Hendrix v. Alsop

• Decision Date: 12 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 85,85
• Citation: 180 S.E.2d 802,278 N.C. 549
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Walter W. HENDRIX, Jr. v. James Richard ALSOP, Charles Pfizer Company, Inc. and J. B. Roerig andCompany, a Division of Charles Pfizer Company, Inc.

Page 802

180 S.E.2d 802

278 N.C. 549

Walter W. HENDRIX, Jr. v. James Richard ALSOP, Charles Pfizer Company, Inc. and J. B Roerig andCompany, a Division of Charles Pfizer Company, Inc.

No. 85.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 12, 1971.

Max D. Ballinger, Greensboro, for plaintiff appellant.

Harry Rockwell and J. B. Winecoff, Greensboro, for defendant Alsop, appellant.

BRANCH, Justice.

We first consider the motion of defendants Pfizer and Roerig to dismiss plaintiff's appeal.

The Court of Appeals unanimously, and we think correctly, affirmed Judge Gambill's order of 6 March 1970, which dismissed the action as to Pfizer and Roerig.

On 6 April 1971 this Court refused to exercise its discretionary power of review pursuant to G.S. § 7A--31 and denied plaintiff's petition for certiorari.

G.S. § 7A--30 provides:

§ 7A--30. Appeals of right from certain decisions of the Court of Appeals.--Except as provided in § 7A--28, (pertaining to post conviction hearings) from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case

(1) Which directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State, or

(2) In which there is a dissent, or

(3) Which involves review of a decision of the North Carolina Utilities Commission in a general rate-making case, an appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court.

Obviously, the record does not present questions under G.S. § 7A--30(1) or G.S. § 7A--30(3); however, plaintiff, without citation of authority, contends that since there was a dissent as to defendant Alsop, he can appeal decision as to Pfizer and Roerig as a matter of right pursuant to G.S. § 7A--30(2).

There are no decisions on this point in North Carolina. Our research indicates that the State of New Jersey has appellate procedures very similar to those provided for in G.S. § 7A--30(2).

The New Jersey Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 5, paragraph 1, in part provides:

'1. Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court: * * *

(b) in causes where there is a dissent in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.'

Complementing this provision of the Constitution is rule 1:2--1 of the New Jersey Supreme Court which, in part, states: 'Appeals may be taken to this Court from final judgments: * * * (b) in causes where there is a dissent in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.'

In Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 89 A.2d 458, the New Jersey Supreme Court, speaking through Justice William Brennan, stated:

'Our new judicial structure is modeled after the federal court system. Our system too contemplates one appeal as of right to a court of general appellate jurisdiction. This is afforded usually in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court. A further appeal to this court is allowed only in the exercise of our discretional power of certification Unless the case comes within one of the limited number of situations for which an appeal to this court as of right is expressly allowed by Article VI, Section V, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of 1947. See also Rule 1:2--1.' (Emphasis supplied)

In Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 112 A.2d 705, two plaintiffs, Pangborn and Forner, obtained verdicts in the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the Pangborn judgment by a divided vote but unanimously affirmed as to Forner. The defendant appealed as to Pangborn and attempted to cross appeal as to Forner under Supreme Court rule 1:2--6, which provided: 'Any respondent may appeal from a judgment, order, or determination by serving and filing a notice of cross appeal which shall be governed by the rules relating to notice of appeal.'

Justice Brennan, again speaking for the Court, stated:

'The Pangborn appeal is here as of right under R.R. 1:2--1(b) by reason of the dissent in the Appellate Division. The railroad attempts to bring the Forner case here by cross-appeal. But the two actions are separate and distinct, and The fact that they were brought under one complaint and tried together does not mean that a dissent in the one case gives the defendant an appeal as of right in the other. R.R. 1:2--6 governing cross-appeals allows such an appeal only from a judgment properly here at the instance of an appellant therefrom. * * * The Forner case could not be brought here except by certification allowed under R.R. 1:10.' (Emphasis supplied)

Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co., supra, differs factually from the case before us for decision. There the defendants sought to appeal by cross-action where there were two separate and distinct actions consolidated for trial. Here, questions presented by plaintiff's attempt to appeal as a matter of right pursuant to G.S. § 7A--30(2) are entirely different from questions which defendant Alsop raises in his appeal as a matter of right by virtue of Judge Graham's dissent. It is apparent that both the General Assembly of New Jersey and the General Assembly of North Carolina intended to insure a review by the Supreme Court of questions on which there was a division in the intermediate appellate court; no such review was intended for claims joined or consolidated in the lower appellate court and on which that court rendered unanimous decision.

The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

The remaining question for decision is whether the trial judge erred when he entered his order of 6 January 1970, dismissing the action as to James R. Alsop.

At the threshold of this question we must decide when plaintiff should have filed his complaint.

In Strickland v. Jackson, 260 N.C. 190, 132 S.E.2d 338, defendant demurred to the complaint and Judge Mintz sustained the demurrer, granting plaintiff thirty days in which to file his amended complaint. Plaintiff refused to amend, and appealed to the Supreme Court, where the demurrer was affirmed. On 20 March 1963, the Supreme Court filed its decision affirming the demurrer, and on 3 April 1963 the cause was certified and recorded in the Superior Court of Pitt County. On 19 April 1963, Judge Hubbard, who was then holding courts in Pitt County, entered an order affirming the order of the Supreme Court. Plaintiff attempted to file amendment to the complaint on 13 May 1963, and defendant, on 27 May 1963, moved to strike the complaint upon the ground that it was not filed in time. The judge allowed defendant's motion and plaintiff appealed. Affirming the action of the trial judge, this Court stated:

'The appeal from the Mintz judgment had the effect of suspending further proceedings pending the appeal. The suspension, however, was lifted when this Court's affirming Certificate was received in the Superior Court of Pitt County on April 3, 1963. As of that date the rights of the parties were fixed by G.S. 1--131, with which the challenged order conformed. The plaintiffs had authority to amend within 30 days. Dudley v. Dudley, 250 N.C. 95, 107 S.E.2d 918; Teague v. Siler City Oil Co., 232 N.C. 469, 61 S.E.2d 345. Judge Hubbard's order of April 19, 1963, neither added to nor took from the rights of the party.

'The plaintiffs' amendment of May 13, 1963, was not filed within 30 days. Consequently, the order of Judge Latham striking the amendment is Affirmed.'

In instant case the period of twenty days in which the plaintiff was permitted to file his complaint began to run on 1 July 1968, and complaint was filed on 1 August 1969. Thus, the principal issue narrows to whether, when plaintiff had filed his complaint over one year after the time permitted but before the defendant interposed a motion to dismiss, the trial judge erred in allowing defendant's motion to dismiss and, in his discretion, refusing to enlarge the time to file complaint.

Both the summons and the complaint were served before the effective date of the new Rules of Civil Procedure, and decision will be governed by the Rules as they existed immediately prior to 1 January 1970. G.S. § 1--121, in part, provided:

'The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff is the complaint. It must be filed in the clerk's office at or before the time of the issuance of summons and a copy thereof delivered to the defendant, or defendants, at the time of the service of summons; provided, that the clerk may at the time of the issuance of summons on application of plaintiff by written order extend the time for filing complaint to a day certain not to exceed twenty (20) days, and a copy of such order shall be delivered to the defendant, or defendants, at the time of the service of summons in lieu of a copy of the complaint; Provided, further, said application and order shall state the nature and purpose of the suit. The clerk shall not extend the time for filing complaint beyond the time specified in such order; except that when application is made to the court, under article forty-six of this chapter, for leave to examine the defendant prior to filing complaint, and it shall be made to appear to the court that such examination of defendant is necessary to enable the plaintiff to file his complaint, and such examination is allowed, the clerk shall extend the time for filing complaint until twenty (20) days after the report of the examination is filed as requiring by § 1--571 * * *.'

The Court of Appeals relies on the case of Roberts v. Allman, 106 N.C. 391, 11 S.E. 424, for the proposition that further order of court extending time to file the complaint 'was not a prerequisite to filing the complaint on that date where no effort has been previously made to dismiss the action.

Roberts v. Allman, supra, was decided under the Code section which provided: 'The plaintiff shall file his complaint in the clerk's office on or before the third day of the term to which the action is brought, otherwise the suit may, on motion, be dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff.' N.C.Code of 1883 § 206.

Roberts is distinguishable from instant case in that there a Judgment by default was taken in 1884 and defendants moved on 18 May 1887 to dismiss for the reason that...