Helms v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 1:91-cv-1532-JEC.
| Decision Date | 04 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 1:91-cv-1532-JEC. |
| Citation | 806 F. Supp. 969 |
| Parties | Dorothy HELMS, Administrator for the Estate of Annie Fain and William Fain, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Dorothea L. Russell, Thomas F. Tierney, Decatur, Ga., for plaintiff.
Howard M. Lessinger, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.
This case is presently before the Court on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 19-1. The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out below, concludes that the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.
Based on the parties' statements of undisputed material facts and responses thereto, viewing all evidence and factual inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the following facts emerge as undisputed. On December 9, 1989, Ms. Dorothy Helms, a plaintiff in this case,1 drove her eighty year-old mother, Ms. Annie Fain, to the K-Mart store to shop for pistachio nuts. While they were inside K-Mart, it started snowing. (Helms deposition, pp. 6, 59). The plaintiff and her mother then decided to drive to a Wal-Mart store. During their twenty minute drive to Wal-Mart, it began snowing harder and, as they arrived at Wal-Mart, the snow was accumulating in the parking lot, where they parked in a handicapped parking space.2 (Helms deposition, pp. 65, 70).
As the plaintiff and her mother walked through the parking lot to the store the snow continued, turning somewhat to rain. (Helms deposition, p. 70-71). Approaching the store, the two women walked through the doors of Wal-Mart at about the same time as five or six other people. (Helms deposition, p. 71). They walked through an outer door which opened automatically, crossed a foyer area, and passed through an interior entrance door, as they hurried to get inside the store. (Helms deposition, pp. 73, 86-87). A step or two in front of her mother, with her back turned to her, (Helms deposition, p. 75), the plaintiff heard a noise and turned around to see that her mother had fallen. (Helms deposition, p. 78).3
During the morning, customers had been walking into the store, bumping their umbrellas onto the floor to remove the excess water. (Quinn deposition, p. 44). Accordingly, the greeter at the door of the Wal-Mart, Ms. Ola Quinn, had been dry-mopping the floor during the morning. If the mop became wet while she mopped, she would wring it out in a bucket. (Quinn deposition, p. 44). Ms. Quinn had just finished dry-mopping the floor when the plaintiff and Ms. Fain arrived.4 (Quinn deposition, p. 43).
In both parties' briefs, there is discussion concerning the existence, and legal significance of the existence, of mats. The testimony of Wal-Mart employees is uncontroverted that there were mats in the vestibule/foyer area of the store. (Anderson deposition, p. 12; Coffin deposition, p. 25).5 The testimony is in dispute as to the existence of mats at the inside entrance to the store, however. Although Wal-Mart employees all agree that the inside mats were there — (Quinn deposition, p. 42, Anderson deposition, p. 12; Coffin deposition, p. 26) — the plaintiff states emphatically that there were no mats at the inside entrance (Helms deposition, p. 86).
Although it appears that the existence of mats in the vestibule-foyer area is not in dispute, because defendant did not notice the existence of mats at that area in Defendant's Statement of Facts, and indeed argues that the question of mats has no factual or legal significance in this case # 28-2, the court does not include that factor in its own listing of material facts not in dispute.
With regard to the existence of signs warning of wet floor conditions wet floor signs, the defendant has noticed that as a fact not in dispute. ). All of the Wal-Mart employees who remembered the incident testified that the signs were on the doors entering the store and a standing sign was near the door. (Coffin deposition, p. 40; Anderson deposition, p. 21). Moreover, Ms. Quinn testified that she put up the signs that morning because she was aware of the bad weather. (Quinn deposition, p. 38).
Plaintiffs have denied this allegation. ). It is not clear whether, in her deposition testimony, plaintiff is asserting affirmatively that there were no warning signs or merely that she did not see any warning signs (Helms deposition, p. 72). Notwithstanding the consistent testimony of the employees, the court will draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party and, for purposes of this motion, assume that the signs were not present. Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1987).
Summary judgment is not properly viewed as a device that the trial court may, in its discretion, implement in lieu of a trial on the merits. Instead, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, as a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53.
The movant bears the initial responsibility of asserting the basis for his motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; APCOA, Inc. v. Fidelity National Bank, 906 F.2d 610, 611 (11th Cir.1990). However, the movant is not required to negate his opponent's claim. The movant may discharge his burden by merely "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. After the movant has carried his burden, the non-moving party is then required to "go beyond the pleading" and present competent evidence6 designating "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. While the court is to view all evidence and factual inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988), "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original).
A fact is material when it is identified by the controlling substantive law as an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. The nonmovant 7 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). An issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence, or if it is created by evidence that is "merely colorable" or is "not significantly probative." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with specific evidence of every element material to that party's case so as to create a genuine issue for trial.
In arguing for summary judgment, the defendant has cited to a long line of Georgia authority. In reply, the plaintiffs have cited to a few cases that appear inconsistent with the lengthy authority that otherwise strongly favors the defendant's position. Given the seeming difficulty in reconciling this authority, a court might deem it preferable to deny the motion for summary judgment and try the case to a jury, with the notion that the jury's decision could obviate the need for the court to determine which line of authority should govern the case. Yet, such a course likely would not render unnecessary the need to grapple with the Georgia law here, inasmuch as the court would expect the defendant to move for judgment as a matter of law at trial. Moreover, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not merely allow, but mandates, the entry of summary judgment in cases in which it is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
Accordingly, this court has carefully analyzed the somewhat conflicting Georgia authority in order to determine the appropriate principles of Georgia law that should govern this motion for summary judgment. Applying Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the applicable substantive law of the governing state jurisdiction, this court finds that summary judgment is appropriate.
Georgia has a long history of cases on rainy day slip and falls. The Georgia cases have held that a merchant is not the insurer for his customers for all injuries that they suffer on his property. E.g., Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga.App. 170, 138 S.E.2d 77 (1964). The cases hold that the basis of liability in a slip and fall case is the proprietor's superior knowledge of a perilous condition; yet, when it is raining, the customer and the proprietor have equal knowledge that the floor near the door may be wet from...
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...are not an exception to premises liability law, but rather an application of its well-settled principles. See Helms v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 806 F.Supp. 969, 973–975 (N.D.Ga.1992) (discussing Georgia's rainy day slip and fall authority). During rainy weather, it is common knowledge that so......
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