Hendrick v. Strazzulla, 31153

Citation135 So.2d 1
Decision Date22 November 1961
Docket NumberNo. 31153,31153
PartiesPaul F. HENDRICK, Petitioner, v. Phillip J. STRAZZULLA, Frank Strazzulla and Dominic Strazzulla, co-partners, d/b/a Strazzulla Brothers Company, and Juan Flores, Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Langbein, Burdick & Silvian, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Earnest, Pruitt, Newell & Schulle, West Palm Beach, for respondents.

THORNAL, Justice.

By petition for a writ of certiorari we are requested to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, because of an alleged conflict with a prior decision of this Court on the same point of law. See Hendrick v. Strazzulla, Fla.App., 125 So.2d 589.

We are called upon to consider a ruling of the trial judge regarding the admissibility of a record of conviction of a crime in order to discredit a witness.

Petitioner Hendrick was plaintiff in an action for damages arising out of a collision of two trucks. At the trial one of the defendants, who was the driver of one of the trucks, was asked on cross-examination, 'Have you ever been convicted of a crime?' He replied, 'No.' The examining attorney thereupon proffered into evidence a certified copy of a record revealing that the witness had been convicted of the crime of reckless driving in the Criminal Court of Record of Palm Beach County. Defense counsel's objection to the introduction of the record was sustained by the trial judge on the ground that impeachment of the credibility of a witness under section 90.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., could be accomplished only by showing that the witness had been convicted of crime involving moral turpitude. The judge relied on Roe v. State, 96 Fla. 723, 119 So. 118. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial judge. While making reference to the basis upon which the trial judge made his ruling, the District Court of Appeal bottomed its conclusion on decisions of this Court in Stevens et al. v. Duke, Fla., 42 So.2d 361, and, Moseley v. Ewing, Fla., 79 So.2d 776. We are now requested to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal on the ground that it conflicts with the decision of this Court in McArthur v. Cook, Fla., 99 So.2d 565.

In McArthur we held Section 90.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to be applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings. It was pointed out that evidence of conviction of a crime might well influence a jury in evaluating the credibility of a witness. We undertook to outline the procedural approach to be followed in bringing the matter to the attention of the judge and jury. It was also pointed out that if a witness admits a prior conviction the inquiry by his adversary must end at that point. On the other hand, if the witness denies the prior conviction, the adversary may produce and file in evidence the record of any such conviction as a reflection on the credibility of the witness. In McArthur we suggested that the record be tendered when the time arrived for the interrogator to present his side of the case. In the instant case it is noted that the record of conviction was tendered on cross-examination of the witness and the point is suggested that it was not proffered by the plaintiff in rebuttal. The procedural point is not important here because the trial judge had expressly stated that he would not allow the introduction of the record for the reason that the crime revealed was not one of moral turpitude. When the judge so ruled it became unnecessary for the plaintiff to undertake the useless step of offering the record a second time.

The trial judge relied upon Roe v. State, 96 Fla. 723, 119 So. 118. While the opinion in Roe v. State, supra, did contain a discussion of the necessity for the presence of moral turpitude in any crime revealed to discredit a witness, actually this was not as aspect of the holding of the Court. It was expressly announced to be a question considered 'but not decided.' Insofar as Section 90.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was concerned, the only point decided...

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16 cases
  • Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 33968
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1965
    ...affirmance on a point no longer relevant (since the error did not recur on the second trial), and the cause was remanded. Hendrick v. Strazzulla, Fla.1961, 135 So.2d 1. On the second trial, verdict and judgment were again for the defendants. The plaintiff again appealed, challenging the pro......
  • Lewis v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 5, 1979
    ...greatly liberalized the rule by allowing proof of almost any conviction of a crime, even including traffic offenses. See, Hendrick v. Strazzulla, 135 So.2d 1 (Fla.1961) and Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967). If crimes introduced for impeachment purposes ......
  • Statewright v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 6, 1973
    ...to any fact in issue. Florida Statute § 90.08 (1971), F.S.A. See Morton v. State, 205 So.2d 662 (Fla.App.1968). See also Hendrick v. Strazzulla, 135 So.2d 1 (Fla.1961). However, this exception is not applicable in the case sub judice as the defendant had never been convicted of the alleged ......
  • Braswell v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 28, 1975
    ...convictions, based their reasoning upon the concept of moral turpitude. However, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Hendrick v. Strazzulla, Sup.Ct.Fla.1961, 135 So.2d 1, has specifically rejected a differentiation based upon moral turpitude, 'While it might seem logical that the statute shoul......
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