Helwick v. Laird, 30059.

Decision Date16 February 1971
Docket NumberNo. 30059.,30059.
Citation438 F.2d 959
PartiesPrivate Michael Leonard HELWICK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Melvin LAIRD as Secretary of Defense et al., Respondents-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Maury Maverick, Jr., San Antonio, Tex., for appellant.

Seagal V. Wheatley, U. S. Atty., Hugh P. Shovlin, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for appellees.

Before WISDOM, THORNBERRY, and DYER, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

Private Michael Leonard Helwick appeals from an order of the district court denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Army wrongfully denied his application for discharge from the service as a conscientious objector. We reverse and remand with directions that the district court grant Helwick's prayer for habeas corpus relief.

I.

Helwick was inducted into the United States Army on September 29, 1969. Before induction, he applied for and received a I-A-O classification as a conscientious objector1 from his local draft board. On January 15, 1970, however, he filed an application with the Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for discharge as a I-O conscientious objector.2

In his request for discharge as a I-O conscientious objector, Helwick set out the basis for his claim. He was the son of Roman Catholic parents and raised as a devout Catholic. He attended Catholic elementary and secondary schools and entered a Catholic university. As a youth, however, he was not entirely happy with his religious training. He resented "the depersonalized nature of the institutionalized church" and the church's "overstressing of the negative side of the religious life". Upon entering college he severed his connections with the Catholic church. This too was unsatisfactory in terms of living with himself. Unhappy with his state of mind, he became attracted once again to the fundamental religious principles he had learned as a youth. In his own words,

I now saw that the only way to true happiness was to be found in showing a loving concern for my fellow man — in adhering to the Christian principles which had been imbedded in me when I was young. I now saw Christian religious principles as a positive force, rather than as a negative one as I had in my youth. From all my previous religious training, I sifted out what I felt to be the essential part of all my training — namely, the Christian principle of love. This became my guiding religious principle, and I resolved to use this religious principle to determine how I would conduct my life in the future.

While in graduate school, Helwick applied for and obtained a I-A-O classification as a conscientious objector from his local draft board. He explained that action in this way: although morally opposed to participation in combat as contrary to the Christian principle of love, he believed that it was in accordance with Christian principles to participate as a noncombatant in the medical branch of the Army. He found the medical branch acceptable to his religious beliefs because he thought "its main purpose was a loving concern to heal the injured participants of war."

In September 1969 Helwick was inducted into the Army and sent to basic training at the United States Army Medical Training Center at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. As a result of his experience at the special training center for noncombatants, his view of the Medical Corps changed:

Since I entered the army, however, my belief as to what constitutes following the Christian principle of love has changed. My belief now is that to participate in the military in any way — even in the noncombat elements of the medical branch — is contrary to the principle of Christian love. This is so because my time in the army has made me realize that, without the medical branch, there can be no army — that, by participating even in the noncombat elements of the medical branch, I am personally allowing the army to carry on in its function of killing human beings. I realize that my purpose is not really to give loving care to the injured but to aid in insuring that the continuous cycle of killing never stops. I now realize that the army is a complex organization made up of many parts, all functioning together as a whole. Without any one of these parts, it cannot function properly. The medical branch is simply one of the parts without which the army cannot function. It is just as much a part of the army as the infantry, which carries on the fighting. This is dramatically illustrated to the motto of the Army Medical Service: "To conserve the fighting strength."
Consequently, I now find participation in the army in any capacity — even the noncombat elements of the medical branch — contrary to my religious beliefs.

This change of view prompted Helwick to apply in January 1970 for discharge under Army Regulation 635-20 as a I-O conscientious objector — i. e., one conscientiously opposed to both combatant and noncombatant military service.3 AR 635-20 sets forth the policy, criteria, and procedures for the disposition of conscientious objector claims of active military personnel. The Regulation requires the Army to consider "requests for separation based on bona fide conscientious objection to participation in war, in any form, when such objection develops subsequent to entry into the active military service." AR 635-20(3) (a). To coordinate with the Selective Service System, however, the Army will not consider claims based on conscientious objection growing out of experiences before entering military service unless that objection did not become fixed until after entry into the service. AR 635-20(3) (b).

Under the Regulation, a chaplain, a psychiatrist, and a hearing officer interviewed Helwick. Based on the results of these interviews and Helwick's statements in his application, his unit commander recommended disapproval of Helwick's application. Helwick's battalion commander, the Medical Training Center commander, and the post commander routinely endorsed the recommendation of the unit commander and forwarded Helwick's application to the Conscientious Objector Review Board.

On March 24, 1970, the Conscientious Objector Review Board denied Helwick's request for discharge as a I-O conscientious objector. In a written opinion the Board assigned two grounds for its decision: (1) that Helwick does not "truly hold" views against participation in war in any form which are derived from religious training and belief, and (2) that Helwick's views have not changed subsequent to his I-A-O classification and entry into military service so as to entitle him to discharge under AR 635-20(3) (b).

Helwick filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus April 13, 1970, in the district court on the ground that the Army wrongfully denied his application for discharge as a I-O conscientious objector. Finding a basis in fact for the conclusions of the Board, the district court denied the petition, and Helwick appealed. See Helwick v. Laird, W.D.Tex.1970, 318 F.Supp. 878.

II.

Federal courts have a narrow range within which to review the conscientious objector claims of active military personnel. As in the case of conscientious objector claims presented to local draft boards before induction, our scope of review is limited to ascertaining whether there is any basis in fact for the Army's finding that an individual has not presented a valid conscientious objector claim. Pitcher v. Laird, 5 Cir. 1970, 421 F.2d 1272, 1278. See also Application of Tavlos, 5 Cir. 1970, 429 F.2d 859, 861; Bates v. Commander, First Coast Guard Dist., 1 Cir. 1969, 413 F.2d 475, 477.

Our first task in this case, therefore, is to determine whether there was any basis in fact for the Board's finding that Helwick does not truly hold views against participation in war in any form which are derived from religious training and belief.

At the outset of this proceeding there seems to have been some dispute as to whether this finding by the Board was a comment on Helwick's sincerity or the "religious" quality of his views. A review of the Boards written opinion, however, makes it clear that the Board meant to hold only that Helwick does not "sincerely" hold his professed views. For example, the Board writes,

Sincerity is a threshold determination in each conscientious objector case, and as the Board determines this issue against Helwick, his request for discharge under AR 635-20 may not be favorably considered. * * * The Board does not go into the issue whether or not Helwick\'s views are religious within the requirements of AR 635-20. * * * This matter is mentioned only with respect to the issue of Helwick\'s sincerity and not with respect to the issue of religion per se.

The Board deliberately chose not to challenge the "religious" nature of Helwick's professed views. We have no doubt, however, that the Board seriously considered the issue, inasmuch as several of the endorsements in Helwick's application expressed doubt as to whether his views were sufficiently "religious." Apparently the Board resolved the issue in Helwick's favor. Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Welsh v. United States, 1970, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308, and United States v. Seeger, 1965, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733, and our decision in Pitcher v. Laird, 5 Cir. 1970, 421 F.2d 1272, that was a wise choice.

Therefore, in this case — indeed, as in all conscientious objector cases — the threshold question for review is the sincerity of the claimant in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in war in any form. Sincerity is of course a subjective question. Witmer v. United States, 1955, 348 U.S. 375, 381-82, 75 S. Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428, 434; United States v. Gernannt, 5 Cir. 1970, 427 F.2d 1157, 1159; United States v. Evans, 9 Cir. 1970, 425 F.2d 302, 305. Nevertheless, despite the narrow scope of review afforded the federal courts on the issue of sincerity, the Conscientious Objector Review...

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