Henderson v. Cameron

Decision Date16 October 2020
Docket NumberNO. 2019-CA-0309-MR,2019-CA-0309-MR
PartiesKEVIN HENDERSON APPELLANT v. DANIEL CAMERON, Attorney General of Kentucky, and THOMAS WINE, Jefferson County Commonwealth's Attorney APPELLEES
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CI-00983

OPINION

AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, MAZE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Kevin Henderson appeals the Franklin Circuit Court's order dismissing his complaint against the Attorney General.1 For the following reasons, we affirm the Franklin Circuit Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in a matter wherein the trial court has determined a question of the propriety of the entry of dismissal is de novo.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true. Mims v. Western-Southern Agency, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Ky. App. 2007). Therefore, "the question is purely a matter of law." James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky. App. 2002). Accordingly, the trial court's decision will be reviewed de novo. Revenue Cabinet v. Hubbard, 37 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Ky. 2000).

Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky. App. 2009).

ANALYSIS

The doctrine of separation of powers is foundational and fundamental to our system of government. Each branch—executive, judicial, and legislative—has its own duties and responsibilities and cannot exert its authority over matters in the domain of another branch.

Section 27 of the Kentucky Constitution mandates separation among the three branches of government andSection 28 specifically prohibits incursion of one branch of government into the powers and functions of the others. The essential purpose of separation of powers is to allow for independent functioning of each coequal branch of government within its assigned sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or intimidation by other branches.

Coleman v. Campbell County Library Board of Trustees, 547 S.W.3d 526, 533-34 (Ky. App. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Though his brief is mostly unintelligible, it appears from the interpretation of the pleadings by the trial court that it determined Mr. Henderson desired to use the courts to force a prosecution of his co-defendant in a twenty-year-old murder case for the crime of perjury. As the Franklin Circuit Court declared in the order dismissing the action:

As officers of the executive branch, the Commonwealth's Attorney and the Attorney General have exclusive authority and absolute discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a case and broad discretion as to what crime to charge and penalty to seek. Jones v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 306, 314 (Ky. App. 2012) [(Nickell, J., concurring)].

The Kentucky Supreme Court observed in the seminal case of Hoskins v. Maricle that a judge has no authority to direct a prosecutor in whether or how to bring criminal charges.

"Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismissa proceeding once brought." Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir.1967). Thus, "[a] judge in our system does not have the authority to tell prosecutors which crimes to prosecute or when to prosecute them." United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992). "Courts do not know which charges are best initiated at which time, which allocation of prosecutorial resources is most efficient, or the relative strengths of various cases and charges." United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations and internal quotes omitted). Thus, we start with the presumption that the party charged with the prosecution of a case is in the best position to evaluate the probability of its success.

150 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Ky. 2004), as modified on denial of reh'g (Dec. 16, 2004).

Mr. Henderson also complains that the action of the Franklin Circuit Court in granting the motion to dismiss in favor of the appellees abridged his right of access to the courts. The fact that this is far from the first action filed by Mr. Henderson during his term of incarceration belies his allegation. One may have the right to file actions, and such is suitable access to the courts. One simply may not be successful in such actions, but no litigant is guaranteed success and it would be wrong to posit that only those who litigate successfully are those with access to the courts; in each litigation there are two parties and only one can be victorious, though both had a right of access.2

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Franklin Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Kevin Henderson, pro se

Burgin, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Carmine G....

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