Hendrickson v. Meredith

• Decision Date: 21 September 1933
• Citation: 161 Va. 193
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: HELEN E. HENDRICKSON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF GEORGE W. MEREDITH, DECEASED, v. MARY MEREDITH.

Page 193

161 Va. 193

HELEN E. HENDRICKSON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF GEORGE W. MEREDITH, DECEASED, v. MARY MEREDITH.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

September 21, 1933.

Present, Campbell, C.J., and Holt, Epes, Hudgins, Gregory and Browning, JJ.

1. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE — Contract Too Vague and Indefinite — Contract that Decedent Was to Pay Plaintiff a Weekly Sum, Furnish Board and Clothes and Provide a Home for Plaintiff During Life. — In the instant case, an action against defendant, an administratrix, for services rendered her decedent, a promise of decedent to pay plaintiff a stated weekly sum, furnish her with board and clothes, and provide a home for her during her life, in return for her services, was too vague and indefinite to be enforced specifically.

2. IMPLIED CONTRACTS — Agreement Treated as Void Merely because It Was Not Enforceable — Implied Assumpsit. — The general rule is that where an agreement is treated as void merely because it is not enforceable and money is paid or services are rendered under it by one party and the other avoids it, there can be a recovery upon an implied assumpsit for the money paid or the value of the services rendered.

3. IMPLIED CONTRACTS — General Rule. — Where an agreement is not illegal, but merely void, or unenforceable, and one of the parties refuses to perform his promise after performance or part performance by the other, the law will create a promise to pay for the benefits received.

4. MASTER AND SERVANT — Recovery for Services Performed — Party Standing in Loco Parentis — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action by plaintiff to recover for services performed for defendant's decedent. There was no obligation, moral or legal, imposing upon plaintiff the duty to leave her parents' home and enter the home of decedent for the purpose of ministering to his household and to him personally. Simply because plaintiff was treated as a member of the family after she entered decedent's home under the circumstances of this case, created no implication that she was performing the work gratuitously. There was no evidence which tended to show that at any time decedent attempted to exercise parental control over plaintiff, or that she treated or regarded him as her foster father.

Held: That the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering the reasonable value of her services on the ground that deceased stood in loco parentis to her.

5. IMPLIED CONTRACTS — Express Contract Distinguished from Contract Implied in Fact. — The only difference between an express contract and a contract implied in fact is that in the former all of the terms and conditions are expressed between the parties, while in the latter some of the terms and conditions are implied in law from the conduct of the parties. Thus: Where one renders services for another at the latter's request, the law, in the absence of an express agreement, implies a promise to pay what the services are reasonably worth, unless it can be inferred from the circumstances that the services were to be rendered without compensation.

6. INSTRUCTIONS — Abstract Propositions of Law — Implied Contracts — Action to Recover for Services — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action against defendant, an administratrix, for services rendered her decedent, the court instructed the jury that "an implied contract is created by law to establish justice between parties. It does not require mutual assent, but may bind a party against his will." Even as abstract propositions of law, the principles enunciated in the instructions are not fully stated, and even if they were, they are abstract principles which have a tendency to confuse, rather than to clarify, the issue to be decided by the jury.

7. MASTER AND SERVANT — Action against Master on Quantum Meruit — Measure of Damages — Reasonable Value of Services Performed by Plaintiff, Less Compensation Received by Plaintiff — Case at Bar. — In an action on a quantum meruit against an administratrix for services performed by plaintiff for her decedent, the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the work and labor performed by plaintiff, less the amount of compensation, whether in money or otherwise, which plaintiff has received.

8. MASTER AND SERVANT — Action against Master on Quantum Meruit — Measure of Damages — Case at Bar. — In an action on a quantum meruit against an administratrix for services performed by plaintiff for her decedent, the measure of recovery did not depend upon the necessity of the decedent and the value of the services to him, but upon the reasonable value of the services in themselves.

9. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT — Admissibility in Evidence of Offer to Compromise. — The essence of an offer of compromise is that the party making it is willing to submit to a sacrifice and to make a concession.

10. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT — Admissibility in Evidence of Offer to Compromise. — The general rule is that on the ground of public policy an offer to compromise or settle a disputed claim will not be received as an admission of the party making the offer, but if during the negotiation there is an admission of an independent fact pertinent to the question in issue, such evidence is admissible.

11. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT — Admissibility in Evidence of Offer to Compromise — Offer by Administratrix — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action against defendant, an administratrix, for services rendered her decedent, the admission of an offer of compromise by the administratrix was assigned as error. There was no statement or admission by the administratrix of an independent fact which tended to show liability, other than an inference which might be deduced from the offer to "give" a certain sum. It was distinctly stated that defendant nade the offer "as a compromise." From the whole setting, it appears that defendant was acting in her representative capacity and had no intention of acknowledging the validity of the debt, but desired to buy peace. It could not be said that the offer amounted to a tacit admission of liability or evinced a consciousness on the part of defendant of her liability.

Held: That the evidence should have been excluded from the consideration of the jury.

12. WILLS — Promise to Make a Will — Corroboration of Plaintiff. — In the instant case plaintiff contended that defendant's decedent had promised to make provision for plaintiff (supposedly by will), in return for plaintiff's services to defendant's decedent. There was a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant urged that the court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict because under section 6209 of the Code of 1930 the verdict of the jury could not be based upon the uncorroborated evidence of plaintiff.

Held: That the corroborating evidence of plaintiff's evidence was sufficient under section 6209 of the Code of 1930.

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Giles county, in a proceeding by motion for a judgment for money. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant assigns error.

The opinion states the case.

J. L. Dillow and W. B. Snidow, for the plaintiff in error.

Williams & Farrier, for the defendant in error.

HUDGINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action against the estate of George W. Meredith to recover the value of services rendered him during several years immediately preceding his death. From a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant obtained this writ.

On the first day of January, 1932, George W. Meredith died intestate, leaving as his only heirs at law and next of kin one son a weak-minded, deaf mute, and one daughter, Helen E. Hendrickson, who qualified as administratrix on the estate. His personal property was appraised at $7,500; no one testified as to the value of his real estate, which consisted of two farms, containing 200 acres each.

Mary Meredith, plaintiff in the trial court, testified that she was twenty-three years of age; that for the past five or six years she had been living in the home of George W. Meredith, except that on July 6, 1929, when Mrs. Meredith, her half-sister, died, she left and went to the home of her parents. Shortly thereafter, George W. Meredith sent for, and made a contract with her, whereby in consideration of her promise to serve and take care of him so long as he lived, he promised to pay her $2.50 per week, furnish her board and clothes, and make provision for her (supposedly by will), and that she was to have a home on his farm so long as he lived. These services she performed. She lived in his home as a member of his family until his death, performing all the household work, such as cooking, washing, ironing, looking after the chickens, cows, and at times other live stock. In addition, she frequently acted as chauffeuse when he went out on business or pleasure, and during the last two years of his life performed the duties of a practical nurse. At the time of decedent's death, she had been furnished board, lodging and clothes, and had received all except between $75 and $100 of the $2.50 per week promised, but decedent died without having made any other provision for her.

Helen E. Hendrickson testified that she had heard both plaintiff and her father, in plaintiff's presence, state that the full compensation agreed upon by the parties was $2.50 per week, board and clothes, and that plaintiff had told her after her father's death that all the estate owed her was between $75 and $100.

This testimony of the interested parties leaves only one provision of the contract between decedent and plaintiff in dispute, i.e., the promise whereby decedent "was to make provision for her (plaintiff) and she was to have a home there (on one of decedent's farms) as long as she lived."

Corroborating evidence was introduced by both parties, upon which the case was submitted to the jury. Most of the errors assigned deal with instructions offered and refused. Plaintiff requested, and the court gave, only one instruction,...