Helmsley v. City of Detroit, Michigan

Decision Date25 July 1963
Docket NumberNo. 15134.,15134.
Citation320 F.2d 476
PartiesHarry B. HELMSLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Michigan, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Henry J. Freud, Detroit, Mich. (James P. Mattimoe, Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellant.

Julius C. Pliskow, Detroit, Mich. (Robert Reese, Corp. Counsel, Vance G. Ingalls, Irving S. Wolfe, Nick Sacorafas, Assts. Corp. Counsel, City of Detroit, Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellee.

Before CECIL, Chief Judge, and MILLER and O'SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.

CECIL, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, in an action brought by the plaintiff under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Section 2201, Title 28, U.S.C.) to declare the assessments for 1960 and 1961 ad valorem taxes, on certain industrial real estate in the city of Detroit owned by plaintiff, as being in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Harry B. Helmsley, plaintiff-appellant, and City of Detroit, defendant-appellee, will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant, respectively.

The district judge acting sua sponte dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff claims jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of citizenship, the amount in controversy being in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs (Section 1332, Title 28, U.S.C.). He also claims jurisdiction by reason of the existence of a federal question under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (Section 1331, Title 28, U.S.C.)

The property in question as described in the complaint was purchased by a partnership of which the plaintiff was a member, for the sum of $500,000. At the time this action was commenced, the plaintiff had succeeded to the sole ownership. We will refer to him as the owner and purchaser. The property was described as an obsolete manufacturing plant, consisting of eleven factory buildings, an office building and a power house. It had been abandoned as a manufacturing plant by Murray Corporation of America in 1954. It is alleged that the only possible present use for the property is division into small or light industrial tenancies, and that even for such purpose part of it is unusable.

For the years in question, 1960 and 1961, the assessment for tax purposes was $3,532,350, of which amount $3,230,180 was for buildings and $302,170 was for land. On the basis of this assessment, the tax burden for the year 1961 was approximately $180,000. At the current level of taxes, the plaintiff suffered a loss of $360,000 in carrying the property from April 1, 1960, to July 1, 1961.

The plaintiff charges that the assessing officials of the city of Detroit are "wilfully and deliberately following an intentional and systematic plan to assess the property in a wrongful manner and without any regard whatever to its true cash value;" that their method "is arbitrary, capricious and based on fundamentally unsound principles;" and that the result is "so totally unreasonable as to constitute fraud in law." He further charges that while the assessors are wilfully assessing his property at seven times its cash value, they are wilfully assessing most Detroit property at an average of one-third to one-half of cash value.

Having exhausted all administrative remedies by timely and proper appeals to the Board of Review of the City of Detroit and to the State Tax Commission, the plaintiff sought relief in the United States District Court. The plaintiff claims that the action of the assessing officials deprives him of his property without compensation and without due process of law and denied him equal protection of the laws all in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The law of the state of Michigan and the city of Detroit provides that the assessment of all real and personal property for ad valorem taxes shall be uniform and at cash value. (Art. X, Secs. 3, 7, Mich.Const.; Title VI, Ch. II, Sec. 1, Charter, City of Detroit; Comp.L. Mich., 1948, Sec. 211.24, MSA Sec. 7.24) Cash value is defined as the price which could be obtained for the property at private sale and not at forced or auction sale. (Comp.L.Mich., 1948, Sec. 211.27, MSA Sec. 7.27) The plaintiff alleges that the property in question is assessed at over seven times its true cash value.

The defendant filed an answer, in which it was alleged inter alia, that the plaintiff had not resorted to "the plain, available and adequate remedy at law provided" by the Michigan statutes. This question arose at a pretrial conference and since the defendant did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint the trial judge considered the question sua sponte.

Section 1341, Title 28, U.S.C. (Johnson Act) provides, "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." Even though the plaintiff is not seeking to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under" the law of Michigan, it is the duty of a district judge to withhold relief by way of declaratory judgment where it appears that the taxpayer has an adequate remedy under state law. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407.

In Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525-526, 52 S.Ct. 217, 219-220, 76 L.Ed. 447, the court said: "The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it. Whenever the question has been presented, this Court has uniformly held that the mere illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax is not in itself a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States. If the remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete, the aggrieved party is left to that remedy in the state courts, from which the cause may be brought to this Court for review if any federal question be involved."

We turn now to the state remedies. In the first instance taxable property is assessed at its estimated true cash value. (Comp.L.Mich.1948, Sec. 211.24, MSA Sec. 7.24) This assessment is subject to review by a board of review on complaints of individual taxpayers. A further review may be had before the State Tax Commission. (Comp.L.Mich. 1948, Sec. 211.152, MSA Sec. 7.210) There is no provision for a judicial review from a decision of the commission. Its action is final. (Comp.L.Mich.1948, Sec. 211.152, MSA Sec. 7.210) Plaintiff has exhausted this avenue of relief. We do not find that review of the action of the commission by certiorari to the Supreme Court of Michigan, as suggested by counsel for the defendant, offers any real practical remedy. The cases1 cited by counsel in their brief do not support this procedure as an available remedy.

A taxpayer may obtain relief from illegal and discriminatory taxes by injunction in cases of fraud or where irreparable injury would result from payment of the tax. This remedy is available notwithstanding Section 211.114, Comp.L.Mich., 1948 (MSA Sec. 7.168) which provides that "no injunction shall issue to stay proceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes." Wyzlic v. City of Ironwood, 365 Mich. 87, 112 N.W.2d 94; United States Cold Storage Corp. v. Detroit Board of Assessors, 349 Mich. 81, 89, 84 N.W.2d 487; Haggerty v. City of Dearborn, 332 Mich. 304, 316, 51 N.W.2d 290; Sunday Lake Iron Company v. City of Wakefield, 323 Mich. 497, 506, 35 N.W.2d 470; Twenty-two Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 294 Mich. 275, 282, 293 N.W. 647; Sloman-Polk Co. v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich. 689, 247 N.W. 95, 87 A.L.R. 1294; Copper Range Co. v. Adams Township, 208 Mich. 209, 175 N.W. 282. The plaintiff has alleged fraud but if he is not able to establish this claim or cannot show that irreparable injury would result from payment of the tax there is a further remedy open to him.

This remedy appears to be adequate and complete. Comp.L.Mich.1948, Sec. 211.53, as amended by Pub.Acts 1962, No. 1332 (MSA Sec. 7.97), provides that a taxpayer may pay the tax under protest and bring suit for recovery of the tax paid. There are many cases in Michigan in which this remedy has been invoked. Davidson v. City of Lansing, 356 Mich. 697, 97 N.W.2d 592; Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. Township of Muskegon, 346 Mich. 16, 77 N.W.2d 255; Haggerty v. City of Dearborn, 332 Mich. 304, 51 N.W. 2d 290; Helin v. Grosse Pointe Township, 329 Mich. 396, 45 N.W.2d 338; Moran v. Grosse Pointe Township, 317 Mich. 248, 26 N.W.2d 763; Hudson Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, 282 Mich. 69, 275 N.W. 770, 113 A.L.R. 1472; S. S. Kresge Co. v. City of Detroit, 276 Mich. 565, 268 N.W. 740, 107 A.L.R. 1258.

The tenor of the opinions in these cases may be stated as follows: "Under the Constitution and laws of this State, the final arbiter of value for taxing purposes which, when it has jurisdiction, determines the same finally and conclusively, is the State tax commission." Hudson Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, 282 Mich. 69, 81, 275 N.W. 770, 775.

In Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. Township of Muskegon, 346 Mich. 16, 20, 77 N.W.2d 255, 257, the Court, quoting from the syllabi of S. S. Kresge Company v. City of Detroit, 276 Mich. 565, 268 N.W. 740, stated the general rule: "`Assessments of properties for purposes of taxation will not be disturbed by courts unless they are so at variance with undisputed facts as to be a fraud upon the taxpayer, notwithstanding courts might disagree with conclusions of...

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