Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corporation, s. 41155

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KNUTSON
• Citation: Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corporation, 166 N.W.2d 95, 283 Minn. 1 (Minn. 1969)
• Decision Date: 07 March 1969
• Docket Number: Nos. 41155,41160--1,s. 41155
• Parties: R. Deloris HEMPSTEAD, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS SHERATON CORPORATION, Capp Towers Hotel, Inc., Travelers Indemnity Company. Marshall-Betty Inc. dba Davey Jones Locker and Standard Accident Insurance Company, Appellants, Leah Rackner dba the Jockey Club, Defendant.

Page 95

166 N.W.2d 95

283 Minn. 1

R. Deloris HEMPSTEAD, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS SHERATON CORPORATION, Capp Towers Hotel, Inc. Travelers Indemnity Company. Marshall-Betty Inc. dba Davey Jones Locker and Standard Accident Insurance Company Appellants Leah Rackner dba the Jockey Club, Defendant.

Nos. 41155, 41160--1.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 7, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

A person who is injured as a result of the intoxication of another resulting from the illegal sale, barter, or gift of intoxicating liquor to the one causing such injury is not barred from recovery under Minn.St. 340.95 where she is merely a companion of the intoxicated person and does not purchase, procure for, or participate knowingly and affirmatively in the illegal sale, barter, or gift of intoxicating liquor to the party causing the injury or damages.

Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, Minneapolis, for Sheraton Corp. & Travelers Ind. Co.

Altman, Geraghty, Leonard & Mulally, St. Paul, for Capp Towers Hotel, Inc. & Travelers Ind. Co.

Carroll, Cronan, Roth & Austin, Minneapolis, for Marshall-Betty Inc. and Standard Acc. Ins. Co.

Daniel T. Cody, St. Paul, for respondent.

OPINION

KNUTSON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Minneapolis Sheraton Corporation, Capp Towers Hotel, Inc., Marshall-Betty, Inc., d.b.a. Davey Jones Locker, and their insurers.

Plaintiff sues to recover for personal injuries under our so-called Civil Damage Act, Minn.St. 340.95. In order to avoid a lengthy and expensive trial, the parties agreed that a deposition of plaintiff taken on September 17, 1964, could be accepted as true and that it, together with other stipulated facts, would constitute the evidence upon which the court should determine, as the only issue in the case, whether complicity of plaintiff, under the facts of this case, would bar recovery. It was agreed that if, under the facts of the case as established by the stipulation and deposition, complicity did not bar recovery, judgment could be entered against the three defendants named above for the sum of $35,000. It was also agreed that there was no evidence against codefendant The Jockey Club and that the case against it could be dismissed, so it is not involved in this appeal.

The facts as shown by the deposition referred to are therefore not in dispute. On the evening of August 8, 1963, plaintiff and her sister, Loretta Ann Bryant, left their apartment in a car which plaintiff had sold to her sister but which was still registered in plaintiff's name. The sale had been made 'two or three months' prior to this time, and Loretta had complete control of the car. She did all the driving on the night in question.

It is conceded that plaintiff was 20 years of age and Loretta 19. Prior to that night, both girls had, however, worked extensively in Minneapolis and St. Paul as cocktail waitresses, obtaining the jobs by misrepresenting their ages and frequently being discharged when it was learned they were under 21.

On the night in question, the girls first went to Davey Jones Locker, where each ordered and paid for her own drink. They each visited with different people. After about a half hour they drove to the Sheraton Ritz, where plaintiff had previously been employed. There the bartender gave each girl a free drink and a customer bought them another. While there they separated and visited with different friends, so plaintiff is not sure how many drinks Loretta had, but stated that she personally had two or three. After about an hour at the Sheraton Ritz, plaintiff and Loretta moved on to the Capp Towers, where a patron bought each of the girls a drink and each purchased one or two more drinks, paying for their own. Again they were separated part of the time, visiting with different friends. Between midnight and 12:30 a.m., they drove to The Jockey Club, but plaintiff cannot remember whether she or her sister had anything more to drink, although she believes she herself did not. She vaguely remembers leaving the club, but does not remember what time it was.

At about 1:45 a.m. the car, driven by Loretta, ran into the back end of a truck. Loretta died as a result of the injuries she received, and plaintiff was seriously injured.

The trial court held that on the facts of the case there was no showing of complicity sufficient to constitute a defense under the Civil Damage Act, even if complicity were to be recognized as a defense by this court. As a result, it was ordered that judgment under the stipulation of the parties be entered against the three named defendants for the sum of $35,000. This appeal is taken from that judgment.

So far as material, Minn.St. 340.95 provides:

'Every husband, wife, * * * or other person who is injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action in his own name, against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; * * *.'

We have had occasion in the past to consider some related questions involving the right to recover under this statutory provision, which had no counterpart under the common law. Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886, 52 A.L.R.2d 875. Our cases leave some doubt as to whether the statute is penal or remedial in nature, requiring a liberal or narrow construction. Confronted with this question, the Eighth Circuit Court in Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, in a comprehensive review of all Minnesota cases which have considered the statute, concluded that its construction depended on the nature of the question before the court. It stated that the true characterization of the statute was that set out in Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 436, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261, saying (291 F.2d 293):

'It is to be borne in mind that civil damage acts, although penal in nature, are also remedial in character and, according to the prevailing view, are to be liberally construed So as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.'

The main difficulty in applying the statute in some of the cases, including the one now before us, involves the correct interpretation of the words 'other person' in determining who is entitled to recovery. Thus, in Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn. 474, 283 N.W. 778, we held the term 'other person' did not include a person who voluntarily brings about his own intoxication. This is true even though he is a minor. See, also, Cavin v. Smith, 228 Minn. 322, 37 N.W.2d 368. In Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83, 103 N.W.2d 131, 133, we held a minor who is a member of a group which sends a representative to a liquor store to purchase liquor could not recover for injuries sustained as a result of his own intoxication in consuming part of the liquor. We there said:

'* * * The Civil Damage Act does not create a cause of action in favor of one injured by his own intoxication. Only an innocent third person who is injured as a result of the intoxication of another is entitled to its benefits. Since neither the common law nor the Civil Damage Act gives plaintiff a right to recover for injury sustained as a result of his voluntary intoxication, the trial court was correct in granting defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. * * *

'* * * Had the legislature intended to give a person whose voluntary intoxication is the proximate cause of his injury a remedy unknown to the common law, it may be expected that it would have clearly done so.'

In our most recent decision, Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 159 N.W.2d 903, we held that where an adult who takes a minor to a liquor store and purchases liquor for him is later injured in an automobile accident when the minor is driving, he cannot recover under this statute. After reviewing many of our past decisions, we said (280 Minn. 441, 159 N.W.2d 906):

'From these prior decisions, and the language used in opinions of this court where the issue now before us was not directly presented, we conclude that the protection to the public afforded by § 340.95 was not intended by the legislature to be extended to persons who participate knowingly and affirmatively in the illegal sale, bartering, or gift of the intoxicating liquor. To hold otherwise, we believe, would be to permit one who has been an intentional accessory to the illegality to shift the loss resulting from it to a person no more responsible for the damage than he himself has been. So considered, the case is different from that of the party who suffers loss at the hands of a person with whose intoxication he had no involvement and where we say in effect that Minnesota's policy against supplying liquor illegally is so strong that recovery will be allowed even though the damaged person, in respects unrelated to the intoxication, may have failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. The person asserting the right of action in such a situation has had nothing to do with the illegal furnishing of the liquor.'

In the Turk case we also held that contributory negligence need not bar recovery 'because the legislative objective undergirding the statute would not be served if fault on the part of the person damaged, wholly unrelated to the illegal furnishing of the liquor, could insulate the supplier from liability.' 280 Minn. 441, 159 N.W.2d 905.

In other cases we have held that neither contributory negligence on the part of the person injured nor lack of guilty knowledge on the part of the supplier of liquor would bar recovery. Kvanli v. Village of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 139 N.W.2d 275; Beck v. Groe, Supra. See, also, Adamson v. Dougherty, 248 Minn. 535, 81 N.W.2d...