Hendrick v. Hendrick, 129-81
| Decision Date | 27 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 129-81,129-81 |
| Citation | 454 A.2d 1251,142 Vt. 357 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Erlene A. HENDRICK v. Robert K. HENDRICK. |
Robert J. O'Donnell and Mark D. Oettinger, Law Offices of Robert J. O'Donnell, Woodstock, for plaintiff-appellant.
Plante, Richards, Terino & Hanley, White River Junction, for defendant-appellee.
Before BARNEY, C.J., HILL, UNDERWOOD and PECK, JJ., and DALEY, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.
The plaintiff-appellant was granted a divorce from the defendant-appellee on the grounds that the parties had lived separate and apart for six months and the resumption of marital relations was not reasonably probable. 15 V.S.A. § 551(7). The parties, first "married" in 1963, were legally married in 1968 due to a technical defect in the first ceremony. The trial court found that the parties had "lived in Windsor County, Vermont, for over fifteen (15) years."
Neither party brought assets of any significant value into the marriage. Nonetheless, their standard of living continually improved until, at the time of their divorce, they enjoyed a life style commensurate with the defendant's $30,000 plus annual net income. The plaintiff argued below that the parties had an equal interest in all the marital property and here appeals the trial court award which, she claims, does not reflect that equality.
The trial court ordered the defendant to pay $100 per week in alimony for one year. This was to allow the plaintiff a recovery period from her recent illness. The defendant was also ordered to pay $75 per week per child as child support until the majority of the two minor children. These provisions for alimony and child support were suggested by the defendant, are unchallenged by the plaintiff in this appeal, and thus are affirmed.
It is from the property division that the plaintiff now appeals. Plaintiff was awarded the home premises and furnishings and a $10,000 certificate of deposit. She was also awarded the family car, which has an associated debt at least equal to its value, and the largest family debt, $13,400, for a now defunct gift shop business. Plaintiff's total equity is $9,700. The defendant, for his part, was awarded a piece of investment property "estimated at $2,500 to $7,000" and 100% of his stock in a plumbing contracting business, valued by the plaintiff's expert witness at between $261,000 and $319,000, but by the defendant and his partner at "substantially less than that amount." At the heart of this dispute is the division of what is clearly the single biggest marital asset: the plumbing business.
The legislative mandate regarding disposition of property is that, "[i]n granting a divorce ... the court shall decree such disposition of the property owned by the parties separately, jointly, or by the entirety, as shall appear just and equitable ...." 15 V.S.A. § 751. Plaintiff argues that, on its face, the trial court's disposition is violative of the above-quoted statute. She concedes, as she must, that her burden is heavy; in order to challenge the property settlement, she must show an abuse of discretion. LaFarr v. LaFarr, 132 Vt. 191, 315 A.2d 235 (1974). However, the burden is not insurmountable. As we have said, "we will not interfere if a reasonable evidentiary basis supports the court's findings and the findings are sufficient to support the conclusions of law, but we have recognized that because 'a decree relative to property is final and not subject to modification ... the wide discretion given to the trial court in this area must be tempered when the distribution reflects inadequate findings.' " Emmons v. Emmons, 141 Vt. 508, ---, 450 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982) (citing Field v. Field, 139 Vt. 242, 244, 427 A.2d 350, 352 (1981)).
At the outset we are presented with a distribution which seems to be weighed very heavily in favor of the defendant. While such an order is not per se violative of § 751, it causes us to examine both the transcript and the order of the lower court most closely. As already noted, distribution of the plumbing business is the focal point on this appeal. Conflicting evidence about the value of the plumbing business was introduced, much of which was incorporated into the findings either directly or by reference to plaintiff's exhibits, without any attempt to resolve the conflict. Thus, the plumbing corporation could be said to have a value ranging from as low as $80,000, according to the value placed on the business by the defendant and his partner, to as high as $319,000, the value estimated by plaintiff's certified public accountant expert witness. Despite numerous findings...
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Klein v. Klein, 86-274
...law practice is property subject to distribution, or consideration in distribution, in a divorce. See, e.g., Hendrick v. Hendrick, 142 Vt. 357, 359-60, 454 A.2d 1251, 1252-53 (1982) (plumbing business); see also Bard v. Bard, 380 N.W.2d 342, 344 (N.D.1986) (law office property). Based on th......
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...tax and 1990 income tax to be paid after the decision, it was required to allocate all of the assets. Cf. Hendrick v. Hendrick, 142 Vt. 357, 361, 454 A.2d 1251, 1253 (1982) (incomplete and unreviewable division resulted from court's failure to evaluate all assets). The foregoing language in......
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