Hendrix v. Dir., TDCJ-CID

• Decision Date: 11 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:20cv009
• Parties: MICHALE PAUL HENDRIX, #2017650 v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

MICHALE PAUL HENDRIX, #2017650
v.
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID

Civil Action No. 2:20cv009

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division

January 11, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ROY S. PAYNE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner Michael Paul Hendrix, a prisoner confined at the Beto Unit within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) proceeding pro se, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254 challenging his Cass County, Texas, conviction. The petition was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case. For the for the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Hendrix's petition should be denied, and the case should be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Procedural History

On July 22, 2015, after a jury trial, Hendrix was sentenced to sixty-five years' imprisonment for one count of injury to a child, (Dkt. #15, pg. 359). He pleaded true to the enhancement paragraphs. Hendrix filed a direct appeal, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction in a written opinion on March 20, 2017. See Hendrix v. State, 2017 WL 1055679 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2017, pet. ref'd). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review on November 1, 2017. Hendrix then filed a state habeas application on September 5, 2019, which was denied without a written order on December 18, 2019. Id. at 836. This timely federal petition follows.

1

II. Factual Background

The appellate court outlined the facts of this case, in pertinent part, as follows:

While there was conflicting evidence, the State's evidence was that, on or about June 7, 2014, Hendrix hit both of K.C.'s thighs hard, a number of times, with his fisted hand, causing complete breaks to both femurs, resulting in his legs being twisted, unnatural, and unable to support his weight. Medical care was administered, resulting in K.C being placed in a spica cast, which immobilized his hips and both legs, but left space for his diaper to be changed Fortunately, at least by April 2015, K.C. had healed and was walking normally again

That evidence supports a finding of serious bodily injury. While the evidence is not clear concerning the length of time K.C. could not walk-it was certainly something less than nine months-the complete, separated breaks in both femurs tends to support a finding that he suffered protracted loss or impairment of his ability to stand or walk.

Hendrix, 2017 WL 1055679, at *2. The appellate court specifically explained that the case presented no reversible error. Id. at *4 n.4.

III. Hendrix's Habeas Claims

In his habeas petition, Hendrix raises three claims for relief. He first maintains that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by denying him his right to “confront witnesses against him who were critical to his defense,” (Dkt. #1, pg. 6). He also claims that the trial court knowingly entered false testimony into the record. Second, Hendrix maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective for forfeiting his rights under the Confrontation Clause-as counsel failed to investigate, locate, interview, and call witnesses against him. Counsel further failed to discover exculpatory evidence that was withheld by Child Protective Services (CPS). Finally, Hendrix asserts that counsel failed to advise him of his right to appeal and file a motion for new trial. Hendrix claims that he is actually innocent.

2

IV. Respondent's Answer

Respondent urges this Court to dismiss Hendrix's petition, (Dkt. #14). Specifically, it maintains that the trial court did not deny his rights under the Confrontation Clause and that counsel was not ineffective. Respondent further argues that the state habeas court's failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to Hendrix's state habeas application is of no consequence.

V. Hendrix's Response

In his response, (Dkt. #18), Hendrix argues that the failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law violated his due process rights. He complains that while the burden of proof is on him in a habeas proceeding, he “stands at a disadvantage” without these findings. Hendrix further argues that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated because state witnesses did not testify-who could have testified to false testimony, (Dkt. #18, pg. 4). He asserts that the State failed to correct and that a witness was “coerced” to testify falsely to “create a false picture.”

Hendrix argues that the June 2014 Affidavit of Removal, Exhibit A contained in the state court records, contains false information that was used to obtain an arrest affidavit. He recounts portions of the trial transcript that he alleges are “inconsistent” or “false” when compared to the affidavit. Accordingly, he argues, the State “withheld favorable evidence,” and knew or should have known that false information existed.

With respect to his claims of ineffective assistance, Hendrix contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate false statements or discover the “identity of the individual or individuals” that coerced witness testimony. He also insists that counsel failed to provide mitigating evidence and that the State failed to provide him with a copy of Exhibit A, the Affidavit of Removal.

3

VI. Standard of Review

1. Federal Habeas Review

The role of federal courts in reviewing habeas petitions filed by state prisoners is exceedingly narrow. A prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus review must assert a violation of a federal constitutional right; federal relief is unavailable to correct errors of state constitutional, statutory, or procedural law unless a federal issue is also present. See Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 503 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We first note that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'”) (internal citation omitted). When reviewing state proceedings, a federal court will not act as a “super state supreme court” to review error under state law. Wood v. Quarterman, 503 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 2007).

Federal habeas review of state court proceedings is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. Under the AEDPA, which imposed several habeas corpus reforms, a petitioner who is in custody “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The AEDPA imposes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings,” which demands that federal courts give state court decisions “the benefit of the doubt.” See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citations omitted); see also Cardenas v. Stephens, 820 F.3d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Federal review under the AEDPA is therefore highly deferential: The question is not whether we, in our independent judgment,

4

believe that the state court reached the wrong result. Rather, we ask only whether the state court's judgment was so obviously incorrect as to be an objectively unreasonable resolution of the claim.”). Given the highly deferential standard, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness and a petitioner can only overcome that burden through clear and convincing evidence. Reed v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 465, 490 (5th Cir. 2007).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To show that trial counsel was ineffective, Hendrix must demonstrate both deficient performance and ensuing prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In evaluating whether an attorney's conduct was deficient, the question becomes whether the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on “prevailing norms of practice.” See Loden v. McCarty, 778 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir. 2016).

Moreover, to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that-absent counsel's deficient performance-the outcome or result of the proceedings would have been different. Id.; see also Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 773 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)). It is well-settled that a “reasonable probability” is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Importantly, the petitioner alleging ineffective assistance must show both deficient performance and prejudice. See Charles v. Stephens, 736 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 2013) (“A failure to establish either element is fatal to a petitioner's claim.”) (internal citation omitted). Given the already highly deferential standard under the AEDPA, establishing a state court's application whether counsel was ineffective “is all the more difficult.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011); see also Charles, 736 F.3d at 389 (“Both the Strickland standard and the AEDPA

5

standard are highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

VII. Discussion and Analysis

Hendrix failed to meet his burden under both the AEDPA and Strickland. He has not shown that the state court's adjudications of his claims were unreasonable or contrary to federal law.

1. Trial Court Error

Hendrix first maintains that the trial court...