Henderson v. Mogren
| Decision Date | 28 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | 2120346. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
| Parties | James Michael HENDERSON v. Julie Jones MOGREN (f/k/a Julie Jones Henderson). |
Kelli F. McDaniel, Montgomery, for appellant.
William R. Blanchard of Blanchard Law Offices, Montgomery, for appellee.
James Michael Henderson (“Henderson”) and Julie Jones Mogren, formerly Julie Jones Henderson (hereinafter referred to as “the former wife” or “Mogren”), were married in 1992 and divorced on October 25, 2006, by a judgment (“the divorce judgment”) entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court. The divorce judgment incorporated the parties' settlement agreement. Regarding Henderson's alimony and life-insurance obligations, which are the subjects of the present appeal, the divorce judgment provided:
(Emphasis added.)
On January 22, 2010, the former wife filed a contempt petition alleging that Henderson had accrued an alimony arrearage of $24,690 and that he had failed to acquire a term life-insurance policy naming her as the beneficiary or the parties' then adult children as the successor beneficiaries. The former wife also alleged that Henderson had failed to pay the parties' income taxes for 2006, the last year in which they were married, which failure, she alleged, resulted in her being liable for “probably not less than $5,000” in unpaid income taxes. She also requested an award of attorney fees. On February 23, 2010, Henderson filed for personal bankruptcy, under Chapter 13 of the federal Bankruptcy Code; as a result, the contempt action was placed on the circuit court's administrative docket, but it was restored to the circuit court's active docket on May 13, 2010. On September 1, 2010, the parties filed a modification agreement for the court's approval, in which they agreed to modify certain provisions of the divorce judgment.
In the modification agreement, the parties agreed that Henderson would pay the former wife $900 per month for 78 months ($900 x 78 = $70,200) and $652.08 on the first day of the 79th month ($70,200 + $652.08 = $70,852.08). Furthermore, Henderson promised to purchase a term life-insurance policy within 30 days in the amount of $150,000 naming the former wife as the beneficiary and their adult children as successor beneficiaries. Neither the alleged income-tax obligation nor the former wife's request for attorney fees was specifically addressed in the modification agreement.
According to the former wife, the modification agreement reflected the parties' attempt to “refinance” Henderson's alimony obligation, and, according to Henderson, his intent was to “fulfill the commitment that [he] had made to [the former wife] previously [—] trying to structure in such a way where [he] could live up to that commitment”; however, Henderson stated, at all times he believed that his alimony obligation would terminate upon the former wife's remarriage. The former wife asserts that, in determining the amount to be paid by Henderson pursuant to the modification agreement ($70,852.08), the parties added Henderson's alimony arrearage of $33,920,1 the former wife's attorney fees in the amount of $2,500, the former wife's payment of income taxes that Henderson had agreed to pay but had failed to pay in the amount of $4,500, and the remaining alimony payments in the monthly amount of $1,200 that had yet to accrue under the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce judgment representing (approximately) 24 months, or $28,800. The total of those sums equals $69,720, which, when divided by 78, equals $893.85. The circuit court entered a judgment incorporating the parties' modification agreement (“the contempt judgment”) on August 31, 2010. In March 2011, the former wife remarried and changed her surname to “Mogren.” Upon the former wife's remarriage, Henderson stopped paying alimony to Mogren but began paying the monthly amount of $900 into his attorney's trust account. Henderson did not purchase a term life-insurance policy.
On December 13, 2011, Henderson filed a petition for a modification of the contempt judgment. He requested the termination of his alimony obligation because, he said, the divorce judgment and the contempt judgment had awarded periodic alimony and his obligation to pay alimony had terminated upon Mogren's remarriage. Mogren filed an answer and an amended answer to Henderson's petition in which she admitted that she had remarried, but she argued that the judgments had awarded her alimony in gross and that Henderson's obligation to pay alimony in gross had not terminated upon her remarriage. Mogren filed a “Counter Petition for Contempt Citation” in which she asserted that Henderson had failed to pay alimony payments or to provide proof that he had purchased a term life-insurance policy as ordered in the contempt judgment. It is undisputed that in January 2012 Henderson purchased a term life-insurance policy in the amount of $150,000 naming Mogren as the sole beneficiary but failing to name the parties' children as successor beneficiaries.
A hearing was held on August 29, 2012, and on September 5, 2012. On September 12, 2012, the circuit court entered its judgment (“the modification judgment”) determining that paragraph seven of the divorce judgment, which was modified by the contempt judgment, had awarded alimony in gross. It ordered Henderson to immediately pay the past-due amounts of alimony, to resume alimony payments, and to pay Mogren's attorney fees in the amount of $2,561.01. It held Henderson in contempt for failing to pay alimony to Mogren and for failing to follow its orders regarding the term life-insurance policy. The circuit court retained jurisdiction to determine the amount of interest due on the past-due alimony installments.
On October 10, 2012, Henderson filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the modification judgment, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. According to Henderson, the evidence indicated that the alimony award in paragraph seven of the divorce judgment, which was modified by the contempt judgment, was a periodic-alimony award because, he asserted, there was “absolutely no marital estate” from which the circuit court could have awarded alimony in gross in the divorce judgment and, he asserted, the circuit court had merely modified the alimony award in the contempt judgment. A hearing on Henderson's postjudgment motion was held, and the circuit court entered an order denying Henderson's motion on December 14, 2012. Henderson filed an appeal on January 25, 2013, seeking this court's review as to whether the circuit court had erred by determining that the award of alimony in paragraph seven of the divorce judgment, which was modified by the contempt judgment, was an award of alimony in gross, by denying his request to terminate his alimony obligation, by holding him in contempt, and by ordering him to pay Mogren's attorney fees.2
The parties' dispute regarding alimony centers on whether Henderson's alimony obligation terminated upon Mogren's remarriage. We conclude that the circuit court's determination that the alimony award was an award of alimony in gross is error; however, the circuit court did not err by denying Henderson's request to terminate his alimony obligation.
Testimony and documentary evidence admitted at the modification hearing indicate that the parties negotiated the terms pertaining to alimony contained in the divorce judgment in an e-mail exchange in 2006. Mogren requested graduated alimony payments—$1,200 per month for 6 months, $1,400 per month until the end of the “first year,” and $1,800 per month for 9 years. Henderson counteroffered, proposing to pay “a flat $1,200 per month for 60 months subject to a review of each of our earnings, and your remarriage, cohabitation, etc.” Mogren counteroffered, requesting “$1,200 per month, for 72 months, no conditions, no reviews.” Henderson accepted Mogren's counteroffer, and their agreement was memorialized in paragraph seven of the settlement agreement, which, as already mentioned, included the following sentence: “The provisions of this paragraph in particular and of this Settlement Agreement in general are part of an integrated bargain between the parties and cannot be modified by the Court without the consent of both parties.” (Emphasis added.) Thereafter the parties consented to a modification of the settlement agreement...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Young v. Corrigan, 2160325
...in finding the mother in contempt, we decline to reverse the trial court's judgments on this point. See, e.g., Henderson v. Mogren, 149 So.3d 629, 639 (Ala.Civ.App. 2014) (upholding attorney-fee award when appellant limited his argument to the merits of the contempt finding that was determi......
- Milligan v. Milligan
-
Hopkins v. Hopkins
...with regard to the attorney's fee award, we decline to reverse the trial court's judgment on this point. See, e.g., Henderson v. Mogren, 149 So.3d 629, 639 (Ala. 2014) (upholding attorney-fee award when appellant limited his argument to the merits of the contempt finding that was determined......