Hembeau v. Great Camp of Knights of Maccabees

• Decision Date: 16 June 1894
• Citation: 59 N.W. 417,101 Mich. 161
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: HEMBEAU v. GREAT CAMP OF KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES.

59 N.W. 417

101 Mich. 161

HEMBEAU v. GREAT CAMP OF KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 16, 1894

Error to circuit court, Saginaw county; Robert B. McKnight, Judge.

Action by John H. Hembeau against the Great Camp of Knights of Maccabees. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Rowland Connor, for appellant.

Durand & Carton, for appellee.

MONTGOMERY J.

The defendant is a fraternal and mutual benefit association doing business on the assessment plan. It pays beneficiaries of the class to which deceased belonged $1,000 in case of death. By the laws of the order, beneficiaries are confined to widows, relatives within the first degree of kinship, and to dependents. Alexander Coderre became a member of the order in 1889, and named the present plaintiff as beneficiary claiming that he was a dependent. Coderre died July 16, 1892. Proofs of death were made by plaintiff. The executive committee of the order which passes on death claims refused to allow the claim of plaintiff, on the ground that plaintiff was not, and never had been, a dependent of Coderre. On appeal to the Great Camp, this action of the executive committee was sustained. Plaintiff then brought the present suit in the circuit court for the county of Saginaw and on the trial the circuit judge directed a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that, by his contract, the plaintiff was precluded from maintaining the action. Among the laws of the order at the time that Coderre became a member of the defendant, and also in force at the time of his death, was section 83, which provides: "The executive committee shall have power to pass on all death claims; and if, in their judgment, any such claim is not, on its face, a valid one, they shall notify the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the deceased member thereof, and give them or their attorneys an opportunity to appear before such committee within sixty days thereafter, and present such evidences as they may have to establish the justness of said claim; and the said committee shall try, hear, and decide upon the justness or validity of such claim, and such decision shall be binding on such claimant, unless an appeal is taken to the Great Camp. The notice of the appeal from the decision of the executive committee must be filed with the great record keeper within sixty days thereafter. The decision of the Great Camp in all such cases shall be final, and no suit at law or equity shall be commenced or maintained by any member or beneficiary against the Great Camp."

We think the ruling of the circuit judge was in accordance with the holdings of this court in Canfield v. Great Camp of Knights of Maccabees, 87 Mich. 626, 49 N.W. 875, and Van Poucke v. Society, 63 Mich. 378, 29 N.W. 863. An attempt has been made to distinguish this case, but we do not discover any difference in principle between the Canfield Case and the present. That was a death claim and the plaintiff was wholly defeated. It was sought to try by the suit at law the question of whether his policy was binding at the time of the death. The only possible difference between that and the present case is that in the present case the determination of the Great Camp was that the policy never was of binding force. But this is not sufficient to distinguish the cases in principle. The plaintiff contends that this law of the order is invalid as against public policy, for the reason that it attempts to oust the courts of jurisdiction. The same point was made in the Canfield Case, and, while it was not much discussed, this court held that the case was controlled by the Van Poucke Case. The holding of the courts places contracts of this nature by which one becomes a member of a mutual association, and entitled to benefits in case of disability, or whose heirs are entitled to benefits in case of death, as upon a different footing than ordinary contracts between individuals. As was said in the case of Rood v. Benefit Ass'n, 31 F. 63: "This is a purely voluntary association. The members of this association have, by their own organic law, provided a tribunal to hear and determine all claims against...