Hendrickson v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 21 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. 09-1375.,09-1375.
• Citation: 589 F.3d 887
• Parties: Vernon A. HENDRICKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

589 F.3d 887

Vernon A. HENDRICKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-1375.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 10, 2009.

Decided December 21, 2009.

Margaret M. Christensen, Phillip J. Fowler, Attorney (argued), Bingham Mchale LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David L. Steiner, Attorney (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before MANION, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge.

Prison is rough. Violent prisoners can pose a serious threat, requiring prison officers to use force to maintain order. Sometimes, though, the only real threat comes from a rogue officer who attacks a prisoner for no good reason. When such abuse occurs in a facility operated by a State, the prisoner can sue the officer under the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for excessive force. Still, a § 1983 suit is not always a perfect remedy, as the prisoner faces many challenges in proving his case. He must pit his story against the conflicting story of the defendant officer, who often boasts an impressive law enforcement résumé and calls a cadre of fellow officers to support his side. Yet this case proves that these challenges are not insurmountable, and that § 1983 plays a pivotal role in the cause against prison brutality.

Vernon Hendrickson, an inmate at Indiana's Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, brought a § 1983 action against Sergeant Scott Cooper, an officer at the facility, claiming that Cooper attacked him without justification. The case went to trial before a jury, which found Cooper liable for using excessive force against Hendrickson in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. Cooper appeals, arguing that the jury's liability finding and damages awards were unsupported by the evidence. We recount that evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 920, 926 (7th Cir.2004).

On April 21, 2005, Hendrickson was walking back from the prison's dining hall to his housing unit. He passed Cooper, who, for no apparent reason, called him a "son of a bitch." Hendrickson stayed quiet and kept walking. Cooper persisted. "Mother fucker" was Cooper's next insult at Hendrickson. Hendrickson, no longer able to bite his tongue, turned back toward Cooper and told him to "keep his mother off the streets."

Hendrickson's verbal insult was unaccompanied by any physical aggression. Hendrickson, along with two of his fellow inmates who witnessed the encounter, testified that he never made any threatening movements towards Cooper. Indeed, Hendrickson was hardly capable of challenging Cooper physically, as two prior car accidents rendered Hendrickson partially crippled. The first accident damaged the right side of Hendrickson's brain along with the left side of his body, affecting his ability to walk. The second resulted in a herniated disk in Hendrickson's neck. These injuries left Hendrickson with serious pain in his neck and upper back, as well as some pain in his lower back.

So while Hendrickson was never any physical threat, his insult gave Cooper all the excuse he needed. "You son of a bitch, you've had it now," Cooper threatened as he walked into the housing unit ahead of Hendrickson. After stalling for a few minutes, Hendrickson entered the building, only to find Cooper there waiting for him. Hendrickson tried to avoid eye contact and quietly walk to his room, but Cooper was honed in. "Now, bitch," Cooper demanded as he threw his equipment belt out of the way, grabbed Hendrickson, threw him against a wall, slammed him onto the concrete floor, and pressed his knees into Hendrickson's back while another officer cuffed Hendrickson.

Hendrickson testified that all of that "hurt pretty bad," especially in light of his preexisting back and neck problems. After Cooper's attack, officers took Hendrickson to a segregation unit, where he initially refused a nurse's offer to examine him because he was agitated and didn't want to deal with prison officials. After about an hour, however, Hendrickson told a nurse that he was feeling "pain all over" and requested treatment. About a month later, Hendrickson followed up with multiple requests for a transfer to a hospital for an MRI scan and additional care, as the Tylenol and ibuprofen that he was receiving in prison were not providing sufficient pain relief. Hendrickson also described for the jury how Cooper's attack increased his back pain. Before Cooper's assault, Hendrickson had a "little bit of lower back pain," but this pain became much worse afterwards.

The jury found Cooper liable for using excessive force against Hendrickson, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The jury awarded Hendrickson $75,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering and tacked on a punitive damages award of $125,000. The district court denied Cooper's motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. Cooper appeals, arguing that the jury's liability finding was unsupported by the evidence and that the damages awards were excessive.

Beginning with Cooper's attack on the jury's liability finding, Cooper faces an uphill battle, for we will overturn a jury verdict only if "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis" exists "for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party." Woodward, 368 F.3d at 926 (quotation omitted). To determine if this verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, we must consider what Hendrickson had to prove to make out his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. The core requirement for such a claim is that Cooper used force not "in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline," but "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). Several factors guide the inquiry of whether an officer's use of force was legitimate or malicious, including "the need for an application of force, the relationship between that need and the force applied, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officers, the efforts made to temper the severity of the force employed, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner." Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). Even if an officer's use of force serves no good-faith disciplinary purpose, the force may be so "de minimis" that it does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). Still, while de minimis uses of force are non-actionable, a prisoner need not suffer "serious injury" in order to bring an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 4, 112 S.Ct. 995.

The evidence in this case amply supports the jury's verdict that Cooper attacked Hendrickson for the malicious purpose of causing harm. Hendrickson and his fellow inmates testified that he made no threatening movements towards Cooper, or anyone else, but simply responded to Cooper's repeated cussings with an insult of his own. Accepting Hendrickson's version of events, as we must, Cooper did not reasonably perceive any threat from Hendrickson and had no need to use any force. Nevertheless, Cooper waited for Hendrickson to enter the housing unit and then grabbed him, slammed him into the wall and concrete floor, and pressed his knees into Hendrickson's bad back. The jury could reasonably find that this use of force was gratuitous and intended solely to cause pain. (It is interesting that although Hendrickson's testimony was corroborated by two other inmates, none of the other correctional officers present during the events provided any evidence at trial.)

Cooper's attack was also not the type of de minimis force that cannot, as a matter of law, constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Cooper offered more than a mere "malevolent touch," Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, or "simple act of shoving," DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir.2000). Cooper took Hendrickson to the concrete ground and kneed him in the back. This force was severe and, though perhaps justified under other circumstances to restrain a dangerous inmate, uncalled-for here. Cf. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 475-76 (7th Cir.2009) (finding that the use of a taser gun was a more than de minimis use of force, triggering the inquiry of whether the tasering served a legitimate disciplinary purpose). Hendrickson was no threat, yet Cooper attacked him for the malicious purpose of causing pain. Or so the jury could reasonably find.

Cooper argues that Hendrickson failed to prove that the attack caused any injury severe enough to violate the Eighth Amendment, stressing that Hendrickson offered no expert medical evidence showing that the attack exacerbated his preexisting back pain. This argument assigns to Hendrickson a burden that he did not have, namely, proof that he suffered any serious injury or longterm pain. It is "pain, not injury," that is the touchstone of an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 475. Hendrickson testified that he felt a lot of pain when Cooper threw him to the ground. It got worse when Cooper gave him the knee treatment, causing what Hendrickson described as a sharp, needle-like pain in his lower back. Hendrickson's testimony about the pain that he suffered from the assault, if believed by the jury, was enough to show an Eighth Amendment violation. The jury was not required to find that Hendrickson suffered a more debilitating, longer-term injury.

True, if an officer's use of force causes only minor injury, that factor tends to show that the force served a proper disciplinary purpose. See Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 837. So in cases where it's debatable whether the use of force was legitimate or malicious, the lack of serious injury may tip the scales against the prisoner....