Henderson v. City of Shreveport

• Decision Date: 04 January 1926
• Docket Number: 27114
• Citation: 160 La. 360,107 So. 139
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: HENDERSON et al. v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT et al

107 So. 139

160 La. 360

HENDERSON et al. v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT et al

No. 27114

Supreme Court of Louisiana

January 4, 1926

Rehearing Denied February 1, 1926

Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; E. P Mills, Judge.

Action by W. K. Henderson and others against the City of Shreveport and the School Board of Caddo Parish to enjoin the city from buying and the School Board from selling certain land. From a judgment enjoining the city from purchasing, but refusing to enjoin School Board from selling, both parties appeal.

Judgment amended so as to reject plaintiff's demand for injunction as to both defendants, and affirmed.

Wilkinson Lewis & Wilkinson, of Shreveport, for plaintiffs.

B. F. Roberts, City Atty., of Shreveport, for defendant City of Shreveport.

Thatcher & Webb, of Shreveport, for defendant Parish School Board.

OPINION

ST. PAUL, J.

This is an action brought by two residents and taxpayers of Shreveport, to enjoin the city of Shreveport from buying, and the school board of Caddo parish from selling, a certain unimproved portion of ground, or site for a building, in said city, on the ground that the former is without authority to buy, and the latter without authority to sell, said particular building site or portion of ground; the said city and school board being about to consummate a purchase and sale of said property for an agreed price of $ 24,000.

There was judgment below enjoining the city from buying, but rejecting plaintiff's demand for an injunction restraining the school board from selling; and plaintiffs and the city both appeal.

I.

The facts of the case are substantially these:

1. The school board purchased the property with funds dedicated to the purchase ofsites for school buildings. It bought the property (as we understand it) in anticipation of its being needed for school purposes, but did not build thereon; and it now finds that the site is not needed or suitable for said purposes, and hence desires to sell.

2. The citizens of Shreveport voted some two years ago a special tax for the purpose of constructing permanent public improvements in said city, including viaducts, storm sewers, and drainage, opening streets, paving streets fronting public property, erecting additional fire stations, purchasing necessary real estate, and construction of such other permanent public improvements as may be considered necessary and authorized by the city council; provided, however, that "no part of the same shall be used for any expenses of the city government."

The city council thought that a public auditorium for the use of the citizens of Shreveport would be a desirable public improvement for said city, and that the erection of such a building would meet with the approval of the people.

The funds derived from the special tax aforesaid would not, however, suffice for both the purchase of a site and the erection of such a building; but the council thought that, if an available site was secured, the people would authorize a further tax for the purpose of constructing the building.

Accordingly, the council proposed and authorized the purchase of the particular site herein involved, which they thought available for the purpose in mind, and which the school board desired to sell. If the people voted the additional tax, the auditorium would be built on the site thus purchased; if the people refused to vote the additional tax, then the site would be used for some other permanent public improvement, or sold again and the proceeds invested elsewhere, as circumstances might dictate; but with no purpose to use at any time any part thereof for the expenses of the city government.

That is the whole story, briefly told.

II.

It is plain from a reading of the declared purpose for which the special tax was voted, with the express authority to use the same for the "construction of such other permanent public improvements as may be considered necessary and authorized by the city council," and with no other limitation than that no part of the same shall be used for any expenses of the city government, that a very large discretion was vested in the city council as to what permanent public improvements might be necessary and desirable, and that the mention of certain public improvements therein was merely general, advisory, and suggestive rather than mandatory. Had the people intended that the special tax should be used only for the public improvements named and those of a similar nature, it would have been easy to express themselves clearly on that subject, by merely adding, after those named, the words "and the like," or words to that effect, instead of adding, as they did, "and (the) construction of such other permanent public improvements as may be considered necessary and (be) authorized by the city council."

And, since the taxpayers have voted to vest that discretion in their own city council, and not in the court of Caddo parish or in this court, it follows that it would be a purely gratuitous and unwarranted assumption of authority on the part of either to interfere with the council in the exercise of that authority, unless manifestly abused.

We see no abuse of discretion, manifest or otherwise, on the part of the city council, in what it proposes to do. The members of the council are presumably in touch and in accord with their constituents, and acquainted with needs of the community in which they reside, and with whose local government they have been intrusted by vote of the people, to whom they are responsible for their stewardship.

Manifestly, therefore, if the funds derived from the special tax had sufficed, both for acquiring a site for an auditorium and for constructing the building itself, there could be no possible ground for the interposition of any court, and the substitution of its authority and power for the discretion of the body legally charged with the expenditure of the fund to the best advantage of those who have raised it and intrusted it to that body for that purpose.

And let us bear in mind that we are not here dealing with the general powers of municipal corporations, and its authority to do this or that with the funds raised by general taxation for the ordinary purposes of government. We are dealing with the case of a body specially intrusted with the expenditure of a particular fund, not belonging to the municipality, but only held by it in trust for certain uses according to the sound discretion of a certain body; and the fact that such body is a city council is merely a coincidence, and serves only to cloud the issue.

Nor do we see wherein there is any abuse of that same discretion, gross or otherwise, because the city council has sought first to obtain an available site for an auditorium, before asking the people to tax themselves for the construction of such building. The site now available may not be available later on, and it may be that to secure such a site at some future time may cost many times the price for which this site may be purchased now. At any rate, the city council is acting according to its own best judgment in the matter, and this court is without right to substitute its judgment for that of the council.

We have no doubt as to the right of the city council to make this purchase.

The cases cited by plaintiffs have no application whatever to the case at bar, to wit, Sugar v. Monroe, 108 La. 677, 32 So. 961, 59 L. R. A. 723; Cruse v. Police Jury, 151 La. 1056, 92 So. 679; O'Bierne v. Police Jury, 151 La. 1088, 92 So. 709; Id., 154 La. 329, 97 So. 461; and Young v. Bossier City, 154 La. 625, 98 So. 45. In all of those there was presented a case where a fund (or property) had been dedicated to some one particular purpose, without any discretion whatever in the trustee thereof to use same for any other, and of course this court held that the trustee must use it for that special purpose only. But here we have a case where there has been discretion vested in the trustee, and hence of course we will not interfere unless that discretion be abused, which it has not in this instance.

III.

We also think the school board has undoubtedly the right to sell land, which it originally purchased for school purposes, but for which it has no longer any need for said purposes and which is unsuitable therefor.

Manifestly the school board has no right to acquire lands for any other than school purposes, and, since it has no right to acquire lands for any...