and presumptions. See, generally, Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 807. ² At the time the instant action was commenced, the relief provided by R.C. Chapter 4112 for sex discrimination in employment was limited to that available in equity, such as injunctive relief, reinstatement, and back pay. R.C. 4112.05(G). No provision was made for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages available at common law. But, see, R.C. 4112.99, effective September 28, 1987. ³ We hold that allowing a plaintiff to pursue common-law remedies in lieu of the relief provided under R.C. Chapter 4112 creates no conflict and serves to supplement the limited protection and coverage of that chapter.

It must be noted that the analogous federal statute, Section 2000e, Title 42, U.S.Code, does not preempt common-law tort claims. In federal discrimination cases, the federal courts have routinely, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, also heard state common-law tort claims. We note also that there is an abundance of case law dealing with facts similar to those alleged here involving an assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress and the like. ⁴ Moreover, our holding that R.C. Chapter 4112 does not preempt common-law tort claims keyed to sexual misconduct is supported by other jurisdictions which have dealt with the preemption issue. ⁵

Appellants cite Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co. (1982), 5 Ohio App.3d 203, 5 OBR 466, 451 N.E.2d 1236, and Howard v. State Farm Ins. Co. (1978), 61 Ohio App.2d 198, 15 O.O.3d 317, 401 N.E.2d 462. Neither of these cases dealt with the assertion of common-law tort claims against an employer. We agree with Peterson that R.C. Chapter 4112 does provide the exclusive remedy for pure employment discrimination claims. Peterson, supra, at 205, 5 OBR at 467, 451 N.E.2d at 1238. However, in that case the court made no ruling and expressed no opinion concerning the rights of an employee with discrimination claims to also pursue common-law claims. Likewise, the court in Howard did not treat the...