Helvering v. National Grocery Co 8212 11, 1938
Decision Date | 16 May 1938 |
Docket Number | No. 723,723 |
Citation | 304 U.S. 282,58 S.Ct. 932,82 L.Ed. 1346 |
Parties | HELVERING, Com'r of Internal Revenue, v. NATIONAL GROCERY CO. * Argued April 8—11, 1938 |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. James W. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Webster Atwell, of Dallas Tex., for petitioner.
Mr. J. D. Carpenter, Jr., of Jersey City, N.J., for respondent.
National Grocery Company is a New Jersey corporation, which operates chain stores. Since 1911 it has had $200,000 capital stock, all owned beneficially by Henry Kohl. In the year ending January 31, 1931, the corporation's books showed a net profit of.$682,850.38, after paying $104,000 to Kohl as salary and the regular federal corporation income tax of 12 per cent. Its surplus, as shown by its books, increased during the year from $7,245,824.26 to $7,938,965.54; that is $693,141.28. It paid no dividend.
Section 104 of the Revenue Act of 1928, c. 852, 45 Stat. 814, 26 U.S.C.A. § 104 note, provides:
'(a) If any corporation, however created or organized, is formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders through the medium of permitting its gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed, there shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the net income of such corporation a tax equal to 50 per centum of the amount thereof, which shall be in addition to the tax imposed by section 13 * * *.
'(b) The fact * * * that the gains or profits are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business, shall be prima facie evidence of a purpose to escape the surtax.'
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, having found that the corporation had been availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon Kohl by permitting the gains and profits to accumulate, assessed upon it, under section 104, a deficiency tax of $477,322.81 for the tax year, in addition to the regular corporation income tax, which had been paid. This amount, together with $37.87 admittedly due, constitutes the total deficiency assessment of $477,360.68.
The corporation petitioned for a redetermination by the Board of Tax Appeals. Before the Board a large volume of evidence was introduced which had not been submitted to the Commissioner. It detailed, among other things, the financial history of the business from its inception. There were thirty-five elaborate exhibits, many of them prepared from the books with the co-operation of the counsel for the corporation and for the Commissioner. Twenty-four of the exhibits were introduced by the taxpayer; eleven by the Commissioner. The taxpayer also presented as witnesses Kohl and the treasurer of the corporation, who testified orally to the history of the business, its practices and aims; local bank officials who testified as experts to the wisdom of accumulating the profits; and other experts who testified to the depreciation in 1930 of the market value of the securities held by the corporation and of its real estate. The Board, by a bare majority,1 sustained the Commissioner's determination. In stating its conclusions, it found as folow s:
'We find as a fact that the petitioner's accumulation of earnings was far in excess of the 'reasonable needs' of the corporate business.
'We are also of opinion that the evidence of record does not rebut the prima facie presumption created by the statute that the accumulation of earnings beyond the 'reasonable needs of the business' was for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its sole stockholder. * * *
'Upon the evidence before us we have made the finding that the petitioner was 'availed of' during the fiscal year ended January 31, 1931, for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its sole stockholder 'through the medium of permitting its gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.'
The corporation then petitioned for a review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. It reversed the order of the Board; and did so on the ground that there was before the Board 'no proof, substantial or otherwise, to support its imposition of' the tax (page 935 of 92 F.2d). Certiorari was sought by the Commissioner, who urged that in so deciding the court had departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. We granted certiorari because of the importance in the administration of the revenue laws of the matter presented. 303 U.S. 630, 58 S.Ct. 645, 82 L.Ed. —-.
The corporation makes here two contentions in support of the judgment which were not discussed by the Court of Appeals. It challenges the constitutionality of the statute and also urges that in holding that there were 'gains and profits' the Commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals misconstrued the statute. These contentions will be considered before examining the alleged lack of evidence to support the findings of the Board.
First. The National Grocery Company concedes that section 104 is constitutional as applied to a corporation organized for the purpose of preventing the imposition of surtaxes upon its shareholders;2 but urges five reasons why it should be held void as applied to a legitimate business corporation which is 'availed of' for the forbidden purpose. None of these reasons is sound.
1. It is said that the statute violates the Tenth Amendment because it interferes with the power to declare or to withhold dividends—a power which the State conferred upon the corporation. The statute in no way limits the powers of the corporation. It merely lays the tax upon corporations which use their powers to prevent imposition upon their stockholders of the federal surtaxes. 'Congress in raising revenue has incidental power to de- feat obstructions to that incidence of taxes which it chooses to impose.' United Business Corporation v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 62 F.2d 754, 756.
Kohl's personal income tax for the calendar year 1931 was $32,034.74. If he had included in his personal return of taxable income the corporation's entire net income for the fiscal year 1930-1931, an additional tax upon him of over $115,000 would have been due;3 and no tax would have been assessable against the corporation under section 104. For the statute expressly provides, in paragraph (d), that the corporation shall not be so taxed, if the stockholders make the return required to ensure the surtax:
2. It is said that the statute is unconstitutional because the liability imposed is not a tax upon income, but a penalty designed to force corporations to distribute earnings in order to create a basis for taxation against the stockholders. If the business had been carried on by Kohl individually all the year's profits would have been taxable to him. If, having a partner, the business had been carried on as a partnership, all the year's profits would have been taxable to the partners individually, although these had been retained by the partnership undistributed. See Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 58 S.Ct. 926, 82 L.Ed. —-, decided May 16, 1938. Kohl, the sole owner of the business, could not by conducting it as a corporation, prevent Congress, if it chose to do so, from laying on him individually the tax on the year's profits. 4 If it preferred, Congress could lay the tax upon the corporation, as was done by section 104. The penal nature of the imposition does not prevent its being valid, as the tax was otherwise permissible under the Constitution. Compare Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917.
3. It is said that section 104 is unconstitutional because the liability is laid upon the mere purpose to prevent imposition of the surtaxes, not upon the accomplishment of that purpose; and that, thus, it is a direct tax on the state of mind. But this is not so. The tax is laid 'upon the net income of such corporation.' The existence of the defined purpose is a condition precedent to the imposition of the tax liability, but this does not prevent it from being a true income tax within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. The instances are many in which purpose or state of mind determines the incidence of an income tax.5
4. It is said that section 104 as applied deprived the corporation of its property without due process of law; that it is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious in that no stand- ard or formula is specified to guide the Commissioner in assessing, or the corporate directors in avoiding, the additional tax; that it is assessed retroactively; and that it is unfair to non-assenting minority stockholders. The prescribed standard is not too vague. As Judge Learned Hand said in United Business Corporation v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 62 F.2d 754, 756: ...
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