Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1957
• Citation: 131 A.2d 622,389 Pa. 21
• Parties: C. S. HELMIG, Appellant, v. ROCKWELL MANUFACTURING COMPANY. and Bethlehem Steel Company.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 622

131 A.2d 622

389 Pa. 21

C. S. HELMIG, Appellant, v. ROCKWELL MANUFACTURING COMPANY. and Bethlehem Steel Company.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 22, 1957.

Rehearing Denied May 28, 1957.

Paul Ginsburg, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

J. Wray Connolly, W. S. Moorhead, Jr., J. M. Feeney, Jr., Moorhead & Knox, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

David McNeil Olds, Carl E. Glock, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, for Bethlehem Steel Co.

Before JONES, C. J., and BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO, ARNOLD and JONES, JJ.

BENJAMIN R. JONES, Justice.

The instant controversy involves two separate appeals from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County--one in an assumpsit, the other in a trespass action. The same appellant and factual situation were before this court in the prior appeal, reported at 380 Pa. 305, 111 A.2d 118. Mr. Justice Chidsey, in the prior appeal, painstakingly stated the facts. Because of this we will restate only those facts which comprise the essence of the present controversy.

In 1948 appellant, a steel broker, undertook to furnish appellee Rockwell Manufacturing Company ¹ with steel sheets to be used in Rockwell's business. Appellant agreed to obtain steel ingots for Rockwell and then secure the services of a rolling mill to convert these ingots into steel sheets. In return Rockwell agreed to pay appellant a commission of $35 a ton for the finished product. Appellant obtained the requisite ingots and then attempted to secure rolling time from appellee Bethlehem Steel Company ² for the necessary conversion into steel sheets. Bethlehem refused to roll the ingots, giving as its reason its policy against entering into any conversion agreement in which middlemen were involved. Rockwell then cancelled its agreement with appellant which cancellation is essentially the basis for all three subsequent appeals--the initial and the two present appeals--to this court.

After the cancellation of the agreement appellant sued Rockwell in assumpsit and this court affirmed the lower court's entry of judgment n. o. v. against appellant. Helmig v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co., supra.

On September 23, 1955, 17 months after the judgment of the lower court was entered, appellant filed a Petition for New Trial for After-Discovered Evidence which requested, as amended, that either a new trial be granted or, in the alternative, that the judgment n. o. v. be vacated and the verdict of the jury in favor of appellant be reinstated. By order of May 23, 1956 the lower court dismissed appellant's petition and the first of these appeals (No. 6 March Term, 1957) followed.

On August 25, 1955, prior to his petition for a new trial, appellant brought an action in trespass, naming both Rockwell and Bethlehem as defendants, and alleging a conspiracy between them to defraud him of his commission by means of the cancellation of the agreement of 1948. The lower court, by order of May 23, 1956, granted the motions of both appellees for judgment on the pleadings and the second of these appeals (No. 7 March Term, 1957) followed.

The grounds upon which the lower court denied appellant's petition for a new trial or opening of the judgment n. o. v. in the assumpsit action are: (1) that the petition was filed too late and (2) that the after-discovered evidence which was the basis for the petition was available at time of trial, and was neither legally nor factually sufficient to justify appellant's prayer for relief.

The court below was correct in its exposition of the law pertaining to new trials. A petition for a new trial must be filed at the same term in which final judgment is entered, with exceptions allowable only where the court has retained control over the verdict or where there is extrinsic fraud, clerical error, or the like. Whether or not a new trial will be granted to let in new evidence is a matter for the trial court and this court will not reverse unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Co. v. DiFrancesco, 362 Pa. 326, 66 A.2d 254; Kingsdorf v. Frank Gamburg, Inc., 147 Pa.Super. 84, 24 A.2d 140; McFadden v. Hanft, 166 Pa. Super. 261, 70 A.2d 450; 6 Standard Pennsylvania Practice, § 99, p. 350. In the instant case appellant's petition was not filed until 17 months after the lower court entered judgment and none of the allowable exceptions are herein applicable.

The lower court also accurately discussed the principles of law applicable to after-discovered evidence and astutely applied those principles to the evidence presented by the appellant below, holding that this evidence could have been obtained at the original trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence on the part of appellant, that its only effect would be to impeach the credibility of Rockwell's evidence as to Bethlehem's policy against dealing with intermediaries, and that this evidence of Bethlehem's acts in the years 1951-1953 was irrelevant to the policy of that company in 1948. No authorities need be cited for the proposition that any evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant to the issues of the case. And, as the court below stated: 'It is well established that in order to grant a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence the evidence must have been discovered since the trial and be such as could not have been obtained at the trial by the use of reasonable diligence; it must not be simply cumulative or merely to impeach the credibility of a witness. Hornick v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 1933, 310 Pa. 225 .' On the basis of the record before us we can find no abuse of the lower court's discretion in refusing to grant a new trial or vacate the judgment n. o. v. on the basis of appellant's alleged after-discovered evidence.

However, appellant seeks to fit still a different string to his bow. Our understanding of appellant's position is that the after-discovered evidence became unnecessary in the court below because, by Rockwell's alleged admission that Bethlehem's policy against dealing through middlemen was irrelevant and immaterial, 'the sole basis for the judgment n. o. v. had been eliminated, leaving the Court no alternative but to vacate it.'

The answer to this contention by appellant is plainly and simply that Rockwell admitted no such thing. In its answer to appellant's petition for a new trial because of after-discovered evidence Rockwell repeatedly asserted that the reason for Bethlehem's refusal to roll appellant's ingots is irrelevant and immaterial; that the whole crux of the case in assumpsit is Bethlehem's refusal to deal through an intermediary regardless of its reasons therefor and appellant's consequent inability to perform his part of the agreement. By what can only be termed obtuse reasoning appellant has seized upon these averments to argue that Rockwell has admitted and agrees that the policy--not Bethlehem's reasons for the policy--is irrelevant and immaterial. Appellant has misconstrued the plain meaning of Rockwell's language and has gone on to reason that the judgment n. o. v. and this court's affirmance of that judgment n. o. v. was based on a ground that Rockwell now admits to be false.

We conclude that Rockwell used the best defense available to it in this action in assumpsit and that appellant has fallen far short of proving, either by his 'after-discovered' evidence, or by his claim that Rockwell now admits its defense in this case heretofore was false, that 'the lower court erred in not holding that a fraud upon the court had been perpetrated.'

Consequently, we hold that the lower court committed no error in dismissing appellant's petition: (1) because the petition was not timely filed; (2) because the evidence upon which it was based cannot qualify as after-discovered evidence and (3) because the crux of Rockwell's defense stands at present just as it stood at trial and upon the first appeal, i. e. that Bethlehem's refusal to deal through appellant, regardless of its reason therefor, prevented appellant's performance of its part of the agreement and justified Rockwell's cancellation thereof.

Appellant's second appeal is from the lower court's order granting the motions of both Rockwell and Bethlehem for judgment on the pleadings in his action in trespass against them for damages arising from an alleged conspiracy to defraud him of his commissions under his agreement with Rockwell. The lower court held: (1) that appellant's claim against Rockwell is barred under the doctrine of res judicata and (2) that appellant's action is barred by the Statute of Limitations which was raised as a defense by both parties. ³

We find no error in the lower court's ruling that the trespass action was barred as against Rockwell by the entry of the lower court judgment in the assumpsit action which judgment was affirmed by this court in Helmig v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co., supra. Appellant's position that there is no final judgment upon which the doctrine may operate is untenable. The finality and conclusiveness of the original judgment cannot be affected by a petition for new trial filed 17 months thereafter and subsequent to the affirmance of that judgment by this court. And, as Rockwell aptly points out in its brief, appellant's petition for a new trial was denied and his appeal from that order does not operate as a supersedeas.

In Re Wallace's Estate, 316 Pa. 148, 153, 174 A. 397, 399, this court stated: 'Broadly stated, the rule of res judicata is, that when a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a litigated cause on its merits, the judgment entered, until reversed, is, forever and under all circumstances, final and conclusive as between the parties to the suit and their privies, in respect to every fact which might properly be considered in reaching a judicial determination of the controversy, and in respect to all points of law there adjudged, as those points relate directly to the cause of action in litigation and affect the fund or other...