Hendon v. Ramsey

• Decision Date: 28 December 2007
• Docket Number: Civil No. 06cv1060 J(NLS).
• Citation: 528 F.Supp.2d 1058
• Parties: Carlos HENDON, Petitioner, v. RAMSEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

528 F.Supp.2d 1058

Carlos HENDON, Petitioner, v. RAMSEY, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 06cv1060 J(NLS).

United States District Court, S.D. California.

December 28, 2007.

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Carlos Hendon, Represa, CA, pro se.

Phillip James Lindsay, State of California, Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.

AMENDED ORDER:

1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; and

2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS;

NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR., District Judge.

Plaintiff Carlos Hendon ("Plaintiff"), a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleges that prison medical staff forcibly drugged him in violation of his civil rights. [Doc. No. 50.] Defendants move to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to file a timely government claim prior to filing suit in federal court. [Doc. No. 51.] Plaintiff opposes the motion. [Doc. No. 53.] After a thorough review, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss.

Background

Plaintiff is an inmate committed to the custody of the California Department of Corrections ("CDC") and is currently housed at California State Prison-Sacramento ("CSP Sacramento") in Represa, California. This action concerns the administration of anti-psychotic medications to Plaintiff while he was housed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJDCF") in San Diego, California. (FAC at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff has named multiple defendants in his complaint, including: RJDCF psychiatrist Ramsey; RJDCF psychologist M. Parker; and unnamed medical contractor; RJDCF correctional officers Woods, Hernandez, Millspaugh, Carroll, Lizarraga, Zieber, Clifford, Pascuzzi, Lang, and Doe; as well as RJDCF clinicians Petersen, Yumiko, Ridley, Marquez, Thompson, and Ibarra.¹ (Id. at ¶¶ 4-8.)

According to the FAC, between 2002 and July 13, 2004, Defendants Ramsey and Parker diagnosed Plaintiff as being suicidal, psychotic, and a potential danger to others. As a result, Plaintiff received "mental health crisis bed treatment." (FAC at ¶ 12.) Defendants Ramsey and Parker prescribed psychotropic drugs and ordered Plaintiff to take the prescribed medication against his will. (Id.) Various defendants aided in forcibly medicating Plaintiff by extracting him from his cell and/or administering the medications to Plaintiff. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff suffered side effects from the administered medications, including stiffness, a shuffling gait, extreme weight gain in excess of fifty pounds, high blood pressure and cholesterol, dry mouth, hallucinations, and symptoms akin to having Parkinson's disease. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff claims that these side effects continued after the drugging stopped. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff alleges that CDC policy requires notice and a hearing in front of a medications review panel prior to drugging a prisoner forcibly, but that he received neither. (Id. at ¶ 16 (citing Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal.App.3d 526, 223 Cal.Rptr. 746 (1986)).) Under California law, the Keyhea procedures Plaintiff cited in his FAC govern the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medications.² The Keyhea injunction provides procedural requirements and substantive standards for medication of different durations.³ Involuntary medication more that 24 days after the initial medication requires a court order.⁴ Plaintiffs allegations under Keyhea are unclear. Plaintiff, however, appears to allege that he was subjected to repeated mental health crisis bed treatments whose duration and frequency violated Keyhea's procedural safeguards. (See FAC at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff attaches records discussing a particular treatment that began on May 7, 2004, and lasted through July 13, 2004, at RJDCF. (See FAC, Appx. A.)

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process of law in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and also alleges state law claims of negligence against all defendants for negligence in their official capacities. (FAC at ¶¶ 19-21.) Plaintiff further alleges that the actions of the collective defendants constitute deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for the physical and emotional injuries sustained as a result of the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs, and requests punitive damages be awarded against all named defendants except the medical contractor. (Id. at p. 8.)

Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his state law claims of negligence should be dismissed for failure to file a timely government claim pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov't. Code § 900 et seq. (Defs.' Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem.") at 1.)

Legal Standard

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all material allegations in Plaintiffs FAC and must also construe the FAC, and all reasonable inferences therefore, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.2002). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but solely whether he has stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir.2003). When the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988). This rule of liberal construction is particularly important in civil rights cases. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court is not permitted to "supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982.)

1. Eighth Amendment Claim: Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Medical Contractor's deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Medical Contractor created or continued a policy of allowing Defendant physicians to determine that he should be forcibly drugged despite no immediate incidence or threat of violence. (FAC at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff also alleges that the other named defendants' failure to intervene to prevent the forcible drugging constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment because his allegations demonstrate that the Defendants treated his medical needs and, ergo, were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Defs.' Mem. at 5.) Deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Deliberate indifference includes denial, delay, or intentional interference with a prisoner's medical treatment. Id. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285; see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 459-60 (9th Cir.1980) (delay of six days in treating hepatitis was sufficient to state a deliberate, indifference claim); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 770-71 (9th Cir.1986) (allegation that jail medical staff would not treat plaintiffs painful hernia until it became strangulated stated a claim against medical personnel). An actionable Eighth Amendment violation first involves an objective inquiry into the seriousness of an inmate's medical need. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1992) ("A determination of `deliberate indifference' involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need."), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.2002) (discussing both the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim). A serious medical need exists if the "failure to treat a prisoner's condition would result in further significant injury or the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285).

Deliberate indifference lies somewhere between negligence and "conduct engaged in for the very purposes of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm will result." Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); see also Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir.1991). To succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (adopting "subjective recklessness" as standard for Eighth Amendment claims); Clement, 298 F.3d at 904-05 (applying subjective state-of-mind element in medical treatment context). Thus, an official must: (1) be actually aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists; (2) actually draw the inference; but (3) nevertheless disregard the risk to the inmate's health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a valid Eighth Amendment claim as to any of the named defendants because, by his own allegations, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Def...