Helton v. State
| Decision Date | 29 October 1958 |
| Citation | 106 So.2d 79 |
| Parties | C. H. HELTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, and R. O. Culver, as Custodian of Florida State Prison, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Philip D. Beall, Pensacola, for petitioner.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
On December 14, 1944, petitioner was adjudged guilty of the offense of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, the petitioner having entered a plea of guilty to the charge. The trial judge withheld the imposition of sentence against petitioner, then aged 16, 'from day to day and term to term, until further order of the court.' Some twelve years later, on April 22, 1957, the trial judge sentenced the petitioner to serve a term of four years in the state prison for the aforementioned crime. By petition for the writ of habeas corpus the petitioner attacked the legality of his detention, his principal contention being that the trial judge was without authority to withhold indefinitely the imposition of sentence in the manner here attempted and sentence him twelve years later for his crime. The writ issued as prayed, and upon consideration of the writ and the return thereto filed by the respondent, this court entered an order discharging the petitioner from custody. This opinion is now filed in explanation of the court's previous order of discharge.
In Bateh v. State, Fla.App., 101 So.2d 869, the District Court of Appeal for the First District considered the exact question presented here. In a well-reasoned opinion the District Court, speaking through Judge Wigginton, discussed the common law and the decisions of this court from which evolved the theory that a trial judge was authorized to suspend or withhold indefinitely the imposition of sentence upon a convicted criminal. It was pointed out therein that in 1941, by Ch. 20519, Acts of 1941, now appearing as Ch. 948, Fla.Stat.1957, F.S.A., the Legislature sanctioned the practice theretofore engaged in by trial judges in this state of suspending the imposition of sentence upon a convicted criminal, but accompanied such sanction with a mandate that the court 'shall place (the defendant) upon probation under the supervision and control of the parole commission for the duration of such probation * * *', § 948.01(3), Fla.Stat.1957, F.S.A. So that there could be no doubt of its intention to limit the suspension power theretofore exercised by trial judges, it was expressly provided in § 948.01(4) that 'In no case shall the imposition of sentence be suspended and the defendant thereupon placed on probation unless such defendant be placed under the custody of said parole commission * * *.'
Thus, regardless of whether the practice as it existed in this state prior to 1941 was lawful, it is clear that since that date the power to suspend the imposition of sentence upon a convicted criminal can be exercised by a trial judge only as an incident to probation under the provisions of Ch. 948, supra. And insofar as the decisions of this court in Collingsworth v. Mayo, Fla.1955, 77 So.2d 843, and the cases cited therein, may be construed to hold to the contrary they are hereby modified.
This is not to say that the trial judge may not withhold temporarily, or even from term to term, the imposition of sentence 'for the purpose of determining motions and other matters arising between verdict and judgment, such as gaining information necessary to the imposition of a just sentence; or during the pendency of other charges, or for other good and valid reasons.' Bateh v. State, supra (101 So.2d 874). And we hold only, as did the District Court, that 'a trial court cannot by the artifice of postponing the pronouncement of sentence exercise the power to conditionally parole or pardon a defendant who stands convicted of a crime.'
The question then arises as to whether the trial judge had jurisdiction to revoke the order illegally suspending the imposition of sentence and to pronounce sentence upon the petitioner. While there is some conflict among the courts of other jurisdictions, we think the better view is that the court does not lose jurisdiction to impose a lawful sentence even though the term during which the defendant was convicted and the illegal order was entered has passed. For decisions supporting this view see Miller v. Aderhold, 1933, 288...
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People v. Harper
...probation) which could have been imposed at the time sentence should have been pronounced on the violation at issue here. See Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla.). Furthermore, imposition of sentence after an unreasonable delay offends the principle of the separation of powers. First, the s......
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Gordon v. State, 1335
...he does not stand convicted as contemplated by the statute. Appellant relies on Bateh v. State, Fla.App., 101 So.2d 869, Helton v. State, Fla., 106 So.2d 79, and State v. Bateh, Fla., 110 So.2d 7, wherein certiorari was granted and the writ discharged. The cases do not involve the same ques......
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State v. Calabaza
...circumstances due to the passage of time. We are not persuaded by the cases Defendant cites from other jurisdictions. In Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79, 79 (Fla.1958), the sentencing court had withheld sentencing the defendant “from day to day and term to term, until further order of the cou......
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Buckbee v. State
...1979); Stuart v. State, 353 So.2d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); see Bouie v. State, 360 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); cf. also Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1958). As was stated in the more general terms of the doctrine which precludes the successful assertion of inconsistent positions ......