Henderson v. Lawrence

• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee
• Writing for the Court: WHITE
• Citation: 369 S.W.2d 553,16 McCanless 247,212 Tenn. 247
• Decision Date: 15 July 1963
• Parties: , 212 Tenn. 247 Eurydice HENDERSON, Appellant, v. Robert H. LAWRENCE and George G. Nowlin, Appellees.

Page 553

369 S.W.2d 553 16 McCanless 247, 212 Tenn. 247 Eurydice HENDERSON, Appellant,
v.
Robert H. LAWRENCE and George G. Nowlin, Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. July 15, 1963.

[212 Tenn. 248] F. C. Sewell, Memphis, for appellant.

Taylor & Taylor, Memphis, for appellees.

WHITE, Justice.

This case is before us on original bill and demurrer. The appellees say: 'The material allegations of appellant's bill must be accepted as the true facts surrounding the controversy.' This statement is in keeping with the general purpose of a demurrer, that is, it admits the facts in a bill to be true, but contends such facts do not constitute a cause of action. (See Gibson's Suits in Chancery, 5th Edition, Section 308.)

The facts are that prior to the death of Frank Henderson on March 4, 1911, he owned some real property located in Shelby County, Tennessee. He left surviving him a widow and four children, of whom appellant is one. The widow died in 1930. Two of the children predeceased her and another died in 1934, none of whom left children or descendants of children. Upon the death of these three children the appellant became the owner of the subject [212 Tenn. 249] property and has been in continuous possession thereof since 1930

On February 5, 1953, appellant conveyed said real estate to Vernon Lloyd and wife, Lila Lloyd, by warranty deed recorded in the Register's Office of Shelby County, Tennessee.

On May 9, 1962, Lila Lloyd conveyed said property to Robert H. Lawrence by warranty

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deed which was duly recorded in said Register's Office.

On July 12, 1962, Lila Lloyd was granted a decree of divorce from Vernon Lloyd and all of the right, title and interest in the subject real estate which Vernon Lloyd may have had was divested out of him and vested in Lila Lloyd. Thereafter, and on or about July 31, 1962 Lila Lloyd executed another warranty deed to Robert H. Lawrence which deed was also put of record. In this deed there was an express provision that the purpose of the execution of this second deed to Lawrence was to confirm and ratify the prior deed executed by her and her then husband to Robert H. Lawrence under date of May 9, 1962.

The original bill charges that the appellant inherited said property, as aforesaid, and that the conveyances were made as aforesaid.

In an amended bill it was charged that Robert H. Lawrence and George G. Nowlin filed a bill in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, in which they made oath that George G. Nowlin was the beneficial owner of said property.

It is further charged in said amended bill that George G. Nowlin, as the beneficial owner of said property, came [212 Tenn. 250] to complainant's home on the 24th day of October, 1962 and advised her that he had won the lawsuit and wanted immediate possession of the property in view of the fact that he had employed a man to grade and level the property so that he could begin the construction of houses.

It is charged in the original bill that Vernon Lloyd, one of the named defendants, 'approached your complainant with the proposition that he buy the property in question from her on easy terms, and that as a part of the consideration he would provide and maintain a home for * * * (her) during the remainder of * * * (her) life * * *. That your complainant refused to do this, but after much talk and persuasion on the part of the defendant, Vernon Lloyd, agreed to make a will devising the property to him, provided he would repair, remodel the home in which she was living,' and maintain a home for her during the remainder of her life giving to the said Vernon Lloyd the privilege of working said land and using the income therefrom for his own use, the property being about twenty-eight acres.

It is further charged that shortly after this conversation took place, said Vernon Lloyd came to complainant's home and took her, Sam Lloyd, who lived with her as her common law husband, and Lila Lloyd to the office of a lawyer who had been employed by Vernon and Lila Lloyd for the purpose of executing a will. It is then charged in the bill.

'That when they arrived at the lawyer's office she attempted to explain what they had in mind; that after some discussion the lawyer drafted a paper and showed her where to sign. That said paper was not read or explained to her in a manner so she could understand [212 Tenn. 251] it was a deed to her property and not a will. That it was pointed out where she should sign, which she did, thinking that it was a will carrying out the contract above mentioned.

'That your complainant was not paid one penny when the above paper was signed, and has not received one penny since that date from Vernon and Lila Lloyd.

'That your complainant is a woman with little education and can barely read and write, and suffered a severe head injury when a child.

'That the defendant, Vernon Lloyd, did not in any manner fulfill the contract they had entered into regarding a will and the use of said property; that the defendant, Vernon Lloyd, later got into some trouble and left town with another...