Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 60214,60214
• Citation: 354 So.2d 1031
• Parties: Rose J. HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant-Relator, v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO. et al., Defendants-Appellees-Respondents.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 1031

354 So.2d 1031

Rose J. HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant-Relator, v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO. et al., Defendants-Appellees-Respondents.

No. 60214.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 30, 1978.

John G. Fontenot, Guillory, McGee & Mayeux, Eunice, for plaintiff-appellant-relator.

Don L. Broussard, Harry V. Singreen, John F. Caraway, A Professional Law Corporation, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees-respondents.

Lemuel E. Hawsey, III, Ronald E. Stutes, Baton Rouge, for amicus curiae.

TATE, Justice.

The claimant was denied workmen's compensation benefits. 346 So.2d 816 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977), certiorari granted, 349 So.2d 886 (La.1977).

The question before us is whether a dependent concubine in popular parlance, a "common-law wife" is totally barred from receiving workmen's compensation benefits arising out of the work-caused death of her "common-law husband", with whom she had been living in a stable home relationship for eleven years. The rights of no member of the decedent's legitimate family who are preferred claimants, anyway, under our compensation law are involved, since the decedent was not married, had no children, and was survived by no dependent parents or siblings.

Stated more technically, the precise legal issue is: Under the circumstances shown above, may the dependent concubine of a workman fatally injured at work recover workmen's compensation benefits, on the basis that she is a dependent member of his family, La.R.S. 23:1232(8), 1253, when her doing so will not infringe upon any share of compensation benefits to which statutorily entitled claimants (wife, child, parent) are preferentially entitled, La.R.S. 23:1232(1)-(7)?

We hold that she may, reversing the previous dismissal of her claim for compensation. In doing so, we overrule Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Co., 235 La. 355, 103 So.2d 895 (1958), which held to the contrary.

I.

The undisputed facts show:

The decedent, George Henderson, died as the result of a work-accident in 1971. George Henderson and the claimant, Rose Henderson, had been living together as man and wife for eleven years (i. e., since 1960) in a stable, loving relationship. Rose was totally dependent on the decedent. (He had, moreover, supported her three children by a prior marriage, who lived in their home. However, the children were no longer dependent upon him at the time of his death.)

At the time of his accident, George Henderson was earning $450 per week. If entitled to workmen's compensation benefits, the claimant is entitled to recover them at the rate of $49 per week, not to exceed 500 weeks. La.R.S. 23:1231 (1968). ¹ The insurer paid the claimant compensation benefits at this weekly rate between the decedent's death in 1971 and early 1974. It then terminated payments upon finding reason to doubt the validity of a (claimed but unproved) Mississippi marriage or common-law marriage. ²

The decedent is not shown to be survived by any wife, child, or other dependent.

II.

The claimant seeks workmen's compensation benefits as an "other dependent" "member of the family". La.R.S. 23:1232(8), 1253. This classification of dependents receives compensation only if compensation liability to certain preferred classifications of dependents (spouse, child, parent, brother, sister) does not exhaust the maximum benefits payable by the employer. La.R.S. 23-1231, 1232; Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So.2d 177 (1953); Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 305 (1951; 1964 pocket part).

Except for the concubine, the jurisprudence is well settled that a member of the decedent's family household, if dependent, is entitled to recover compensation benefits when a contributing wage earner dies as the result of work-caused injuries. The dependent member of the family group is entitled to compensation regardless of blood relationship or the technicalities of inheritance law. This broad interpretation has been adopted to effectuate the socio-economic purposes of the statute to provide compensation for dependents deprived of support through the work-caused death of the decedent.

See: Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So.2d 177 (1953); Patin v. T. L. James & Co., 218 La. 949, 51 So.2d 586 (1951); Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So.2d 842 (1944); Archibald v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 202 La. 89, 11 So.2d 492; Malone, cited above, Section 304. See also: McDermott v. Funel, 258 La. 657, 247 So.2d 567 (1971).

The sole jurisprudential exception to this rule is the concubine in popular language, a "common-law wife".

The status as concubine arises when a man and a woman live together in a permanent relationship as husband and wife, although without benefit of matrimony or a putative marriage. See, e. g.; Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310, 94 So.2d 270 (1957); Succession of Jahraus, 114 La. 456, 38 So. 417 (1905); Succession of Keuhling, 187 So.2d 520 (La.App.3d Cir. 1966); Note, 32 Tul.L.Rev. 127 (1957). As we stated in Gauff v. Johnson, 161 La. 975, 977, 109 So. 782, 783 (1926): " * * * the concubine must not be confounded with the courtesan, or even what is ordinarily called a mistress. She is a wife without title."

We held that a man and a woman living together in this relationship constitute a family for purposes of the workmen's compensation act; therefore, their children are entitled to compensation benefits if the wage earner is killed at work, as dependent members of the family. Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So.2d 842 (1945). ³ Even the concubine's nephew living in the household, if dependent on the wage-earner, is entitled to workmen's compensation benefits as a member of his family for purposes of the compensation act. Patin v. T. L. James & Co., 218 La. 949, 51 So.2d 586 (1951).

Nevertheless, in Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Co., 235 La. 355, 103 So.2d 895 (1958), this court refused to allow compensation benefits to the concubine herself. We followed two earlier intermediate court decisions to the same effect. We did so primarily because we thought it beyond the legislative intent to allow any recovery whatsoever to the concubine, even though dependent, arising out of an illicit relationship "not countenanced by" the laws of our state stating, " 'Where there is turpitude, the law will help neither party to the transaction.' " 103 So.2d 903.

III.

In the present case, the court of appeal reluctantly followed Humphreys, since it had not yet been overruled. ⁴ However, the intermediate court correctly noted that the Humphreys decision is inconsistent with Archibald and Thompson, cited above, and with the intent of the compensation act as a whole.

In these latter decisions we held that the workmen's compensation act was designed to protect all dependent members of the family household from the loss of support caused by a wage-earner's death through work-accident. The industry which caused the loss should bear it, not the individual nor the taxpayer through welfare benefits. "Undoubtedly, the Legislature intended to allow compensation to those who were dependent upon an employee for support." Archibald, at 11 So.2d 493-94. See Thompson, at 22 So.2d 857. ⁵

As Professor Malone noted in his authoritative treatise, the denial of compensation to the concubine because of moral turpitude "is more moralistic than it is sound. No other claimant need prove his moral worthiness so long as he or she is dependent. It would seem that the fault of the dependent concubine should no more exclude her from compensation than should the fault of the employee himself. . . . The social need for compensation here is as great as though the dictates of convention had been met. It does not seem fair that the employer or his insurer should benefit by the windfall." Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 304, p. 399 (1951).

We are unable to find in the terms of the compensation act itself any legislative intent to deny compensation benefits to any dependent member of the decedent's family household because of moral unworthiness. Under the terms of the act, all dependent members of the family are entitled to compensation, subject only to the priority of preferred claimants who exhaust the statutory maximum weekly payments.

Further, we are unable to find any general legislative policy indicating a desire to punish a concubine by depriving her of all benefits or rights whatsoever because of her status. The status is not punishable by criminal penalty, for instance. Historically, the civil penalty has been, not to deprive the concubine of any right whatsoever to receive donations or testamentary dispositions, but only to limit the amount which may be donated. La.Civil Code art. 1481.

In Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388, 389-90 (1930), for instance, we pointed out that "In the absence of express legislation on the subject, we have no judicial authority or power to draw a distinction between the classes of beneficiaries named in life insurance policies", so as to deny recovery to a concubine. Similarly, here, in the absence of indication that the legislature desired to exclude concubines from the dependency benefits otherwise allowable under the terms of the statute, we conclude that we erred in Humphreys in importing moral unworthiness as a criterion for eligibility for compensation benefits, and in thus excluding dependent concubines alone from the compensation benefits to which all dependent members of the deceased wage earner's family household are entitled by statute. ⁶ We therefore overrule Humphreys.

Decree

Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the previous courts which had dismissed the plaintiff's suit and had granted the defendants judgment on their reconventional demand. For the reasons assigned, we render judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Rose J. Henderson, and against the defendants, Travelers Insurance Company and Fred A. Setton, holding them...