Helwick v. Laird, 30059.
Decision Date | 16 February 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 30059.,30059. |
Citation | 438 F.2d 959 |
Parties | Private Michael Leonard HELWICK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Melvin LAIRD as Secretary of Defense et al., Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Maury Maverick, Jr., San Antonio, Tex., for appellant.
Seagal V. Wheatley, U. S. Atty., Hugh P. Shovlin, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for appellees.
Before WISDOM, THORNBERRY, and DYER, Circuit Judges.
Private Michael Leonard Helwick appeals from an order of the district court denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Army wrongfully denied his application for discharge from the service as a conscientious objector. We reverse and remand with directions that the district court grant Helwick's prayer for habeas corpus relief.
Helwick was inducted into the United States Army on September 29, 1969. Before induction, he applied for and received a I-A-O classification as a conscientious objector1 from his local draft board. On January 15, 1970, however, he filed an application with the Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for discharge as a I-O conscientious objector.2
While in graduate school, Helwick applied for and obtained a I-A-O classification as a conscientious objector from his local draft board. He explained that action in this way: although morally opposed to participation in combat as contrary to the Christian principle of love, he believed that it was in accordance with Christian principles to participate as a noncombatant in the medical branch of the Army. He found the medical branch acceptable to his religious beliefs because he thought "its main purpose was a loving concern to heal the injured participants of war."
In September 1969 Helwick was inducted into the Army and sent to basic training at the United States Army Medical Training Center at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. As a result of his experience at the special training center for noncombatants, his view of the Medical Corps changed:
This change of view prompted Helwick to apply in January 1970 for discharge under Army Regulation 635-20 as a I-O conscientious objector — i. e., one conscientiously opposed to both combatant and noncombatant military service.3 AR 635-20 sets forth the policy, criteria, and procedures for the disposition of conscientious objector claims of active military personnel. The Regulation requires the Army to consider "requests for separation based on bona fide conscientious objection to participation in war, in any form, when such objection develops subsequent to entry into the active military service." AR 635-20(3) (a). To coordinate with the Selective Service System, however, the Army will not consider claims based on conscientious objection growing out of experiences before entering military service unless that objection did not become fixed until after entry into the service. AR 635-20(3) (b).
Under the Regulation, a chaplain, a psychiatrist, and a hearing officer interviewed Helwick. Based on the results of these interviews and Helwick's statements in his application, his unit commander recommended disapproval of Helwick's application. Helwick's battalion commander, the Medical Training Center commander, and the post commander routinely endorsed the recommendation of the unit commander and forwarded Helwick's application to the Conscientious Objector Review Board.
On March 24, 1970, the Conscientious Objector Review Board denied Helwick's request for discharge as a I-O conscientious objector. In a written opinion the Board assigned two grounds for its decision: (1) that Helwick does not "truly hold" views against participation in war in any form which are derived from religious training and belief, and (2) that Helwick's views have not changed subsequent to his I-A-O classification and entry into military service so as to entitle him to discharge under AR 635-20(3) (b).
Helwick filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus April 13, 1970, in the district court on the ground that the Army wrongfully denied his application for discharge as a I-O conscientious objector. Finding a basis in fact for the conclusions of the Board, the district court denied the petition, and Helwick appealed. See Helwick v. Laird, W.D.Tex.1970, 318 F.Supp. 878.
Federal courts have a narrow range within which to review the conscientious objector claims of active military personnel. As in the case of conscientious objector claims presented to local draft boards before induction, our scope of review is limited to ascertaining whether there is any basis in fact for the Army's finding that an individual has not presented a valid conscientious objector claim. Pitcher v. Laird, 5 Cir. 1970, 421 F.2d 1272, 1278. See also Application of Tavlos, 5 Cir. 1970, 429 F.2d 859, 861; Bates v. Commander, First Coast Guard Dist., 1 Cir. 1969, 413 F.2d 475, 477.
Our first task in this case, therefore, is to determine whether there was any basis in fact for the Board's finding that Helwick does not truly hold views against participation in war in any form which are derived from religious training and belief.
The Board deliberately chose not to challenge the "religious" nature of Helwick's professed views. We have no doubt, however, that the Board seriously considered the issue, inasmuch as several of the endorsements in Helwick's application expressed doubt as to whether his views were sufficiently "religious." Apparently the Board resolved the issue in Helwick's favor. Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Welsh v. United States, 1970, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308, and United States v. Seeger, 1965, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733, and our decision in Pitcher v. Laird, 5 Cir. 1970, 421 F.2d 1272, that was a wise choice.
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