Hendrickson v. Branstad

• Decision Date: 23 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 2C 84-3012.,2C 84-3012.
• Citation: 740 F. Supp. 636
• Parties: Thomas Neil HENDRICKSON, Jr.; Bertha M. Foy, a minor, by her next friend, Blake Parker; and Sessions Harper, a minor, by his next friend, Blake Harper; individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Terry E. BRANSTAD, individually and in his capacity as Governor of the State of Iowa; and Richard R. Ramsey, individually and in his capacity as Executive Director of the Iowa Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning Agency, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

740 F. Supp. 636

Thomas Neil HENDRICKSON, Jr.; Bertha M. Foy, a minor, by her next friend, Blake Parker; and Sessions Harper, a minor, by his next friend, Blake Harper; individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Terry E. BRANSTAD, individually and in his capacity as Governor of the State of Iowa; and Richard R. Ramsey, individually and in his capacity as Executive Director of the Iowa Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning Agency, Defendants.

No. 2C 84-3012.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, C.D.

March 23, 1990.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harry Swanger, St. Louis, Mo., Blake Parker, Fort Dodge, Iowa, for plaintiffs.

Carlton Salmons, Charles Phillips, Des Moines, Iowa, for defendants.

ORDER

DONALD E. O'BRIEN, Chief Judge.

Before the court are the parties' joint motions to dismiss this action on the basis of mootness, and plaintiffs' renewed motion for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. For the reasons discussed below, the court awards plaintiffs' counsel $276,163.09 in attorneys' fees and costs, and dismisses this action.

Plaintiffs commenced this case on February 2, 1984, alleging violations of due process, the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, statutory rights under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5601, et seq. ("JJDPA"), and state and federal contract law arising from juvenile detention and jailing practices in Webster County, Iowa. The subsequent history of this litigation is outlined in this court's April 9, 1987 opinion in Hendrickson v. Griggs, 672 F.Supp. 1126 (N.D.Iowa 1987), and in the Eighth Circuit opinion in Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1988). This court ruled, inter alia, that juveniles could assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to seek redress for violations of rights created by the JJDPA, and that Iowa was required to submit a plan for achieving policy changes and reductions in the rate of juvenile jailing in adult jails to place the state in compliance with the JJDPA.

On May 4, 1987, the state filed its plan for reducing the rate of juvenile confinement in adult facilities, and supplemented the plan on May 21 to include reference to newly-enacted Iowa legislation regarding juvenile detention. See Iowa Code Ann. §§ 232.8, 232.22, 232.44, 805.1, 903.1 (West Supp.1989).¹ In August, 1988, the Circuit, on appeal by defendants, declined to reach the merits of this court's April 9, 1987 ruling, holding that the ruling was a nonappealable interlocutory order. Hendrickson, 856 F.2d at 1044-45.

Plaintiffs originally requested attorneys' fees and costs as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in an April 21, 1987 motion. This Court by order of May 7, 1987, held this motion to be "premature, and that plaintiffs' counsel should bring their motion once all substantive questions are resolved." The parties support their subsequent July 3, 1989 motions for dismissal or conclusion of plaintiffs' action with affidavits indicating that Iowa is now in compliance with the JJDPA. Plaintiffs' counsel thereupon renewed their request for attorneys' fees.

The parties jointly agree that the State of Iowa is now in compliance with the JJDPA. Therefore, the court finds that this case is moot and that dismissal of this action is appropriate.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' renewed motion for attorney's fees and costs is timely. Plaintiffs motion and defendants' resistance related thereto present three general questions. First, are plaintiffs a "prevailing party" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988? Second, what is the proper amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded in this case? Third, should an award of attorneys' fees and costs be apportioned among the county² and state defendants.

Defendants contend plaintiffs are not prevailing parties for two reasons. First, they assert that subsequently enacted Iowa legislation, and not plaintiffs' action and this court's April 9, 1987 ruling, was the cause of Iowa's compliance with the JJDPA and virtual elimination of the practice of holding juveniles in adult jails. Second and alternatively, they contend that plaintiffs are not prevailing parties because this court limited its discussion in its April 9, 1987 ruling, for purposes of plaintiffs' request for damages, solely to a finding of a private cause of action for juveniles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and this court did not address plaintiffs' eighth amendment and due process claims. As will be shown, neither of defendants' contentions has merit.

It is well-established that plaintiffs can be prevailing parties and entitled to attorneys' fees when substantial, but not complete, relief is obtained. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).

"Plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorneys' fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefits the parties sought in bringing the suit. This is a generous formulation that brings the plaintiff only across the statutory threshold. It remains for the district court to determine what fee is reasonable."

Id. 103 S.Ct. at 1939, (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) (plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties "if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefits the parties sought in bringing the suit").

A change in legal relationship need not be a part of the ultimate relief ordered. An award is proper, for example, if a plaintiff's suit was a catalyst for the remedying of constitutional violations. See, e.g., United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 348 (8th Cir.1980); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 n. 9 (8th Cir.1980); DeGidio v. Pung, 723 F.Supp. 135, 138 (D.Minn.1989). In United Handicapped Federation, 622 F.2d at 348, the Eighth Circuit set out a two-part test for evaluating when a plaintiff has been a catalyst. First, the lawsuit and efforts of counsel must have been a "necessary and important factor in achieving the improvements." Id. at 346. Second, the changes or reforms accomplished must have been legally required and not merely gratuitous or voluntary. Id. (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir.1978).

Plaintiffs meet both of these conditions. Defendants acknowledge that plaintiffs' action and this court's injunctive relief preceded Iowa legislative action by more than three years. This chronological sequence of events is persuasive evidence that plaintiffs' lawsuit was a material factor promoting Iowa's compliance with the JJDPA. See Coyote v. Roberts, 502 F.Supp. 1342, 1351 (D.R.I.1980) (chronological sequence of events is persuasive, although not decisive, evidence). More importantly, Iowa's compliance with the JJDPA was more than voluntary or gratuitous; indeed, it was compelled by this court's order that Iowa submit a plan to bring the state into compliance with the JJDPA. Defendants' response that "the groundwork for the passage of the state legislation had been laid before this court's order of early 1987, and its passage without this order was probable, if not certain" is not borne out by the facts. As noted in the State Defendants' "Plan" for compliance with this court's April 9, 1987 ruling:

"The State of Iowa will pursue legislation which conforms with the requirements of (the JJDPA). Most observers are confident of the bill's passage ... the added weight of the court order on this matter is known to the members of the General Assembly."³

State Defendants "Plan", para. I emphasis added. As recognized by the Tenth Circuit in Chicano Police Officer Assn. v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 131 (10th Cir.1980), a lawsuit "can be the initial catalyst in producing action or can be the constant producing that motivates a defendant to go further than it otherwise would have." Defendants' claim that Iowa legislative action was imminent is further defeated by this court's specific finding in its April 9, 1987 order that "There is every indication that the jailing of juveniles will continue at an impermissibly high rate." Hendrickson, 672 F.Supp. at 1139. It is noteworthy here that before plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint to include the State Defendants, this court in 1985 invited the State's participation in this action, which participation the State declined.⁴ If the State and/or the legislature had seriously been pushing legislative reform at that time, one might think that the State would have welcomed an opportunity to demonstrate this fact and to save litigation costs, especially when the existing juvenile jailing practices were under attack through plaintiffs' action.

Defendants' second contention, that plaintiffs did not prevail because this court did not address all their claims, also fails. In Hensley, the court addressed situations such as the one at bar which contain essentially a single claim, i.e., removal of juveniles from adult jails in Iowa based on alternative, multiple theories for relief (JJDPA, 8th and 5th/14th Amendments), and held that:

the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing the fee. The result is what matters.

109 S.Ct. at 1040 citations omitted emphasis added. Plaintiffs obviously succeeded against the defendants through the court's favorable ruling in the April 9, 1987 order on plaintiffs' JJDPA claim. Although this court declined to address plaintiffs' eighth amendment and due process theories on mootness grounds, this is not a sufficient reason for reducing plaintiffs' attorneys'...