Hendrix v. Evans

• Decision Date: 15 March 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. No. S 84-625.
• Citation: 715 F. Supp. 897
• Parties: James HENDRIX; and Gerald Cobbs, Plaintiffs, v. Daniel F. EVANS, Jr.; John T. Shettle; Cloid Shuler; Jack Duckworth; and Indiana Attorney General, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

715 F. Supp. 897

James HENDRIX; and Gerald Cobbs, Plaintiffs, v. Daniel F. EVANS, Jr.; John T. Shettle; Cloid Shuler; Jack Duckworth; and Indiana Attorney General, Defendants.

Civ. No. S 84-625.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

March 15, 1989.

James Hendrix and Gerald Cobbs, Michigan City, Ind., pro se.

David Arthur, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.

The complaint in this case was originally filed pro se on October 12, 1984, by five inmates incarcerated at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana (ISP). Three of the original plaintiffs were dismissed from this action pursuant to order of this court on March 14, 1986, for failing to appear at a scheduled pretrial conference. The remaining plaintiffs, James Hendrix and Gerald Cobbs, purport to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and invoke this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4).

The plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The court will construe the latter motion as a second or amended motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.). The defendants have filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which demonstrates the necessary compliance with the mandates of Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.1982). Additionally, defendants have filed a memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' summary judgment motions. The plaintiffs have not filed a response to defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Therefore, this case is now ripe for ruling.

I. Introduction

This case involves conditions of plaintiffs' confinement in K-Dormitory (maximum security, out-custody) at the ISP. The plaintiffs allege a myriad of constitutional violations and seek monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Plaintiff James Hendrix, however, is no longer incarcerated at the ISP. He was transferred to the Indiana Pendleton Reformatory on November 17, 1986. Thus, plaintiff Hendrix no longer has standing to assert any type of injunctive relief. Nonetheless, the court will address his claims concerning alleged constitutional violations that occurred while he was incarcerated at the ISP.

The named defendants are the Chairman of the Indiana Board of Corrections, Daniel F. Evans, Jr.; the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Corrections, John T. Shettle; a Deputy Commissioner of Corrections, Cloid Shuler; and the Superintendent of the ISP, Jack Duckworth.

Consistent with Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), this court has given the plaintiffs' complaint and their motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings an extremely liberal interpretation in order to extract all claims raised and argued by the plaintiffs. See also Smith v. Fairman, 862 F.2d 630 (7th Cir.1988); Abdul-Wadood v. Duckworth, 860 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1988); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir.1988). This is necessary because claims addressed in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment are not addressed in their motion for judgment on the pleadings and vice versa. The inconsistency has placed a burden on this court to, in effect, incorporate both motions in order to create one single motion. Additionally, this court notes that the defendants have had this same burden in attempting to respond to plaintiffs' motions.

Essentially, the following claims for relief are raised in the plaintiffs' complaint and argued in their motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings:

(1) that the First Amendment rights of plaintiff James Hendrix were violated when defendants: (a) refused to support and fund his lobbying efforts; (b) prohibited him from publishing "leaflets" to distribute to the general public; and (c) prohibited him from attending Lifers' organization meetings;

(2) that the due process rights of plaintiff James Hendrix were violated when defendants prohibited him from attending Lifers' organization meetings;

(3) that the due process rights of plaintiff Gerald Cobbs were violated when defendants refused to permit him to participate in a continuing legal education program at a local university;

(4) that the equal protection rights of plaintiff Gerald Cobbs and other K-Dormitory inmates were and are being violated by an alleged prison policy which prohibits K-Dormitory inmates from participating in educational and vocational programs;

(5) that the due process rights of plaintiffs were and are being violated in that: (a) the Inmate Trust Fund prohibits them from earning interest on their personal funds and (b) its operating procedures prohibit them from withdrawing their personal funds to send to persons who are not in their immediate family (prospective relief is now limited to plaintiff Cobbs);

(6) that the equal protection rights of plaintiff Gerald Cobbs and other K-Dormitory inmates were and are being violated by an alleged prison policy which denies K-Dormitory inmates equal access to recreational supplies purchased from the Inmates' Recreation Fund; and

(7) that the Eighth Amendment rights of plaintiffs were and are being violated by the living conditions in K-Dormitory (prospective relief is now limited to plaintiff Cobbs).

For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants summary judgment as to all claims above with the exception of claims (4) and (7). With respect to plaintiff Cobbs' equal protection claim (denial of academic and vocational training), plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings are denied. As will be discussed later, this claim is reserved for further proceedings consistent with this order. In regard to the Eighth Amendment claim, defendants concede that there are genuine issues of material fact remaining as to the conditions of confinement at K-Dormitory. Consequently, defendants are not seeking summary judgment in their favor on this issue.

II. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.; accord Arkwright-Boston Mfg. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wausau Paper Mills Co., 818 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir.1987). A material question of fact is a question which will be outcome-determinative of an issue in that case. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Big O Warehouse, 741 F.2d 160, 163 (7th Cir. 1984).

Recently the Supreme Court of the United States took the opportunity to address Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. In two cases decided on the same day, the Court expanded the scope of the application of Rule 56. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.

After Celotex it is clear that a non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings to avoid summary judgment. 106 S.Ct. at 2554. See also Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33 (D.C.Cir.1987). The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate "`with or without supporting affidavits'" the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Rule 56). Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine material issue for trial.'" Id. In Anderson, the Court held that what facts are material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling that case or issue. 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In addition, the Court went on to interpret Rule 56 as requiring that the courts analyze summary judgment motions utilizing the standard of proof relevant to that case or issue. Id. at 2512-2513. For recent academic insight into Celotex and Anderson, see Childress, A New Era For Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183, 194 (1987), where the author states:

The recent Supreme Court cases likely require that summary judgment be more readily granted.... This emerging trend signals a new era for summary judgments, one in which the old presumptions are giving way to a policy of balancing and efficiency, and the mechanism is more appropriate to double as a sufficiency motion — allowing some sort of trial itself on the paper record.

For the judicial epilogue of Celotex, see Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., supra. A recent object lesson applying these ideas is found in Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392 (7th Cir.1988). For an exact and recent analysis on this subject, see Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards? 63 Notre Dame L.Rev. 770 (1988).

III. Eleventh Amendment

It is clear from plaintiffs' complaint that the defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment states as follows:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

See Kashani v. Purdue University, 813 F.2d 843 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 141, 98 L.Ed.2d 97 (1987); Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648 (7th Cir.1982); Sheets v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 656 F.Supp. 733 (S.D.Ind. 1986). For recent authority consistent with Kashani, supra, see Shannon v. Bepko, 684 F.Supp. 1465 (S.D.Ind.1988). Any and all damage claims against defendants in their official...