Hendrick v. Caldwell, Civil Action No. 7:16CV00095

Citation232 F.Supp.3d 868
Decision Date08 February 2017
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 7:16CV00095
Parties Cary HENDRICK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Donald CALDWELL, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

Erin Margaret Trodden, Federal Public Defenders Office Western District of Virginia, Amy Elizabeth Walters, Mary Catherine Bauer, Mary Frances Charlton, Charlottesville, VA, Donald P. Salzman, Mark D. Young, Maureen A. Donley, Theodore M. Kneller, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Margaret Hoehl O'Shea, Nancy Hull Davidson, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Glen E. Conrad, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Cary Hendrick, Bryan Manning, Ryan Williams, Richard Deckerhoff, and Richard Walls bring this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Donald Caldwell and Michael Herring, in their official capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. This case is presently before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant defendants' motion.1

Background

The following facts, taken from the plaintiffs' complaint, are accepted as true for purposes of the defendants' motion to dismiss. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). The named plaintiffs in this matter are homeless individuals who suffer from alcohol use disorder and have been interdicted pursuant to Virginia Code § 4.1–333(a). Defendants are prosecutors for the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Virginia Code § 4.1–333(a) states:

When after a hearing upon due notice it appears to the satisfaction of the circuit court of any county or city that any person, residing within such county or city, has been convicted of driving any automobile, truck, motorcycle, engine or train while intoxicated or has shown himself to be an habitual drunkard, the court may enter an order of interdiction prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to such person until further ordered.

The statute does not define "habitual drunkard," and there is no clear standard for removing the label once determined to be such. Compl. ¶ 32–33. A person can be interdicted in absentia, and a defendant does not have the right to counsel or trial by jury at the interdiction hearing as it is a civil proceeding. Id. ¶ 19.

It is a Class 1 misdemeanor for an interdicted individual to "consume, purchase or possess, or attempt to consume, purchase or posses, any alcoholic beverage." Va. Code § 4.1–305. It is this prohibition of consumption, possession, or attempted possession or consumption that plaintiffs challenge (the "consumption prong"). Virginia Code § 4.1–322 also makes it a Class 1 misdemeanor for an interdicted person to be drunk in public, and plaintiffs do not challenge this aspect of the statutory scheme. The punishment for conviction of a Class 1 misdemeanor is "confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both." Va. Code § 18.2–11(a). Between August of 2005 and August of 2015, there were 4,743 convictions under this statutory scheme (the "Interdiction Statute"). Id. ¶ 21.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), plaintiffs seek to certify a class of homeless alcoholics who have been or will be interdicted, and a class of defendant Virginia Commonwealth Attorneys who have the authority to enforce the Interdiction Statute. The complaint alleges that alcoholism is an addiction: a chronic disease of the brain

that compels the plaintiffs to pathologically pursue alcohol use. Id. ¶ 25. Their homelessness exacerbates their alcoholism and makes long-term abstention "nearly impossible." Id. ¶ 26.

The named plaintiffs were interdicted between 2009 and 2012. These four plaintiffs have been arrested and prosecuted under the Interdiction Statute between ten and thirty times each. All of the named plaintiffs were either interdicted in absentia or requested counsel, but their requests were denied. Id. ¶ 19. The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs have been arrested for constructive possession of alcohol, including situations in which a plaintiff was merely sitting near open containers or emitting a detectable odor of alcohol. Id. ¶ 29.

Plaintiffs challenge the Interdiction Statute, claiming that it violates their rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs bring five claims against defendants.2 Count One alleges that the enforcement of the Interdiction Statute results in cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Three alleges deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Five claims that the Interdiction Statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Seven alleges deprivation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Eight requests injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Plaintiffs ask the court to certify the classes of plaintiffs and defendants, declare that the defendants' practice of enforcing the consumption prong of the Interdiction Statute against homeless alcoholics violates their constitutional rights, and enjoin defendants from further enforcing this portion of the Interdiction Statute against plaintiffs and others in the class.

Standard of Review

"The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro , 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). When deciding a motion to dismiss under this rule, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and draw all reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ; see also Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co. , 708 F.3d 527, 539 (4th Cir. 2013). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

Discussion

Defendants make five arguments, four of which are procedural and one of which is substantive, in support of their motion to dismiss: (1) that the RookerFeldman doctrine precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction over this case; (2) that plaintiffs have had the opportunity to challenge their interdictions in state court, and those judgments have preclusive effect; (3) that plaintiffs' request for future equitable relief is not ripe for adjudication; (4) that plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief is barred by the statute of limitations; and (5) that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. Procedural Arguments
a. The RookerFeldman Doctrine

Defendants contend that plaintiffs' complaint is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment and is thus barred by RookerFeldman . See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) ; D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The RookerFeldman doctrine arises from Congress' assignment of original jurisdiction to the district courts and appellate jurisdiction over final state court judgments to the United States Supreme Court. Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md. , 827 F.3d 314, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2016). When applicable, the RookerFeldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar that prevents a state court loser from seeking, in substance, appellate review of his adverse state court decision by a federal district court. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell , 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). In determining whether the doctrine applies, the fundamental question is whether the litigant is seeking federal appellate review of the merits of a state court decision. Id. A litigant may not "escape the jurisdictional bar of RookerFeldman by merely refashioning its attack on state court judgments as a § 1983 claim." Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia , 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997). Stated otherwise, if the federal court's action would render the state court judgment ineffectual, RookerFeldman is implicated. Id.

The Fourth Circuit recently addressed the RookerFeldman doctrine and clarified its narrow scope. See Thana , 827 F.3d at 319 ("[T]he RookerFeldman doctrine is narrow and focused ...."). Noting that the "distinction between preclusion principles and the RookerFeldman doctrine can sometimes be subtle," the Fourth Circuit observed that the RookerFeldman doctrine "assesses only whether the process for appealing a state court judgment to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) has been sidetracked by an action filed in a district court specifically to review the state court judgment." Id. (emphasis in original). The Fourth Circuit further emphasized that the Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine should be restricted "to cases whose procedural posture mirrored those in the Rooker and Feldman cases themselves." Thana , 827 F.3d at 320 (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) ). Accordingly, the RookerFeldman doctrine bars a district court's jurisdiction in similar situations: when ...

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