Hemenway v. Rock Cnty. , 18-cv-307-jdp
| Decision Date | 19 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | 18-cv-307-jdp |
| Parties | STEPHANIE HEMENWAY, Plaintiff, v. ROCK COUNTY and AMY SPODEN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Plaintiff Stephanie Hemenway, a former deputy at the Rock County Sheriff's Office, is suing the county's HR director, defendant Amy Spoden, under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and defendant Rock County under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). Hemenway alleges that she suffered a disability because of head and knee injuries and needed to take medical leave, but that Spoden denied her leave and that the county failed to accommodate her disability and then terminated her for complaining about it.
Defendants move to dismiss Hemenway's ADA retaliation claim and her FMLA claims.1 Dkt. 5. They contend that Hemenway has not plausibly alleged facts sufficient to state these claims and that Spoden, as a public agency supervisor, cannot be held individually liable under the FMLA. Defendants also move to strike Hemenway's request for punitive damages and damages for emotional distress and loss of reputation under the FMLA. Hemenway concedes that punitive damages and damages for emotional distress and loss of reputation are not available under the FMLA. Dkt. 13, at 10. So the court will grant that part of defendants'motion. But the court will deny the motion as to the underlying FMLA claims and ADA retaliation claim.
The court draws the following facts from Hemenway's complaint, Dkt. 1, and accepts them as true for the purpose of deciding defendants' motion. Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas, LLC, 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016).
Hemenway was a sheriff's deputy in the Rock County Sheriff's Office. In May 2016, Hemenway was in a "squad accident." Dkt. 1, ¶ 4. Hemenway does not explain what a "squad accident" is, but the exact nature of the accident is not important at this stage. As a result of the accident, she suffered from, and continues to suffer from, concussion-related symptoms. In January 2017, Hemenway was placed on light duty status because she had frequent headaches, memory loss, and sleep deprivation, which made it difficult to complete job tasks.
In February, Hemenway slipped on ice and injured her knee. After a month of recovery, she returned to work in March and continued to work until she underwent knee surgery in April.
Prior to her surgery, Hemenway submitted an FMLA leave form to the county's HR director, defendant Amy Spoden. The form included medical certifications that said that Hemenway could not work for 12 weeks, from April 18, 2017 to July 10, 2017. The certification further indicated that the surgeon would reevaluate Hemenway on July 3 and determine whether she could then return to work.
Hemenway went on FMLA leave. But Spoden ordered Hemenway to return to work prematurely on June 28. Hemenway returned and worked until July 3, when the surgeonreevaluated Hemenway and told her not to work. After the evaluation, Spoden informed Hemenway that if she did not work, she would no longer receive temporary total disability payments.
Spoden then contacted Hemenway's surgeon to discuss accommodations that the county could provide Hemenway. After this discussion, the surgeon approved Hemenway's return to work. Hemenway did not give prior consent for Spoden to contact her health care provider.
Hemenway returned to work for two days, until a doctor reevaluated her ongoing concussion-related issues. Again, Hemenway's doctor said she could not work. Hemenway met with the chief deputy of the sheriff's office, who told her that she could use sick time and vacation time to take paid leave, so that is what she did.
While on sick leave, Hemenway was still required to fill out weekly time-off requests. But the medication that Hemenway took for her concussion symptoms made her sleepy, and this impeded her ability to fill out the requests. So the county allowed Hemenway to use an administrative assistant to fill out her requests.
Spoden again contacted Hemenway's doctor without prior consent from Hemenway. The doctor sent Spoden paperwork indicating that Hemenway could not work until at least September 13, when she was scheduled for another medical evaluation.
On August 24, Spoden contacted the sheriff's office and told it to send a letter to Hemenway stating that she would be terminated unless she returned to work on August 28. A sergeant at the sheriff's office called Hemenway and told her to return to work. But at that time, Hemenway was in Nashville with her friends. So she asked for a request to take vacationtime. Although the county had previously granted similar requests for other employees, it denied Hemenway's request. Hemenway flew back to Wisconsin and returned to work.
Hemenway worked until August 30, when her doctor again wrote to the county and said that Hemenway could not work until at least September 13. The sheriff's office then launched an internal investigation into Hemenway for various rule violations, including failing to complete time sheets and taking vacation without prior approval. Hemenway complained that she had received approval to have an administrative assistant fill out timesheets, and she told investigators that she was being harassed and discriminated against because of her injuries and their accompanying disabilities. The investigation resulted in Hemenway's termination.
Hemenway brings four claims against defendants. She claims that Amy Spoden interfered with her right to take FMLA leave and retaliated against her for exercising her FMLA rights. She claims that Rock County failed to accommodate her disability as required by the ADA and retaliated against her when she complained of ADA violations. Defendants move to dismiss all claims except for the ADA accommodation claim. They contend that Hemenway's FMLA claims fail because Spoden is not an employer within the meaning of the FMLA, and that Hemenway has failed to allege facts sufficient to plausibly state an FMLA claim or an ADA retaliation claim.
The court will deny the motion. The FMLA defines employer broadly, and its plain language states that individual supervisors, including public agency supervisors like Spoden, can be held individually liable. As for whether Hemenway's allegations state a claim,Hemenway has met her burden to plead facts sufficient to plausibly state claims for retaliation under the ADA and interference and retaliation under the FMLA.
Throughout their briefing, defendants contend that Hemenway's allegations are insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). But even after Twombly and Iqbal, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only that a complaint (1) give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests; and (2) plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level. Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 812 F.3d 599, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2016). Although the court is not bound to accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions or conclusory allegations, "[a] complaint that invokes a recognized legal theory . . . and contains plausible allegations on the material issues . . . cannot be dismissed under Rule 12." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2012). The court will review Hemenway's allegations under this standard.
Defendants contend that Hemenway cannot assert FMLA claims against Spoden because (1) public officials are not employers under the FMLA; and (2) even if public officials can be held liable under the FMLA, Hemenway has not alleged facts sufficient to show that Spoden was her employer. The court will address each issue in turn.
The FMLA's definition of employer is broad and includes a provision extending individual liability to persons acting in the employer's interests. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii).But there is a circuit split regarding whether this provision applies to public agency supervisors like Spoden. The courts of appeals for the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit have held that it does, Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012); Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2006); Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2002), but courts for the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit have held that it does not. Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2003); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683 (11th Cir. 1999). And although the court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit has implied that public officials can be held individually liable, See Horwitz v. Bd. of Educ. of Avoca Sch. Dist. No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 610 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001), it has never ruled on the issue nor discussed it in depth.
Because this is an issue of statutory construction, the court must begin with the language of the statute itself and, if that language is plain, the court enforces it "according to its terms." In re Crane, 742 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 954 (7th Cir.2004)). The FMLA defines employer as follows:
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A).
The statute defines employer to include both any public agency, id. § 2611(4)(A...
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