Henderson v. Lawrence

Citation369 S.W.2d 553,16 McCanless 247,212 Tenn. 247
Parties, 212 Tenn. 247 Eurydice HENDERSON, Appellant, v. Robert H. LAWRENCE and George G. Nowlin, Appellees.
Decision Date15 July 1963
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee

F. C. Sewell, Memphis, for appellant.

Taylor & Taylor, Memphis, for appellees.

WHITE, Justice.

This case is before us on original bill and demurrer. The appellees say: 'The material allegations of appellant's bill must be accepted as the true facts surrounding the controversy.' This statement is in keeping with the general purpose of a demurrer, that is, it admits the facts in a bill to be true, but contends such facts do not constitute a cause of action. (See Gibson's Suits in Chancery, 5th Edition, Section 308.)

The facts are that prior to the death of Frank Henderson on March 4, 1911, he owned some real property located in Shelby County, Tennessee. He left surviving him a widow and four children, of whom appellant is one. The widow died in 1930. Two of the children predeceased her and another died in 1934, none of whom left children or descendants of children. Upon the death of these three children the appellant became the owner of the subject property and has been in continuous possession thereof since 1930

On February 5, 1953, appellant conveyed said real estate to Vernon Lloyd and wife, Lila Lloyd, by warranty deed recorded in the Register's Office of Shelby County, Tennessee.

On May 9, 1962, Lila Lloyd conveyed said property to Robert H. Lawrence by warranty deed which was duly recorded in said Register's Office.

On July 12, 1962, Lila Lloyd was granted a decree of divorce from Vernon Lloyd and all of the right, title and interest in the subject real estate which Vernon Lloyd may have had was divested out of him and vested in Lila Lloyd. Thereafter, and on or about July 31, 1962 Lila Lloyd executed another warranty deed to Robert H. Lawrence which deed was also put of record. In this deed there was an express provision that the purpose of the execution of this second deed to Lawrence was to confirm and ratify the prior deed executed by her and her then husband to Robert H. Lawrence under date of May 9, 1962.

The original bill charges that the appellant inherited said property, as aforesaid, and that the conveyances were made as aforesaid.

In an amended bill it was charged that Robert H. Lawrence and George G. Nowlin filed a bill in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, in which they made oath that George G. Nowlin was the beneficial owner of said property.

It is further charged in said amended bill that George G. Nowlin, as the beneficial owner of said property, came to complainant's home on the 24th day of October, 1962 and advised her that he had won the lawsuit and wanted immediate possession of the property in view of the fact that he had employed a man to grade and level the property so that he could begin the construction of houses.

It is charged in the original bill that Vernon Lloyd, one of the named defendants, 'approached your complainant with the proposition that he buy the property in question from her on easy terms, and that as a part of the consideration he would provide and maintain a home for * * * (her) during the remainder of * * * (her) life * * *. That your complainant refused to do this, but after much talk and persuasion on the part of the defendant, Vernon Lloyd, agreed to make a will devising the property to him, provided he would repair, remodel the home in which she was living,' and maintain a home for her during the remainder of her life giving to the said Vernon Lloyd the privilege of working said land and using the income therefrom for his own use, the property being about twenty-eight acres.

It is further charged that shortly after this conversation took place, said Vernon Lloyd came to complainant's home and took her, Sam Lloyd, who lived with her as her common law husband, and Lila Lloyd to the office of a lawyer who had been employed by Vernon and Lila Lloyd for the purpose of executing a will. It is then charged in the bill.

'That when they arrived at the lawyer's office she attempted to explain what they had in mind; that after some discussion the lawyer drafted a paper and showed her where to sign. That said paper was not read or explained to her in a manner so she could understand it was a deed to her property and not a will. That it was pointed out where she should sign, which she did, thinking that it was a will carrying out the contract above mentioned.

'That your complainant was not paid one penny when the above paper was signed, and has not received one penny since that date from Vernon and Lila Lloyd.

'That your complainant is a woman with little education and can barely read and write, and suffered a severe head injury when a child.

'That the defendant, Vernon Lloyd, did not in any manner fulfill the contract they had entered into regarding a will and the use of said property; that the defendant, Vernon Lloyd, later got into some trouble and left town with another woman and has not been heard from since that date, except in a round about way, and at no time has his address been obtained even though strenuous efforts have been made to locate him.'

It is then alleged in the original bill that the complainant has been in possession of said property since the year 1930 and has lived on it continuously since that date, with the exception of one short interval prior to the year 1950 during which time she rented said property and collected the rent therefrom.

She prayed that an injunction issue restraining and prohibiting the defendants from interfering with her possession of the property in question and that the aforesaid deeds and the divesting and vesting of title as set out in the decree of divorce be declared null and void and that they be removed as a cloud on her title to said property.

In the amended and supplemental bill which was filed with leave of the court, it is charged that during the latter part of 1961 the defendants, Robert H. Lawrence and George G. Nowlin, had actual notice prior to the time that Lila Lloyd conveyed the property to Robert H. Lawrence that your complainant claimed the property in question as her own and further that she claimed the deed to Vernon Lloyd and Lila Lloyd was obtained by fraud and without consideration. It is also averred that these defendants had knowledge that she, the complainant, had agreed to make a will devising the property in question to Vernon Lloyd provided he maintained a home for her and Sam Lloyd during the remainder of their lives.

In the prayer in the amended bill an injunction was sought to restrain and prohibit the defendants, Nowlin and Lawrence, from interfering with complainant's possession of the property in question until the final determination of the matters in controversy by the court.

The defendants, Nowlin and Lawrence, filed separate demurrers to the original bill which were treated as demurrers to the bill as amended. Upon the hearing, the Chancellor sustained said demurrers and dismissed complainant's bill as amended.

The court granted a temporary injunction restraining and prohibiting the defendant, George G. Nowlin, from interfering with complainant's possession of the property constituting the subject matter of this suit, pending an appeal by the complainant to this Court and conditioned upon the complainant making an injunction bond in the penal sum of $1,000.00, or upon taking the oath for poor persons as required by law. The issuance of the injunction was also conditioned upon complainant paying into the registry of the court all rents collected from said property pending determination of the issues raised by this case.

Publication was made for Vernon Lloyd and upon his failure to appear and answer a pro confesso was taken as to him.

The answer filed by Lila Lloyd states:

'This defendant says, however, that it is her intention that the complainant and Sam Lloyd be allowed to live on the property...

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    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee
    • February 27, 2009
    ...C/A No. M2004-02414-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 344759 at *12 (Tenn.Ct. App.M.S., Feb. 14, 2006)(emphasis added); accord Henderson v. Lawrence, 212 Tenn. 247, 369 S.W.2d 553, 556 (1963) (stating "A bona fide purchaser is one who buys for a valuable consideration without knowledge or notice of facts ......
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    ...of the defect in the title and of the Banks’ liens, and as such, were not bona fide purchasers for value. See Henderson v. Lawrence, 212 Tenn. 247, 369 S.W.2d 553, 556 (1963) (noting that a bona fide "purchaser is one who buys for a valuable consideration without knowledge or notice of fact......
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    ...without knowledge or notice of facts material to the title." In re Silver Dollar, 2008 WL 53695, at *3; see also Henderson v. Lawrence, 369 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn.Page 25 1963). As a hypothetical bona fide purchaser under section 544(a)(3), the Trustee "is deemed to have conducted a title se......
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