Hemsley v. State
| Decision Date | 22 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1355-2019 |
| Parties | DEANGELO HEMSLEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Charles County Case No. 8-K-16-000497.
OPINION [*]
On the evening of April 23, 2016, Deangelo Hemsley ("Appellant") "busted in" to the home of Jaqueline and John Yates, [1] where his estranged wife and his daughter were temporarily living, and stabbed John Yates to death.
In May 2016, a grand jury indicted Appellant of eight offenses including the first-degree murder of John Yates. Appellant, a diagnosed schizophrenic, entered a plea of not competent to stand trial and was committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ("DHMH")[2] for evaluation. He later entered a plea of Not Criminally Responsible by Reason of Insanity ("NCR").
After Appellant was found competent to stand trial in January 2017, he was tried before a jury trial over five days in the Circuit Court for Charles County. The trial was bifurcated on the separate issues of guilt and criminal responsibility. The jury found Appellant guilty of first degree murder of John Yates (count 1); home invasion (count 3); kidnapping of A.H. (count 4); second-degree assault of A.H. (count 6); and false imprisonment of A.H. (count 7). The same jury also found him criminally responsible.
Appellant presents the following five questions for our review, which we have reworded slightly for clarity:
First, we hold that the circuit court did not err in precluding the testimony of two lay witness about Appellant's alleged abnormal behavior on the day of the murder after determining that there was no rational nexus between the proffered testimony and Appellant's mens rea to commit first-degree murder. Second, we conclude that Appellant's challenge to the admission of the clinical social worker's testimony was not preserved. Third, we hold that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not violate Appellant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, or exceed its authority under Maryland Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Article ("CP"), § 3-111, by granting the State's request for a second psychiatric examination of Appellant and admitting the results of that examination only during the criminal responsibility phase of the bifurcated trial. Fourth, we agree with Appellant-and the State-that Appellant's sentence for second-degree assault merges into his sentence for kidnapping; therefore, we vacate the sentence for second-degree assault. Finally, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction for home invasion in violation of Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2014 Supp.), Criminal Law Article ("CR"), §6-202(b).
On June 1, 2016, Appellant entered a plea of incompetent to stand trial in the Circuit Court for Charles County and requested that his competence be evaluated. On June 8, 2016, the court entered an order requiring that Appellant be committed to DHMH for examination as to competency to stand trial. After receipt of DHMH's evaluation indicating that Appellant was not competent to stand trial, on July 28, 2016, the court committed Appellant to DHMH based on a finding that, because of a mental disorder, he was a danger to himself and others. On August 3, 2016, Appellant entered an NCR plea.
On January 26, 2017, based on a DHMH report, the circuit court found Appellant competent to stand trial. The court also ordered that Appellant be evaluated to determine whether he could be held criminally responsible. Dr. Vanessa Green and Dr. Annette Hanson of Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center ("Perkins"), evaluated Appellant and in a report dated March 2, 2017, opined that Appellant was both "Competent to Stand Trial" and "Not Criminally Responsible."
On May 1, 2018, the State filed a "Request to have Defendant Evaluated by State's Retained Expert to Determine Criminal Responsibility." The State sought permission to have Appellant evaluated by a forensic psychologist, Dr. Michael Spodak, due to the unavailability of Dr. Green at trial and the incomplete records held by Perkins in relation to the March 2nd report.[4] Appellant filed an opposition to the request, arguing that his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination would be violated by an order to submit to "interrogation by a State agent while in custody."
On May 10, 2018, at a motions hearing, the court heard argument from the State on its request for a second evaluation. In deciding whether to grant the State's request, the court considered other options, such as allowing Dr. Hanson to conduct a "full, complete, documented evaluation[, ]" rather than allowing Dr. Spodak to perform his exam. The State objected, arguing that under the circumstances, it was entitled to an evaluation performed by Dr. Spodak. Eventually, the circuit court granted the State's request over Appellant's objection.
The following facts were adduced at trial, beginning on June 10, 2019.
During the guilt/innocence portion of the trial, testimony established that, on the evening of April 23, 2016, Appellant "busted in" to the Yates home, where A.H. and her cousin, Jamari Hagens, were sitting in the kitchen. Dameka Hemsley, the Yates's daughter and mother of A.H., was elsewhere in the home. Jaqueline Yates was on her way into the kitchen and John Yates was in the basement.
Mr. Hagens, A.H. and Jaqueline Yates testified that Appellant was yelling, wielding a box cutter and a crowbar and "saying, '[w]here's my daughter at?'" A.H. replied, saying "I'm right here." Appellant then approached Jaqueline Yates, demanding "[w]here is Mr. Yates?" She informed him that Mr. Yates was "downstairs." Appellant then began walking downstairs, and Jaqueline Yates immediately "went into [her] bedroom and [] called 911" because she was "frightened" about what Appellant might do in the basement. She said that he seemed unusually angry and unfocused and was speaking to her in a way he normally would not.
Moments later, Mr. Hagens and A.H. heard Mr. Yates "choking on his blood" and "took off running downstairs to see what was going on." They saw Appellant "on top of" Mr. Yates. Hagens related that he saw blood "squirting out of [Mr. Yates's] neck, everywhere." A.H. tried to pull Appellant off Mr. Yates, while Hagens ran "to the next door neighbor ['s] house and called the police."
A.H. recounted that, Appellant, who was covered in blood, grabbed A.H. by the arm and pulled her upstairs to his truck, saying "[c]ome on, let's go." She testified that she did not go with Appellant willingly. Appellant put A.H. in the passenger seat and as he walked around the back of the truck to reach the driver's seat, A.H. "climbed over the driver's seat because the window was down, . . . jumped out of the window" and ran "[b]ack in the house."
Police responded to the scene and witnessed Appellant's truck coming down the Yates's driveway towards them. Appellant failed to follow the police commands to stop but was eventually blocked by a police cruiser. Sargent Daniel Bacon testified that he "approached the vehicle, gave orders for the driver to put his hands up and exit the vehicle." Appellant did not respond to any of these commands. Instead, Appellant appeared to be gripping the steering wheel, quietly staring straight ahead, and revving his engine. Appellant was then apprehended and arrested.
Mr. Yates was pronounced dead at the scene. Dr. Jack Titus, assistant medical examiner for the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maryland, testified that Mr. Yates's death was caused by "six sharp force injuries to his body" and was determined to be a homicide. He noted that "[t]here was a stab wound to the left side of [Mr. Yates's] face that went in through the skin and soft tissue, and actually hit the upper part of the spinal column and fractured it."
At the close of the State's case, Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. The court denied the motion, although the State entered nolle prosequi on count five (child abuse).
Appellant elected not to testify. Instead, he called his cousin, Mr David Thomas, as a witness. As discussed in more detail infra, the State objected to Mr. Thomas's anticipated testimony regarding the "history of behavior . . . specifically [Appellant's] mental health, to negate the specific intent to first-degree murder down to second-degree murder." The State contended that such testimony was inadmissible in the guilt/innocence portion of the trial. Over defense counsel's objection, the court agreed with the State, and restricted Mr. Thomas's...
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