Henderson v. Graddick
| Decision Date | 26 August 1986 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 86-H-680-N. |
| Parties | Jerry HENDERSON and Dejerilyn Henderson, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Charles GRADDICK, individually and in his official capacity as Attorney General of Alabama; John Baker, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Alabama State Democratic Executive Committee; and the Alabama State Democratic Executive Committee, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
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Ira A. Burnim, Deborah A. Ellis, Montgomery, Ala., Ralph I. Knowles, Jr., Jack Drake, Drake, Knowles & Pierce, Tuscaloosa, Ala., Neil Bradley, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs.
Hamilton P. Fox, III, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, Washington, D.C., Champ Lyons, Jr., Coale, Helmsing, Lyons & Sims, P.A., Mobile, Ala., Robert E. Sasser, Jones, Murray & Stewart, P.C., J. Anthony McLain, McLain & Hampton, Montgomery, Ala., Walter J. Sears, III, Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant Graddick.
Joseph C. Espy, III, Melton & Espy, Montgomery, Ala., for defendants Baker and Alabama State Democratic Executive Committee.
Before JOHNSON, Circuit Judge, and HOBBS and MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judges.
Plaintiffs are black citizens of Alabama who voted in both the Democratic primary on June 3, 1986 and the Democratic gubernatorial runoff on June 24, 1986. They seek to represent a class composed of all black registered voters who voted in both of these elections. The Court is satisfied that the prerequisites for a class action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are present, and, therefore, the action may proceed accordingly.
On behalf of themselves and the class they represent, plaintiffs contend that Charles Graddick, Attorney General of Alabama and a candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination for governor, attempted to administer and did in fact effect a change in the conduct of the June 24 runoff in violation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by using his office to advise voters they could vote in the Democratic runoff in violation of Democratic Party rules even though they had voted in the June 3 Republican primary and by preventing the Democratic Party from enforcing its rule prohibiting such "crossover" voting by threatening election officials with civil and criminal penalties if they attempted to prohibit crossover voting.
This Court concludes that Attorney General Graddick did violate the Voting Rights Act by this conduct, and he will therefore be enjoined from interfering with the operation of Art. VII, Section 1, subsection (e) of the Democratic Party of Alabama's rules. The Court will further direct that the Democratic Party of Alabama shall not certify Charles Graddick as its nominee unless he is successful in another runoff election at which those persons who voted in the June 3 Republican primary are excluded.
The Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)) and is properly convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
The Democratic primary of June 3, 1986 had a number of candidates for the party's gubernatorial nomination. Because no candidate received a majority of the votes in the June 3 Democratic primary, a runoff election was held on June 24 between the two candidates having the most votes: Lt. Governor William Baxley and Attorney General Charles Graddick. The rematch proved to be the closest in Alabama history, with Attorney General Graddick winning by only 8,756 votes of nearly a million cast.
Alabama law expressly provides that each party shall "determine who shall be entitled and qualified to vote" in the party's primary elections. Ala. Code § 17-16-14 (1975). Pursuant to this statutory authority, on April 21, 1979 the Alabama Democratic Party adopted as a part of its governing rules Article VII, § 1(e), which provides in relevant part:
Any person who (1) votes in any primary election of another political party, (2) participates in the nominating process of another party's candidate(s), or (3) promotes the candidacy of an independent candidate, shall not be entitled to vote in Primary Elections of the Democratic Party held in the calendar year in which such person does any of said prohibited act(s). Without limiting the foregoing, any person who votes in the first primary election of another political party shall not be entitled to vote in the Democratic Party's run-off Primary Election which follows such first primary election. (Emphasis added)
According to a former Executive Director of the Democratic Party, Ms. Lindblom, the Party adopted the anti-crossover rule as a result of some concerns caused by the Republican Party's first use of statewide primaries in 1978. (See Lindblom depo., pp. 12-13). In the 1978 primaries, persons who had voted in the Republican primary had then voted in the same primary for Democratic nominees or voted in the Democratic runoff after having voted in the Republican primary. Obviously, the Democratic Party has a legitimate concern about the possibility of "raiding;" which occurs, for example, when supporters of another political party choose their party's nominee and then help to name the nominee of the Democratic Party by voting for the weaker Democratic candidate. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973). The 1979 anti-crossover rule was a response to this concern, and made absolutely clear that persons who voted in a Republican primary could not thereafter vote in a Democratic runoff following such primary election.
After the anti-crossover rule was adopted, the Democratic Party had ten thousand copies of the rule printed and widely distributed throughout the state to probate judges, Democratic Committee members, officeholders generally, and to the news media. The rule was also a subject discussed on television talk shows in elections in 1980, 1982 and 1984, and was the subject of work shops in various areas of the state prior to those elections. Ms. Lindblom testified that the Democratic Party's position has been consistently the same since the rule's adoption in 1979.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required that the Democratic Party's anti-crossover rule be submitted for approval to the Attorney General of the United States or to a three judge court in the District of Columbia prior to its implementation. The United States Attorney General or the District of Columbia court then had the responsibility of determining whether the change in the law brought about by the new rule had the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race. Pursuant to Section 5's commands, this rule was submitted to the Attorney General of the United States and was approved, i.e., "precleared" by him in 1980 for enforcement as a valid, nondiscriminatory provision of Alabama law. That rule is thus enforceable and may not be modified or voided without first obtaining approval in either of the two fashions noted.
There have been two statewide Democratic Party runoffs since the rule was precleared by the U.S. Attorney General— in 1982 and 1984. No challenge was made by either the Democratic Party or a losing candidate to crossover votes in those runoffs. Mr. Al LaPierre, Executive Director of the Alabama State Democratic Party, testified in his deposition that the Democratic Party had no need to take affirmative measures in 1982 and 1984 to prevent crossover voting because very few people voted in Republican primaries in those years and there was no general solicitation of crossover votes by Democratic candidates for statewide office. Mr. LaPierre's testimony is uncontradicted, and the newspaper clippings introduced into evidence by Mr. Graddick are further evidence that no one urged the legality of crossover voting on a statewide basis in the 1982 and 1984 elections. Hence, the Democratic Party had no need to take special measures in the years prior to 1986 to enforce its rule forbidding crossover voting.
Beginning in early 1986, Mr. LaPierre and Mr. John Baker, Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee, began receiving notice that in some areas of the state, particularly Montgomery, Huntsville and Birmingham, some Republican officials and candidates who were running for local offices were telling voters they would not lose their right to vote in a Democratic gubernatorial runoff by voting in the Republican primary. Mr. Baker along with others in the state Democratic Party felt that because these were localized incidents, the response should be on a local level. Accordingly, press conferences were held in the areas where crossover voting was being encouraged, and the Party rule was publicized in those areas.
As the June 3 primary drew near, the claims by some in these areas that cross-over voting was permitted intensified. Mr. Baker considered filing a lawsuit to clarify the matter but abandoned the idea on advice of counsel that such a lawsuit might only exacerbate the problem and because no Montgomery County judge could take the case due to conflicts either of interest or scheduling. In any event, Mr. Baker thought the problem would best be handled by local Democratic Party officials giving further local publicity to the Party rule.
On June 2, 1986, the evening before the primary, a prominent reporter of the Alabama political scene broadcast on a Montgomery television station his editorial opinion that crossover voting was legal. Mr. Baker immediately tried to respond, but was not given an opportunity to present his rebuttal on the television station until June 11 or 12.
Soon after the June 3 primary, some Republican officials began encouraging crossover voting on a statewide basis. The state Democratic Party...
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