Henderson v. Baird

• Decision Date: 14 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-1226,93-1226
• Citation: 29 F.3d 464
• Parties: Andre T. HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David BAIRD, jointly and severally, in their official capacity; Dayton Hawkins, jointly and severally, in their official capacity; James Anthony, jointly and severally, in their official capacity; G.E. Huss, Captain, jointly and severally, in their official capacity; Captain Morales, jointly and severally, in their official capacity, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 464

29 F.3d 464

Andre T. HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David BAIRD, jointly and severally, in their official capacity; Dayton Hawkins, jointly and severally, in their official capacity; James Anthony, jointly and severally, in their official capacity; G.E. Huss, Captain, jointly and severally, in their official capacity; Captain Morales jointly and severally, in their official capacity Defendants-Appellants.

No. 93-1226.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 14, 1994.

Decided July 14, 1994.

Lonnie F. Bryan, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for appellant.

Craig S. Davis, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for appellee.

Before BOWMAN, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Andre T. Henderson brought this Bivens federal constitutional tort action ¹ alleging that the defendants, federal prison officials, violated a number of his constitutional rights by instituting and carrying out prison disciplinary proceedings against him. The defendants appeal the district court's order denying their motion for qualified immunity on Henderson's substantive due process and retaliation claims. We reverse and remand.

I.

In early 1987, Henderson was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Sandstone, Minnesota. On March 12, 1987, David Baird, a corrections officer at the Sandstone prison, approached Henderson's cell and offered Henderson a food tray of lunch. When Henderson declined the offer, Officer Baird returned the food tray he was holding to the food cart. Officer Baird then approached the cell to remove beverage containers of Kool-Aid from the food slot that had been placed there earlier. What happened next is disputed. Officer Baird alleges that Henderson took one of the containers of Kool-Aid and threw it on Officer Baird. Henderson alleges that initially both he and Officer Baird had hold of the container and that when Henderson let loose of the container on which Officer Baird was still pulling, the Kool-Aid was inadvertently spilled on Officer Baird.

Officer Baird filed an incident report and charged Henderson with the offense of "Assaulting any person," in violation of Bureau of Prisons regulations. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 541.13, Table 3 (1986). On March 16, 1987, the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) held a hearing. Henderson did not meet or talk with the UDC, although there is some dispute about whether he declined to do so or simply did not have the opportunity. A member of the UDC subsequently advised Henderson that the UDC was referring the matter to the Institutional Discipline Committee (IDC) and informed him of his rights before the IDC.

The IDC held a hearing on this matter March 26, 1987. The IDC consisted of defendants Dayton Hawkins, James Anthony, and G.E. Huss, all employees of the prison. Both the IDC's disciplinary report and the affidavit statements of IDC members indicate that Henderson did not request witnesses for the IDC hearing. Henderson acknowledged in his original complaint in this Bivens lawsuit that he did not request witnesses for the IDC hearing. However, after the defendants had filed motions for summary judgment, Henderson filed a second amended complaint alleging that he had requested, but was not allowed to present, witnesses at the IDC hearing. This matter remains in dispute.

In his statement at the IDC hearing, Henderson said that he did not assault Officer Baird and that Officer Baird was lying about the incident. He noted that he would not have thrown anything because he was scheduled to be transferred to a halfway house the day after the incident. Prison officials had approved his release to the halfway house just two days before the incident. He also noted that he had been harassed by Officer Baird and others in the past and he had been "set up" in this case.

The IDC found that Henderson had committed the offense "[a]ssaulting any person," a violation rated in the category of greatest offense severity in the prison system. As a sanction for this conduct, the IDC imposed 15 days of disciplinary segregation, stripped him of 18 days of good time credits, and revoked his transfer to the halfway house. Henderson was given a copy of the report and notified of the sanctions imposed and his right to appeal. Henderson did not appeal. His sentence expired on July 31, 1987.

On March 13, 1990, Henderson filed this Bivens action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan alleging a number of claims that the defendants had violated his Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment rights in both initiating and carrying out disciplinary proceedings against him at the prison in Sandstone, Minnesota. Henderson subsequently filed an amended complaint alleging that his substantive due process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence of guilt against him on the charge. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Alternatively, the defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Henderson then filed a second amended complaint adding the allegation that Officer Baird filed false charges against him in retaliation because he reported his harassment by prison officials to the F.B.I., and the allegation that he had requested to call witnesses at the first disciplinary hearing.

The district court found venue in the Western District of Michigan to be improper and transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The case was referred to a magistrate judge who on March 12, 1992, entered an order and report and recommendation on the pending motions. The magistrate judge recommended, among other things, dismissing defendant Captain Morales, dismissing the claims against all the defendants in their official capacities, and dismissing three of the constitutional claims in their entirety. The magistrate judge also recommended, however, denying the defendants' motion to dismiss on: (1) Henderson's substantive due process claim alleging that he was found guilty of the violation without sufficient evidence on the charge against him; (2) his procedural due process claim that he was denied the right to call witnesses at the IDC hearing; and (3) his claim that Officer Baird initiated the disciplinary proceeding against him in retaliation for reporting harassment by prison officials to the F.B.I. The magistrate judge also recommended that the district court deny the motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

The defendants filed objections to the report and recommendation and requested the district court to remand the case to the magistrate judge for reconsideration. The district court remanded the matter to the magistrate judge for reconsideration of the substantive due process and procedural due process claims. On reconsideration, the magistrate judge again recommended that the district court deny the defendants' motion to dismiss these claims. The district court then adopted both reports and recommendations in all respects over the defendants' renewed objections. In doing so, the district court specifically denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants filed this interlocutory appeal challenging only the district court's qualified immunity ruling on Henderson's substantive due process claim and his retaliation claim against Officer Baird. ²

II.

While the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not normally an appealable final judgment, an exception exists for a summary judgment order denying qualified immunity. Mahers v. Harper, 12 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817-18, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). We have jurisdiction to review such a decision as an interlocutory appeal. Bartlett v. Fisher, 972 F.2d 911, 914 (8th Cir.1992). We review de novo the district court's denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment. Id. We also have jurisdiction to review and decide issues of law that are closely related to the qualified immunity determination. Id. Closely related issues include the viability of the constitutional or common-law tort claims that would dispose of the immunity issue if resolved. Moreno v. Small Business Admin., 877 F.2d 715, 716 (8th Cir.1989).

"Generally, prison officials may rely on the defense of qualified immunity to protect them from liability for civil damages." Mahers, 12 F.3d at 785. They are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "In order for a person to have a clearly established right, 'the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' " Mahers, 12 F.3d at 785 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).

III.

The defendants first argue that the district court erred in denying them qualified immunity on Henderson's substantive due process claim. The prison disciplinary committee found that Henderson had committed the offense of "[a]ssaulting any person," in violation of Bureau of Prisons' regulations found at 28 C.F.R. Sec. 541.13, Table 3 (1986). At the time of the disciplinary proceeding in March 1987, this regulation read in its entirety as follows: "101 Assaulting any person (includes sexual assault)." Id. The Bureau of Prisons categorized this as an offense of the greatest severity. See id.

The magistrate judge's reports and recommendations, which the district court adopted in their entirety, first found that by charging and disciplining Henderson for "[a]ssaulting any person," the defendants violated Henderson's substantive due process rights. The magistrate judge reasoned that a prison disciplinary...