Hendrix v. Wolfenbarger
| Decision Date | 29 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:10-CV-14253 |
| Parties | PAUL THOMAS HENDRIX, Petitioner, v. HUGH WOLFENBARGER, Respondent, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE MARIANNE O. BATTANI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Paul Thomas Hendrix, ("Petitioner"), confined at the Macomb Correctional Facility in New Haven, Michigan, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his application, filed by counsel Larry A. Smith, petitioner challenges his sentence for three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L.A. 750.520b(1)(a); and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L.A. 750.520c(1)(a). For the reasons stated below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to the above offenses in the Oakland County Circuit Court. On April 7, 2003, petitioner was sentenced to fifty to seventy five years in prison on the first-degree criminal sexual conductconvictions, which constituted an upward departure from the minimum sentencing guidelines range of 135 months to 18 years. At the time of petitioner's sentencing, the trial judge had received a number of letters from several family members and friends of petitioner, which accused him of numerous acts of sexual misconduct against children for which he had never been charged or convicted.
Petitioner moved to withdraw his nolo contendere plea or in the alternative for re-sentencing. On April 16, 2004, the Oakland County Circuit Court judge denied the motion to withdraw the plea. With respect to petitioner's request for re-sentencing, the judge provided petitioner's counsel with letters that had been sent to the court at the time of sentencing and ruled that petitioner should file an offer of proof which challenged the veracity of the letters reviewed by the judge in the course of its sentencing or otherwise indicate how the judge's decision was inappropriately affected by the letters. People v. Hendrix, Nos. 02-185883-FC/02-187092-FC (Oakland County Circuit Court, April 16, 2004).
The trial judge subsequently denied petitioner's request for a re-sentencing, because petitioner had failed to make an offer of proof which challenged the truth or the veracity of the letters which had been submitted to the court, even though he had been given an opportunity to do so. The judge further ruled that petitioner had failed to establish that he had relied upon these letters at the time of sentencing. People v. Hendrix, Nos. 02-185883-FC/02-187092-FC (Oakland County Circuit Court, June 29, 2004).
Petitioner's sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Hendrix, No. 257591 (Mich.Ct.App. December 17, 2004); lv. den. 474 Mich. 1006; 708 N.W. 2d 105 (2006).
Petitioner then filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment, which the trial court denied. People v. Hendrix, Nos. 02-185883-FC/02-187092-FC (Oakland County Circuit Court, December 9, 2008). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Hendrix, No. 2290011 (Mich. Ct. App. March 13, 2009); lv. den. 485 Mich. 926; 773 N.W. 2d 673 (2009).
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)(per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' onthe correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade. 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.
"[l]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington. 131 S. Ct. at 786. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only "in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" the Supreme Court's precedents. Id. Indeed, "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979))(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). lndeed, a "readiness to attribute error [to a state court]is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford. 537 U.S. at 24. Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington. 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.
A. The procedural default issue.
Respondent contends that petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted, because he raised them for the first time in his post-conviction motion for relief from judgment and failed to show cause for failing to raise these issues in his appeal of right, as well as prejudice, as required by M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3).
In this case, petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his first claim on his direct appeal. Ineffective assistance of counsel may establish cause for procedural default. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 (2000). If petitioner could show that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that rose to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation, it would excuse his procedural default for failing to raise his claims on his direct appeal in the state courts. Seymour v. Walker, 224 F. 3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 2000). Given that the cause and prejudice inquiry for the procedural default issue merges with an analysis of the merits of petitioner's defaulted claims, itwould be easier to consider the merits of these claims. See Cameron v. Birkett. 348 F. Supp. 2d 825, 836 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 292. Moreover, petitioner could not have procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, because state post-conviction review was the first opportunity that he had to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. See Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F. 3d 286, 291 (6th Cir. 2010).
B. Claim # 1. The sentencing claim.
In his first claim, petitioner contends that the trial judge erred in departing above the sentencing guidelines range on the basis of uncharged and unproven allegations of sexual misconduct against other children.
To the extent that petitioner challenges the scoring of the sentencing guidelines, he would not be entitled to habeas relief. It is well-established that "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)(quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). Petitioner's claim that the state trial court incorrectly scored or...
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