Henderson v. Stokes

• Decision Date: 28 March 1887
• Citation: 42 N.J.E. 586,8 A. 718
• Parties: HENDERSON v. STOKES.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

8 A. 718

42 N.J.E. 586

HENDERSON

v. STOKES.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

March 28, 1887.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

On bill for specific performance.

C. G. Garrison, for complainant.

R. J. Clymer, for defendant.

BIRD, V. C. This bill is filed to reform a writing, which contains a promise to convey real estate, signed by the defendant, and to specifically perform such promise. The writing is in these words:

"Received of John M. Henderson one hundred dollars on account of purchase of dwelling and store property occupied by William S. Conner and Carr & Smith, on Main St., Woodbury, N. J., I to give him deed for the same August 1, 1886, conditional that he pay six thousand dollars for the property.

"George P. Stokes."

This writing bears date and was executed and delivered July 7, 1886. The lots of land named adjoin each other, and are of equal depth. The complainant says that the agreement was that a portion of another lot lying in the rear of the two named should have been included in the writing. The lots named are 117 feet deep, and the complainant says that the agreement was that they were both to be extended about 25 feet, to the extension of the line of a lot then recently sold to a sister of the defendant.

The parties had had several interviews before the money was paid, and the receipt containing the promise to convey was given. He says at one of these interviews he asked if the lots so occupied by Conner and Carr & Smith would not be extended to the corner of the lots sold to Mrs. Stokes in case the bargain should be completed, and that the defendant agreed that they should, but this is denied by the defendant. After this alleged interview respecting the extension of the lots, the parties met and had other interviews respecting the sale and purchase, and on July 3, 1886, the defendant called on the complainant, and told him that he could have the lots for $6,000. Prior to that time the point of difference between them had been the consideration to be paid; on the one hand it being urged that the consideration asked was first $7,000, and then $6,500, and finally $6,000, while, on the other, it is urged that $6,500 was the first price named. I mention this fact, because, from the testimony on the part of the defendant, it would appear that the consideration for the lots occupied by Conner and by Carr & Smith was the only question that the parties did not agree upon, and that the quantity of land was in nowise taken into account, it being understood from the first that the two lots named, and only those two, without any addition, were in the minds of the parties; while the complainant insists that the subject-matter of their interviews comprehended the extension of said lots, although he admits that matter was not spoken of once. It appears from the complainant's statement that the time when he inquired, in case he bought, whether such extension would be made or not, was some time prior to the consummation of the negotiations, on July 3d. When the negotiations were concluded, it does not appear that there was any understanding that the terms of the agreement should be reduced to writing.

July 5th the complainant called upon Edwin Stokes, a nephew of the defendant, and with whom the complainant had had one or more conversations respecting the price of the lots, and asked him to accept of $100 as part payment of the consideration for the lots, and to give him a receipt therefor, intimating that he would prefer to deal with him. Edwin then drew the receipt above copied, and submitted it to the complainant, who read it, and understood it, and claimed that it should have included the extension referred to. Edwin told him "no; that that was not included in the agreement; and that he couldn't have it." They parted, with the understanding that Edwin was to have the defendant sign the receipt. He procured such signature, and about two hours afterwards the complainant called on Edwin and took the receipt.

The parties and the witnesses are of the highest standing for integrity. The defendant emphatically denies any agreement or promise to sell any land beyond the bounds of the lots occupied by Conner and by Carr & Smith. The complainant says that the additional land was to be included, and that, on one occasion after the receipt was signed and delivered, the defendant admitted that he had agreed to include it by saying: "Well, I oughtn't to have sold you that, for it was leased to L. B. Brown & Co. as a lumber yard." The defendant denied this on his direct examination; but on cross-examination was made to admit it; and, again, when re-examined, very pointedly denied it. These statements show all that there is in the case up to the time of the delivery of the receipt. 1 cannot perceive that anything appears afterwards to strengthen the one side or...