Henderson v. Stone
| Decision Date | 03 April 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-2575,89-2575 |
| Citation | 930 F.2d 25 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. Sylvester HENDERSON and Veronica Henderson, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Fred STONE, Karl Schmitt, Denise Gray, Stephen Janka, Alan Lucas, W. Dorsch, J. Brimer, Washington Booker, James P. Moss, Officer Ploszaj, Fred A. Ramano, Robert Maeyama, Leroy Lerchin, Gerrald Hamilton and Gaughae, Assistant State's Attorney, Felony review unit, Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Sylvester Henderson and his wife, Veronica, pro se, appeal the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiffs' civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The Hendersons allege numerous constitutional violations relating to the arrest of Sylvester, which resulted in his conviction for rape and deviant sexual assault. The district court found that, with the exception of one allegation, all of the issues that the Hendersons raise in their section 1983 claim were litigated at the suppression hearing or in the state appellate court and decided on the merits. Consequently, the district court held that those issues are barred by collateral estoppel as to both plaintiffs. The district court also held that the Hendersons' conspiracy allegation failed to raise a genuine issue for trial.
In their appellate brief, the Hendersons repeat several of the same issues guised under various constitutional provisions that they allege were neither litigated nor decided on the merits. These allegations are not supported by the record. We agree with the district court that the Illinois courts would apply collateral estoppel to all but one of the issues in this case. See Stevenson v. City of Chicago, 638 F.Supp. 136, 141 (N.D.Ill.1986).
After reviewing the decision of the district court, the briefs, and the record, we have determined that the district court properly identified and resolved the issues now before us on appeal. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court for the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion.
FRED STONE, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDERPlaintiffs Sylvester and Veronica Henderson (husband and wife) bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 alleging that defendant police officers violated their constitutional rights in the process of arresting plaintiff Sylvester Henderson (Henderson). Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that certain of plaintiffs' fourteen claims are barred by collateral estoppel and, with respect to the remaining counts, plaintiffs fail to raise a triable issue. For the following reasons, we grant defendants' motion.
Henderson was arrested and his home searched, without a warrant, in Will County, Illinois, on September 22, 1983, in furtherance of a police investigation involving a rape which occurred in Chicago just hours before the arrest. Henderson and a co-defendant, James Sims, were charged with rape and deviate sexual assault. Following a jury trial on August 9, 1984, Henderson was found guilty of both charges and sentenced to life imprisonment under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, p 33B-1).
Both Henderson and Sims appealed their convictions to the Illinois Appellate Court, alleging the lower court incorrectly denied their motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The Appellate Court affirmed Henderson's conviction and sentence, People v. Sims, 166 Ill.App.3d 289, 519 N.E.2d 921, 116 Ill.Dec. 706 (1st Dist.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 118 (1988), and the Illinois Supreme Court denied further review. Plaintiffs subsequently instituted this present civil action.
In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that Henderson was arrested on fabricated charges, without adequate investigation, without a warrant, and by police officers outside of their jurisdiction; that their home was forcefully entered and searched without a warrant; that Henderson was detained without being informed of the charges against him and held so that a case could be fabricated against him; and that the officers destroyed allegedly exculpatory evidence. (2nd am.cplt. at paragraphs 140-153.) Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendants "entered into a conspiracy with others to deprive plaintiff of equal protection and due process of law ... and failed to prevent their co-conspirators from violating plaintiff's rights" (cplt. at p 153).
All defendants 1 filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that plaintiffs' claims are either barred by collateral estoppel or fail to raise a genuine issue for trial.
Defendants allege that several of the grounds advanced by plaintiffs have already been decided in state court, and are thus barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We first determine whether state criminal proceedings are given collateral estoppel effect in a federal civil proceeding.
In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Supreme Court held that state criminal proceedings may serve to estop federal section 1983 civil actions. The Court there stated that
... nothing in the legislative history of Section 1983 reveals any purpose to afford less deference to judgments in state criminal proceedings than to those in state civil proceedings. There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged at all.
Id. at 104. A number of courts have held Sec. 1983 actions barred by prior state criminal proceedings based on Allen. See, e.g., County of Cook v. Midcon Corporation However, a federal court will afford only the same preclusive effect to a prior state criminal proceeding that would be given by the state's own collateral estoppel standards. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 375 (1985), rehr'g denied, 471 U.S. 1062 (1985), ("Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738, a federal court generally is required to consider first the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered to determine its preclusive effect."); Haring et al. v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983); County of Cook v. Midcon et al., 773 F.2d at 898 (). This rule is designed to "promote the comity between state and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 96. Therefore, we next examine Illinois preclusion law.
et al., 773 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir.1988); Stevenson v. Illinois, 638 F.Supp. 136, 138 (N.D.Ill.1986); Lucien v. Roegner, 574 F.Supp. 118, 120 (N.D.Ill.1983).
The standards for invoking collateral estoppel in Illinois are:
(1) that the issue decided in the prior adjudication be identical with the one presented in the case under review; (2) that the party against whom the estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation; and (3) that there has been a final judgment on the merits in the former suit. Moreover, for collateral estoppel to apply, a plaintiff must be afforded a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate.
Raper v. Hazlett & Erdal, 114 Ill.App.3d 649, 652, 449 N.E.2d 268, 270, 70 Ill.Dec. 394, 396 (1st Dist.1983) (citations omitted). See also County of Cook v. Midcon et al., 773 F.2d at 898; Whitley v. Seibel, 676 F.2d 245, 248 n. 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 942 (1982).
As to Sylvester Henderson, the requirements for invoking collateral estoppel appear to have been met. 2 Henderson was a party in the prior litigation, which concluded with a final judgment on the merits. Further, he had ample incentive to litigate his claim in the criminal proceeding, as was noted by Judge Hart: "Because of the potentially serious consequences of a felony conviction, a defendant in a criminal proceeding has ample incentive to fully litigate Fourth Amendment issues in the suppression hearing in hopes of excluding potentially damaging evidence." Stevenson v. City of Chicago, 638 F.Supp. at 141.
It is important to note that Henderson does not allege any form of misconduct by the Illinois Appellate Court. Rather, he chooses to argue that the court was in error as a matter of law. "As a general matter, even when issues have been raised, argued, and decided in a prior proceeding, and are therefore preclusive under state law, '[r]edetermination of [the] issues [may nevertheless be] warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.' " Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. at 317-18 (brackets in original), quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n. 11 (1979). Henderson has provided no reason to doubt the Illinois courts.
The final task is to determine if any of plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claims were decided on the merits in the earlier state court proceedings. If they were, they are barred due to the judicial concerns underlying collateral estoppel, namely, "reliev[ing] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserv[ing] judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourag[ing] reliance on...
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