Henderson-Mizell Mercantile Co. v. C.D. Chapman & Co.

• Citation: 3 Ala.App. 296,57 So. 82
• Parties: HENDERSON-MIZELL MERCANTILE CO. v. C. D. CHAPMAN & CO.
• Decision Date: 30 November 1911
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

57 So. 82

3 Ala.App. 296

HENDERSON-MIZELL MERCANTILE CO. v. C. D. CHAPMAN & CO.

Court of Appeals of Alabama

November 30, 1911

Appeal from Circuit Court, Geneva County; H. A. Pearce, Judge.

Action by C. D. Chapman & Co. against the Henderson-Mizell Mercantile Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

W. O Mulkey, for appellant.

C. D. Carmichael, for appellee.

WALKER P.J.

This is an action for the conversion of a wagon and two mules which had been mortgaged to the plaintiff (the appellee here). The transaction on which is based the charge that the defendant (appellant) corporation converted the mortgaged property was as follows: The mortgagor, Campbell, who lived in Florida came in the wagon, accompanied by his young son, to the town of Samson in this state, stopped in the street near the storehouse of the defendant, unhitched the mules and tied them to the hind wheels of the wagon, and went into the defendant's store. While he was in the store making a settlement for a bale of cotton with J. S. Pinckard, one of the defendant's clerks, his son called attention to the fact that some one had hitched the mules to the wagon and was about to drive off. Campbell said "Don't let him take my mules," and he and the clerk with whom he was dealing went out into the street, and the clerk prevented the man, one Sykes, who had hitched the mules to the wagon, from driving off with them. The manager of the defendant's store also came out and assisted in getting Sykes to surrender possession of the wagon and team having threatened to have him arrested if he did not do so. After this occurrence Campbell took charge of his wagon and team and returned with them to his home in Florida, one of the clerks in the defendant's store going with him at his request and with the permission of the manager of the store. The circumstance principally relied on in argument for the appellee as tending to show a connection of the defendant corporation with the transaction is this statement by Sykes in the course of his examination as a witness for the plaintiff: "Me and Mr. Clark just loosed them and hitched them to the wagon, and got in and drove off, when Mr. Pinckard ran up and grabbed hold of the bridle, and says, 'What does this mean?' and I said it was to satisfy a debt Campbell owed Chapman, and that Mr. Chapman had authorized me to take them. He said, 'We have one, too, and you are not going to take the team away from him.' " The testimony tended to show that when demand was made on Sykes to show his authority to take possession of Campbell's property he did not exhibit or make known the authority under which he was acting. However, Chapman had authorized Sykes to take possession of the wagon and team under the mortgages to him. No one on behalf of the defendant at any time assumed possession or control of the wagon or team, or asserted any claim to it. The claim of the appellee is that on the evidence tending to prove the state of facts above summarized it was a question for the jury whether the appellant was liable for a conversion of the wagon and team.

The liability of a corporation for a tort committed by its agent is but an application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, long recognized as a part of the law of agency; and in respect of such liability private corporations stand before the law on the same footing as natural persons. A state of facts which would not render a natural person liable for an act of one who was at the time his agent would not render a corporation liable if it is the principal or employer sought to be charged. Jordan v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 74 Ala. 85, 49 Am. Rep. 800; 10 Cyc. 1204. "It is a general rule of the law of agency, that a principal is liable for any tort committed by his agent in the performance of the business which he was employed to transact, even though the particular act constituting the tort may have been done without the knowledge of the principal, and in violation of his express...