Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18, 20-2018

Decision Date26 March 2021
Docket NumberNo. 20-2018,20-2018
Citation992 F.3d 950
Parties Brett HENDRICKSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. AFSCME COUNCIL 18; Michelle Lujan Grisham, in her official capacity as Governor of New Mexico; Hector Balderas, in his official capacity as Attorney General of New Mexico, Defendants - Appellees. National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Amicus Curiae.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Brian K. Kelsey (Reilly Stephens, with him on the briefs), Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, Illinois, for the Plaintiff - Appellant.

Eileen B. Goldsmith, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, California (Scott A. Kronland, and Stefanie L. Wilson, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, California; Shane C. Youtz, and Stephen Curtice, Youtz & Valdez, P.C., with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Defendant - Appellee AFSCME Council 18.

Lawrence M. Marcus (Alfred A. Park, with him on the brief), Park & Associates, L.L.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the DefendantsAppellees Michelle Lujan Grisham and Hector Balderas.

Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, Virginia, filed an amicus brief in support of DefendantsAppellees.

Before MATHESON, Circuit Judge, LUCERO, Senior Circuit Judge, and McHUGH, Circuit Judge.

MATHESON, Circuit Judge.

Brett Hendrickson worked for the New Mexico Human Services Department ("HSD") and was a dues-paying member of the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees Council 18 ("AFSCME" or "Union"). He resigned his membership in 2018 after the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018).

In Janus , the Court said the First Amendment right against compelled speech protects non-members of public sector unions from having to pay "agency" or "fair share" fees—fees that compensate the union for collective bargaining but not for partisan activity. Mr. Hendrickson contends that, under Janus , the Union cannot (1) retain dues that had been deducted from his paycheck, or (2) serve as his exclusive bargaining representative. The district court dismissed these claims.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm these dismissals but remand for amendment of the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1

Mr. Hendrickson signed membership agreements that permitted union dues to be deducted from his paycheck. After Janus , he terminated his membership. His dues deductions stopped shortly thereafter.

1. Union Membership and Dues-Deduction Authorizations

This timeline lists Mr. Hendrickson's actions regarding union membership and dues-deduction authorizations:

2001 - Began working for the HSD. HSD employees are part of the bargaining unit represented by the Union.
2004 - Signed an agreement to join the Union and authorized the deduction of union dues from his paycheck.
2006 - Took a position outside the bargaining unit. As a result, his union membership and dues payments ended.
2007 - Returned to the bargaining unit. He signed another membership agreement and dues-deduction authorization.
2017 - Signed a membership agreement and dues-deduction authorization for the third time.
2. Dues-Deduction Authorization - 2017

The 2017 member agreement stated:

Effective 4/7/17, I authorize AFSCME Council 18 as my exclusive bargaining representative, and I accept membership in AFSCME Council 18. I request and authorize the State of New Mexico to deduct union dues from my pay and transmit them to AFSCME Council 18. The amount of dues deduction shall be the amount approved by AFSCME's membership as set forth in the AFSCME constitution and certified in writing to my employer.

Suppl. App. at 18-19, 50.2

The agreement also created an "opt-out window." It limited the time period during which Mr. Hendrickson could terminate his dues deductions:

This authorization shall be revocable only during the first two weeks of every December, or such other time as provided in the applicable collective-bargaining agreement.

Id. at 19, 50.

3. Membership and Dues-Deduction Termination - 2018

On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus . On August 9, Mr. Hendrickson emailed the State Personnel Office ("SPO"), asking, "Are we able to withdraw as full members now or do we have to wait for a certain amount of time?" Id. at 110; see also id. at 20.3 The SPO responded that "to cease payroll deductions for Membership dues, you must refer to the [collective bargaining agreement] regarding the request to cease payroll deductions." Id . at 110; see also id. at 20.4

On November 30, Mr. Hendrickson filed this suit. On December 6, the Union wrote to Mr. Hendrickson:

It has come to our attention through the filing of a lawsuit that you wish to resign your union membership and cancel your authorization for the deduction of membership dues. We have no prior record that you made any such request to the union. Nevertheless, we have processed your resignation from membership. Additionally, your dues authorization provides that it is revocable during the first two weeks of December each year. Accordingly, we are notifying your employer to stop further membership dues deductions.

Id. at 20-21, 58.

On December 8, the Union received a faxed letter from Mr. Hendrickson stating he would like to "opt out of being a member." Id. at 61; see also id. at 21.

4. Refund - 2019

Despite this correspondence, dues continued to be deducted from Mr. Hendrickson's paycheck. On January 7, 2019, he emailed the SPO to request the deductions be stopped, attaching the Union's December 6 letter. The SPO responded that because it had not received his request during the opt-out window in the first two weeks of December, it would not stop deductions. Mr. Hendrickson then sent a request to the HSD to cease dues deductions.

On January 9, the SPO notified the Union that it had no record of Mr. Hendrickson's requesting termination of his dues deductions during the opt-out window. The Union responded, "requesting that [the SPO] cease dues deductions for Hendrickson immediately." Id. at 68; see also id. at 22.

Mr. Hendrickson's deductions stopped starting "with the second pay period in January." See id. at 22. In February, the Union refunded Mr. Hendrickson the dues deducted from his paychecks following the closure of the 2018 cancellation window.5

B. Procedural Background

In addition to suing the Union, Mr. Hendrickson also named as defendants, in their official capacities, New Mexico Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham and New Mexico Attorney General Hector Balderas (the "New Mexico Defendants").

On March 15, 2019, Mr. Hendrickson filed a First Amended Complaint. He alleged two counts:

"By refusing to allow [him] to withdraw from the Union and continuing to deduct his dues, Defendants violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association" (Count 1); and
"The state law forcing [him] to continue to associate with the Union without his affirmative consent violates [his] First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association and 42 U.S.C. § 1983" (Count 2).

Suppl. App. at 8, 11 (emphasis omitted).

On Count 1, Mr. Hendrickson sought a declaration stating that "the Union and [the Governor] cannot force public employees to wait for an opt-out window to resign their union membership and to stop the deduction of dues from their paychecks." Id. at 10. He also sought a declaration that the New Mexico statute authorizing deductions and allowing an opt-out window "constitutes an unconstitutional violation of his First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association." See id.6 He further sought "damages in the amount of all dues deducted and remitted to the Union since he became a member [in 2004]," id. , or in the alternative, "since the Janus ruling [in 2018]," id. at 11.7

On Count 2, Mr. Hendrickson sought a declaration that the New Mexico statute providing for exclusive representation "constitute[s] an unconstitutional violation of his First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association." See id. at 12.8

The Union and Mr. Hendrickson each filed motions for summary judgment. The New Mexico Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.

The district court granted the Union's motion for summary judgment and the New Mexico Defendantsmotion to dismiss. It denied Mr. Hendrickson's motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed the suit in its entirety. Mr. Hendrickson appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Count 1 because Mr. Hendrickson's request for prospective relief is moot, and his request for retrospective damages relief fails on the merits. We affirm the district court's dismissal of Count 2 because the Eleventh Amendment bars his claim against the New Mexico Defendants, and the claim against the Union fails on the merits.

"We review de novo the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal." Bixler v. Foster , 596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2010). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Doe v. City of Albuquerque , 667 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).

"We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court." Helm v. Kansas , 656 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "In conducting the analysis, we view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Morris v. City of Colo. Springs , 666 F.3d 654, 660 (10th Cir. 2012) (alterations and quotation omitted).

A. Count 1 – Union Dues

Mr. Hendrickson objects to the deduction of union...

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