Hempfield Tp. v. Hapchuk
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
| Writing for the Court | Before PALLADINO and PELLEGRINI, JJ., and NARICK; NARICK |
| Citation | Hempfield Tp. v. Hapchuk, 620 A.2d 668, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 173 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) |
| Decision Date | 22 March 1993 |
| Parties | HEMPFIELD TOWNSHIP v. George HAPCHUK and Ellen I. Hapchuk, his wife, Appellants. |
George Hapchuk and Ellen I. Hapchuk, pro se.
Francis R. Murrman for appellee.
Before PALLADINO and PELLEGRINI, JJ., and NARICK, Senior Judge.
George and Ellen I. Hapchuk appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County that granted Hempfield Township's complaint in equity requesting an injunction against Hapchuks. We reverse.
In 1987, Hapchuks purchased 107 acres of farm property in Hempfield Township, part zoned residential (R-1) and part zoned agricultural (A-1). 1 The property has been actively farmed by Hapchuks or their predecessors-in-title for the past fifty years. Prior to the filing of the Township's complaint, the Hapchuks had obtained a permit from the Department of Environmental Resources (DER), which authorized the agricultural utilization of sewage sludge on 31.77 acres of their property. The permit covers not only a part of the property zoned A-1, but also a portion of the property that is zoned R-1. The sole area of dispute is the R-1 portion of Hapchuks' property upon which they agriculturally utilize sludge pursuant to their DER permit.
After learning of Hapchuks' DER permit, the Township filed a complaint in equity, requesting an injunction against the utilization of the sewage sludge on the portion of the property zoned R-1. The zoning ordinance does not specifically permit the spreading of sewage sludge in areas zoned R-1. 2
Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order permanently enjoining Hapchuks from conducting the agricultural utilization of sludge operation upon that portion of their property which had been zoned R-1. The trial court held that: 1) prohibition of Hapchuks' operations on their R-1 property was not an impermissible exercise of zoning power; and 2) the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA), Act of July 7, 1980, P.L. 380, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 6018.101-6018.1003, did not preempt the zoning ordinance.
On appeal, 3 Hapchuks argue that the trial court erred in: 1) granting the injunction because SWMA preempts the Township's zoning ordinance; 2) failing to find that the Township did not provide for the processing of septic waste as required by 25 Pa.Code § 71.21(4)(iv); and 3) failing to find that the farm usage of the entire property, including that now zoned R-1, predates the zoning ordinance and, therefore, Hapchuks agricultural utilization of sludge, an ancillary farm use, was a grandfathered and permitted use. 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the matter of preemption in United Tavern Owners of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia School District, 441 Pa. 274, 272 A.2d 868 (1971). In that case, the Court stated:
In determining whether, by the enactment of the specific statute, the Commonwealth completely barred a municipality enactment of an ordinance relating to the same field, we will refrain from striking down the local ordinance unless the Commonwealth has explicitly claimed the authority itself, or unless there is such actual, material conflict between the state and local powers that only by striking down the local power can the power of the wider constituency be protected.
Id. at 280, 272 A.2d at 871. An ordinance will not be stricken down unless it is clearly shown that the legislature intended to preempt the field or unless the ordinance conflicts with the statute. Retail Master Bakers Association v. Allegheny County, 400 Pa. 1, 161 A.2d 36 (1960). SWMA and predecessor statutes do not show a clear intent to preempt local zoning regulations. Greene Township v. Kuhl, 32 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 592, 379 A.2d 1383 (1977). While certain limited areas are pre-empted by the Act, 5 we have carefully reviewed SWMA and hold that nothing in SWMA discloses a specific grant of authority regarding preemption of zoning regulations on such issue.
Next, Hapchuks contend that the Township's failure to adhere to the provisions of 25 Pa.Code § 71.21(a)(iv) bars the Township from attempting to enjoin the use. Section 71.21(a)(iv) provides that a municipality will meet with the DER prior to preparation of an official plan for the resolution of sewage disposal. This includes submission by the municipality of a plan for identifying the need for a sewage management program to assure the future operation and maintenance of existing and proposed sewage facilities. While Hapchuks raised this issue before the trial court, they did not pursue this argument there. Thus, we find that it was waived, even though the Township 6 failed to introduce any evidence that the ordinance properly provides for the processing of septic waste as 25 Pa.Code § 71.21 requires.
Finally, Hapchuks contend that amendment 80-10 to the Township's zoning ordinance cannot bar utilization of the portion of their property now zoned R-1 for sewage sludge because their property has been continuously used for agriculture purposes and sewage sludge is an ancillary agricultural use. We agree.
Hapchuks' final argument is actually two pronged. First, they argue that the historical agricultural use of their property entitles them to continue that use, notwithstanding subsequent adoption of a zoning ordinance or changes to those zoning ordinances. Second, Hapchuks argue that sewage sludge is a form of agricultural use which fits within the historical agricultural use which they are entitled to continue.
As to the first element of their final argument, Hapchuks are clearly right as a matter of law. The adoption of a zoning ordinance does not mandate discontinuance of the existing use of a property affected by the ordinance. A zoning ordinance operates prospectively, only. Similarly, where land use conforms to an existing zoning ordinance, an amendment to the ordinance which reclassifies the property does not mandate discontinuance of the existing conforming use. In either case, the use simply becomes a nonconforming one which may continue, but may not be changed or expanded.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the rule that a property owner may continue an existing use, notwithstanding adoption or change to a zoning ordinance. This rule, sometimes referred to as a form of "grandfather" rule, was discussed in Hanna v. Board of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 306, 183 A.2d 539 (1962), wherein the Supreme Court held:
The use of the property which the ordinance protects, or 'freezes', is the use which was in existence at the time of the passage of the ordinance or the change of a use district (Upper Darby Township appeal, 391 Pa. 347, 138 A.2d 99 [ (1958) ]; Lance Appeal, 399 Pa. 311, 159 A.2d 715 [ (1960) ] ) but it offers no protection to a use different from the use in existence when the ordinance was passed. The latter does not render the ordinance invalid. The nonconforming use which is within the orbit of protection of the law and the Constitution is the nonconforming use which exists at the time of the passage of the zoning ordinance.... (emphasis in original).
Hanna, 408 Pa. at 313, 183 A.2d at 543-544.
Under the facts of this case, the Hapchuks' property was historically used for agricultural purposes. The Township admitted that the use of the Hapchuk property in 1970, when the Township enacted the zoning ordinance, was agricultural. The record shows that in 1970, when the zoning ordinance was enacted, the entire Hapchuk property was zoned for agricultural use. In 1980, when the zoning ordinance was amended to its present form, a portion of the Hapchuk property was rezoned to R-1. However, the Township also admitted that in 1980 and thereafter, the entire Hapchuk property, including the portion rezoned R-1 in 1980, continued to be used as agricultural land. Thus, under the holding in Hanna, the property owner may perpetuate what became a nonconforming use so long as they did not expand or change the nonconforming use.
It makes no difference that the Hapchuks purchased the property in 1987, after the 1980 zoning ordinance amendment. Where a portion of the property had already been zoned R-1, as long as the intervening purchaser does not expand or change the use, they are entitled to the same "grandfather" protection. Luciany v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 399 Pa. 176, 159 A.2d 701 (1960).
The only question remaining is whether Hapchuks' specific use of the R-1 portion of their property for sewage sludge is...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial
-
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Maritime Management, Inc.
... ... 58, 67, 423 A.2d 713, 718 (1980). The party seeking the permanent injunction has the burden of showing entitlement to it. Hempfield v. Hapchuk, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 173, 177 n. 6, 620 A.2d 668, 671 n. 6 (1993), allocatur denied, 537 Pa. 643, 644 A.2d 165 (1994). Additionally, a party ... ...
-
Gilbert v. Synagro Cent., LLC
... ... " includes "land application of sewage sludge for its plant nutrient value or as a soil conditioner") (emphasis added); see also Hempfield Twp. v. Hapchuk, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 173, 620 A.2d 668, 672 (1993)(holding application of sewage sludge for farming purposes comported with prior, ... ...
-
Gilbert v. Synagro Cent., LLC
... ... Hempfield Twp. v. Hapchuk, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 173, 620 A.2d 668 (1993), has interpreted this regulatory definition to conclude that the application of sewer ... ...
-
Espenshade v. Van Ormer, No. 2565 C.D. 2002 (Pa. Commw. 11/24/2003)
... ... See Hempfield Township v. Hapchuk , 620 A.2d 668 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) ... 9. The paragraphs detail two property disputes. The first property dispute involves the ... ...