Henderson v. United States
| Decision Date | 19 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1744,84-1744 |
| Citation | 90 L.Ed.2d 299,476 U.S. 321,106 S.Ct. 1871 |
| Parties | Thomas J. HENDERSON, Scott O. Thornton and Ruth Freedman, Petitioners v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The Speedy Trial Act (Act) commands that a defendant be tried within 70 days of the latest of either the filing of an indictment or information, or the first appearance before a judge or magistrate. However, a provision of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (hereafter subsection (F)), excludes from this time "[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including . . . delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." With regard to petitioners, who were ultimately convicted in Federal District Court of charges relating to the manufacture, possession, and distribution of controlled substances, the Act's 70-day period commenced on September 3, 1980, but the trial did not begin until November 1, 1982, because of various delays, including those resulting from overlapping filings by petitioners and the Government with respect to a motion to suppress certain evidence, a hearing and posthearing submissions by the parties on that motion, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the court's denial of the motion to suppress, and petitioners' motion to dismiss the indictment because of violation of the Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners' convictions, rejecting their contention that under subsection (F) only delays that were "reasonably necessary" could be excluded from the Act's 70-day period.
Held:
1. Congress intended subsection (F) to exclude from the Act's 70-day limitation all time between the filing of a pretrial motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is "reasonably necessary." The plain terms of the statute exclude all time between the filing of and the hearing on a motion, whether that hearing was prompt or not. Moreover, Congress' express use of the phrase "reasonable period of delay" in another provision of the statute indicates that the exclusion of the period defined in subsection (F) was intended to be automatic. The legislative history also supports this reading of subsection (F). Nor does the phrase "or other prompt disposition" in subsection (F) imply that only reasonably necessary delays may be excluded between the time of filing and the conclusion of the hearing. That language was intended to apply to situations where motions are decided on the papers filed without a hearing. Pp. 326-330.
2. Subsection (F) also excludes time after a hearing on a motion where the District Court awaits additional filings from the parties that are needed for proper disposition of the motion. Although the language of the statute is not clear on this point, its structure requires that such time be excluded. Pp. 330-331.
3. Under the facts in this case, there were only 69 nonexcludable days of delay before petitioners' trial, and therefore the Act was not violated. Pp. 331-333.
746 F.2d 619 (CA9 1984), affirmed.
Denise Anton, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners.
Roger Clegg, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II), as amended in 1979 and in 1984, commands that a defendant be tried within 70 days of the latest of either the filing of an indictment or information, or the first appearance before a judge or magistrate. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes from this time "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." This case requires us to decide the narrow questions whether that exclusion is limited to reasonably necessary delays, and whether it applies to delays occasioned by the filing of posthearing briefs on motions.
A jury convicted petitioners of charges arising out of manufacture, possession, and distribution of controlled sub- stances.S1 The evidence at trial showed that in February and April 1980 petitioner Henderson, under the alias "Richard Martin," placed orders with a scientific supply company in Ohio for chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of illegal drugs. The orders attracted the attention of the Drug Enforcement Agency. Agents obtained a warrant from a United States Magistrate, authorizing installation of an electronic transmitter in one of the chemical containers. Henderson drove from California to Ohio, picked up the second order of chemicals on June 24, and headed west. Agents lost the tracking signal despite their following by both car and plane, only to receive it later in July from petitioner Freedman's house near Watsonville, California. A search pursuant to warrant on July 17 revealed an illicit drug factory. The last of the codefendants, Peter Bell, was arraigned on September 3, 1980.2
The Speedy Trial Act requires that trial begin within 70 days of the latest indictment, information, or appearance—in this case, September 3. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). A timely trial would have commenced on November 12, 1980, barring periods of excludable delay. Overlapping filings by petitioners and the Government, however, kept a suppression motion pending from its filing on November 3, 1980, through a hear- ing on that motion on March 25, 1981.3 The court deferred decision on the motion pending receipt of posthearing submissions from the parties, the last of which was filed on December 15, 1981. See App. 29-31. The District Court finally denied the motion to suppress on January 19, 1982.
From January 25 to May 10, 1982, both parties filed additional motions before the District Court—on January 25 the Government moved to set the case for trial, and on March 23 petitioners moved to reconsider the motion to suppress. On February 3, the court held a hearing on the Government's motion and granted a continuance through April 21 to allow defense counsel to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the suppression motion.4 After a hearing on May 10, the court denied petitioners' motion to reconsider the motion to suppress, and set a trial date of September 13, 1982. The court also entered an order excluding, for purposes of the Act, the time from May 10 to September 13 based on a provision of the Act that allows such exclusion by the Court to satisfy the "ends of justice." Id., at 32-33; see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).5
On July 23, 1982, Thornton filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The other two petitioners subsequently joined this motion. The District Judge held a hearing almost two months later, on September 8, and denied the motion from the bench on that date. He filed a memorandum and order outlining his reasons exactly 30 days later. At that time, the judge also entered an order excluding the time from October 8 to November 1, again based on the "interests of justice." 3 Record, Doc. Nos. 98-99. Trial commenced on November 1, 1982.
Petitioners appealed their convictions, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court could exclude from their Speedy Trial Act computation only delays that were "reasonably necessary." 746 F.2d 619, 622 (CA9 1984). The Court of Appeals held that the statute "excludes delays resulting from pretrial motions without qualification." Ibid. The court noted that Congress had explicitly provided that the excludability of certain other delays depended on their reasonableness, but had not done so for delays from pretrial motions. Ibid. Judge Ferguson dissented, relying on the Act's legislative history and the interpretations of other Circuits. Id., at 625-626. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits.6 474 U.S. 900, 106 S.Ct. 225, 88 L.Ed.2d 224 (1985). We now affirm.
The Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal trial must commence within 70 days of the latest of a defendant's indictment, information, or appearance, barring periods of excludable delay. United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 106 S.Ct. 555, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985); see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Section 3161(h)(1)(F) (subsection (F)) excludes from these 70 days certain delays occasioned by the filing of pretrial motions:
* * * * *
"(F) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion" (emphasis added).
On its face, subsection (F) excludes "[a]ny period of delay" caused by "any pretrial motion," "from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing." The plain terms of the statute appear to exclude all time between the filing of and the hearing on a motion whether that hearing was prompt or not. Moreover, subsection (F) does not require that a period of delay be "reasonable" to be excluded, although Congress clearly knew how to limit an exclusion: in § 3161(h)(7), Congress provided for exclusion of a "reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted." Apart from this single instance, every other provision in § 3161(h) provides for exclusion of "any period of delay." 7...
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