Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. N.L.R.B.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1980
• Docket Number: No. 80-1283,80-1283
• Parties: 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3158, 89 Lab.Cas. P 12,318 HENDRICKS COUNTY RURAL ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 766

627 F.2d 766

104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3158, 89 Lab.Cas. P 12,318

HENDRICKS COUNTY RURAL ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.

No. 80-1283.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued June 3, 1980.

July 21, 1980.

Warren D. Krebs, Parr, Richey, Obremskey & Morton, Lebanon, Ind., for petitioner.

Richard Michael Fischl, N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before SPRECHER and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. ^*

SPRECHER, Circuit Judge.

This review causes us to examine again the questions (1) what standard is to be applied to determine a confidential employee excluded under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., and (2) whether the Board's finding that an employee was not a confidential employee is supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).

I

On July 17, 1978, the Board issued its order finding that the Company had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging Mary M. Weatherman, the personal secretary to its general manager and chief executive officer, for signing a petition calling for the reinstatement of an injured employee, and by interrogating another employee regarding the petition. The Board ordered the Company to cease and desist from discharging or taking other adverse action against any employee for engaging in protected, concerted activity, and from coercively interrogating employees concerning such activity. The Board further ordered the Company to reinstate Weatherman to her former job, or a substantially equivalent position, with back pay. 236 N.L.R.B. 1616 (1978).

On July 26, 1979, this court enforced the Board's order concerning the 8(a)(1) interrogation. However, we reversed and remanded the portion of the order dealing with the discharge of Weatherman and ordered the Board to use the legal standard outlined in our opinion to determine whether she was a confidential employee and therefore not covered by the Act. 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979).

On October 10, 1979, the Board advised the parties that it had "decided to accept the remand from the Court of Appeals . . ., and all parties are hereby advised that they may file Statements of Position with the Board. . . ." The Company in its statement indicated that it believed that the record already contained enough evidence to require the conclusion that Weatherman was not an employee under the standard established by this court. The Company added:

However, if the Board believes that its prior conclusions and testimony hereinbelow does (sic ) not mandate such a conclusion, the . . . (Company) believes that it is entitled to and that the Board should order a reopening of the proceedings to present further evidence regarding the issues on remand.

Record, Statement of Position of Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corporation, at 3.

Instead of taking further evidence, the Board reexamined the previous record and reaffirmed its prior conclusion that Weatherman was an employee under the Act. 247 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (1980).

The case is again before the court upon the Company's petition for review and the Board's cross-application for enforcement.

II

In National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974), the Supreme Court held that Congress intended to exclude from the protection of the National Labor Relations Act all employees properly classified as " 'managerial employees,' rather than just those in positions susceptible to conflicts of interest in labor relations." Id. at 274, 94 S.Ct. at 1261-62. To reach this holding, the Court first concluded that "confidential employees" were excluded from coverage under a "broad definition" not limited to those having a labor nexus. The Court said:

In 1946 in Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322, the Board had narrowed its definition of "confidential employees" to embrace only those who exercised " 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations." The discussion of "confidential employees" in both the House and Conference Committee Reports, however, unmistakably refers to that term as defined in the House bill, which was not limited just to those in "labor relations." Thus, although Congress may have misconstrued recent Board practice, it clearly thought that the Act did not cover "confidential employees" even under a broad definition of that term.

416 U.S. at 284 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. at 1766 n. 12.

Immediately following in the text, the Court quoted with complete approval the Court of Appeals statement in Bell Aerospace as follows:

"Surely Congress could not have supposed that, 'while confidential secretaries' could not be organized, their bosses could be."

Id. at 284, 94 S.Ct. at 1767, quoting 475 F.2d 485, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1973).

Thus, although the Bell Aerospace holding applied to managerial employees, the statement in note 12 about confidential employees was not a mere dictum, ¹ but was the basis, or at least part of the basis, upon which the holding itself was constructed. In United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1101 (7th Cir. 1970), we noted that a court of appeals could not depart, at its own choosing, from an analytical construct uniformly adhered to in decisions of the Supreme Court.

Although the Board has accepted our prior decision in this case, in at least one subsequent case pending on review before us, Malleable Iron Range Co. v. N. L. R. B., No. 79-1991, the Board strongly urges that our prior decision be overruled, ² either on the basis that the Supreme Court was in error or misled as to the legislative history in footnote 12, or because of the Court's later opinion in N. L. R. B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 100 S.Ct. 856, 63 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980).

Not only are decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and their clear implications absolutely binding on inferior federal courts, ³ but this is especially true of matters of legislative history and congressional purpose, In re Continental Investment Corp., 586 F.2d 241, 248 (1st Cir. 1978), and of standards to be applied by an administrative agency or lower court. Patterson v. Brown, 393 F.2d 733, 736 (10th Cir. 1968). While we seriously doubt that the Supreme Court could be misled by counsel, a court of appeals is not at liberty to go behind an opinion or its clear implications on the ground that the Supreme Court "was not fully apprised by counsel in that case as to the legislative history . . .." United States v. Russell, 461 F.2d 605, 608 (10th Cir. 1972).

We find nothing in the Yeshiva case which undermines or impliedly overrules anything said in Bell Aerospace, which is cited with approval throughout the opinion. Therefore, we adhere to everything we said in Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979), despite the Board's opinion that it is erroneous insofar as it relies upon note 12 of Bell Aerospace. Any changes in the substance of note 12 must come from higher authority.

III

In our prior opinion, we concluded that:

The administrative law judge in this case limited his factual inquiry to a determination that Weatherman had not acted in a confidential capacity with respect to labor relations. We therefore find it necessary to remand the case for a determination (under the proper standard) . . ..

603 F.2d at 30 (footnote omitted).

The administrative law judge in his original opinion made it clear that the only standard he applied and the only one that the record evidence supported was the labor nexus standard:

The record shows that Weatherman did not act "in a confidential capacity" to Dillon (the general manager) in any meaningful sense with respect to . . . (the Company's) labor relations policies . . . .

Weatherman's "duties do not involve her in a confidential capacity with his responsibilities" with respect to labor policies. Accordingly, I conclude that Weatherman was not a confidential employee as the Board defines that term.

236 N.L.R.B. at 1619, 1620.

The record context in which the above statements were made by the administrative law judge was as follows. Early in the proceedings, the Company filed a written motion to dismiss on the ground that Weatherman was a confidential employee excluded under the Act. In an order dated July 22, 1977, an administrative law judge other than the one who eventually heard the evidence ruled that the motion would be reserved for the judge who would conduct the hearing. When the hearing began before the second judge, he noted the pendency of the motion and reserved his ruling. Near the beginning of the general manager's testimony intended to establish the confidential nature of Weatherman's job, the administrative law judge admonished the general manager to "stick to personnel files" and "to files pertaining to the employees." Transcript, Vol. II, at 101. A reading of the administrative record makes it obvious that the admonitions were observed inasmuch as there is clearly a conscious effort by all participants to restrict the evidence to that which pertains to labor or personnel matters.

If we had believed that the prior record was sufficient to support a finding under the Bell Aerospace standard, we would not have remanded the proceeding to the Board. Upon remand, the Board asked for statements of position, and the Company's position was that the proceedings should be reopened to present further evidence. When an erroneous standard for the admission of evidence is used, it follows almost mandatorily that a new record is needed, not only to add evidence in patchwork fashion but also possibly to rehear all the relevant evidence under the different admission standard.

The Board did not reopen the proceedings under the different standard, did not take any additional evidence, did not remand the proceedings to the administrative law judge who heard the original...