Henderson v. Travelers Indem. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1963
• Docket Number: No. 10026,10026
• Citation: Henderson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 158 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1963)
• Parties: Pinanko ('Pin') HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana

Page 365

158 So.2d 365

Pinanko ('Pin') HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 10026 Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Nov. 1, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 6, 1963.

Theus, Grisham, Davis, Leigh & Brown, Monroe, for appellants.

Robinson & Atkins, Homer, for appellee.

Before HARDY, AYRES and BOLIN, JJ.

AYRES, Judge.

This action for damages arose out of a collision between plaintiff's Chevrolet and defendant John R. Malone's Cadillac, at the intersection of South Main and West Third Streets in the Town of Homer.

Negligence charged to defendant included his failure to accord plaintiff the right of way, or to maintain a proper lookout, or to keep his vehicle under control, in entering the intersection (a blind corner) at an excessive rate of speed, and in accelerating his speed in order to 'beat' plaintiff across the intersection. The defendants, Malone and his public liablity insurer, contended that Malone had the right of way and, moreover, had preempted the intersection, and charged plaintiff with negligence, or, in the alternative, contributory negligence constituting a cause of the accident. Specified were plaintiff's alleged failure to accord defendant the right of way, to keep a proper lookout, or to keep his vehicle under control, or to take evasive action to avoid the accident.

After trial, plaintiff was found to have entered the intersection on a green light and that his actions were those of a reasonable and prudent operator. To the contrary, it was found that defendant Malone, whose lateral vision was impaired by fog on his windows and windshield, was negligent in entering a blind intersection with the traffic light, as to him, out of order, and consequently not working, without his first having ascertained that he could negotiate the intersection in safety to himself and to normally operating traffic on the intersecting street, which had a favorable signal and a preference and priority. Accordingly, there was judgment in plaintiff's favor from which defendants appealed. Plaintiff, by answer to the appeal, has prayed for an increase in the award.

Material undisputed facts, or about which there could be little, if any, controversy, may be briefly stated. The movement of traffic through the intersection at the acene of the accident is controlled by an electric light of the usual and customary design, suspended above the center of the intersection. Plaintiff was proceeding easterly on South Main Street; defendant, south on West Third Street. A church on the west side of West Third Street, facing north, covers the block alongside said street and extends to South Main Street. A 'blind corner therefore exists, particularly as to traffic southbound on West Third Street. Fog on defendant's car windows and windshield obscured or obstructed his view except through the area where his windshield wipers operated. The accident occurred in the southwest quadrant of the intersection. Following the accident, plaintiff's car came to rest facing west. Defendant's vehicle took and pursued a southeasterly course, striking a residence located at the southeast corner of the intersection. Plaintiff did not see defendant's car until the moment of the impact of the collision.

A controverted fact is that defendant Malone stopped at the intersection and looked for traffic before he entered the intersection. Defendant testified, however, that, when only three feet into, or one-eighth of the distance across, the street intersection, he saw plaintiff approaching it at a distance of 140 feet, whereupon he accelerated his speed in an effort to beat plaintiff across the intersection. With his windows and windshield fogged as they were, because of the fact, as defendant testified, that the car remained, during the previous night, unprotected from the weather, it is difficult to understand, with his restricted view, how he could see plaintiff's car a distance of 140 feet away and to his right. Moreover, the speed of plaintiff's vehicle would hardly be indicative that his car was such a distance away.

Defendant's primary complaint of error in the judgment appealed relates to the question of liability. This complaint is predicated upon the contention that plaintiff did not see defendant's car until the moment of the impact, and that plaintiff must, therefore, be found not to have kept or maintained a proper lookout. Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. That plaintiff had a favorable signal, a green light, is not disputed. Plaintiff, before reaching the intersection, ascertained that he had a favorable signal. He continued his observation of the light, mindful that it did not change, until he actually entered the intersection.

A motorist on a right-of-way street with knowledge of the location of a stop sign or that he has a favorable signal light, has a right to assume that any driver, approaching the intersection from a less favorable street, will observe the law and bring his vehicle to a complete stop, or will await a favorable signal before entering the intersection. Such motorist can indulge in this assumption until he sees, or should see, that the driver of the other car has not observed, or is not going to observe, the law. Koob v. Cooperative Cab Co., 213 La. 903, 35 So.2d 849; Ryan v. Allstate Insurance Company of Chicago, 232 La. 831, 95 So.2d 328; Steele v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 235 La. 564, 105 So.2d 222; Henderson v. Central Mutual Insurance Company, 238 La. 250, 115 So.2d 339.

Plaintiff was shown to have been proceeding at a speed of 15--20 m.p.h., concededly a moderate and reasonable speed. He thus had his car under such control as to meet and respond to any hazard which might be expected under normal conditions, and this was all the law required of him.

With reference to a motorist proceeding on a favorable signal, it was pointed out in Youngblood v. Robison, 239 La. 338, 118 So.2d 431, 434, that

'He was not obliged, * * * to turn his head in the direction of traffic approaching from his left or right, or from both left and right, to ascertain whether someone might violate the law by running the crossing on a red light. On the contrary, he had the right, under our jurisprudence, to assume that the law would be respected.'

That plaintiff had the right of way was fully established. The signal light, as heretofore stated, was favorable to him. He had a right to rely upon it. Moreover, he was approaching the intersection from defendant's right. In the absence of the control of the movement of traffic by signal or otherwise, plaintiff had the directional right of way under the provisions of the Highway Regulatory Act. LSA-R.S. 32:237, subd. A; Montalbano v. Hall, La.App. 2d Cir., 1958, 108 So.2d 16, 19; Terrill v. ICT Insurance Co., La.App.1st Cir., 1957, 93 So.2d 292, 295. Upon noticing the nonoperation of the traffic signal light to him, it became incumbent upon defendant driver to exercise extraordinary precaution before and on entering the intersection. Terrill v. ICT Insurance Co., supra; Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marquette Casualty Co., La.App.3d Cir., 1962, 140 So.2d 750.

A point of law involved in these cases concerned the relative duties of two motorists converging on...