Hendryx v. State

Decision Date02 February 1892
Docket Number16,154
Citation29 N.E. 1131,130 Ind. 265
PartiesHendryx v. The State
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

From the Elkhart Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed, with directions to the circuit court to sustain the appellant's motion for a new trial.

H. D Wilson, W. H. Vesey and C. W. Miller, for appellant.

J. T Sullivan, Prosecuting Attorney, and J. H. State, for the State.

Coffey J. Olds, J., took no part in the decision of this cause.

OPINION

Coffey, J.

The appellant was indicted in the Elkhart Circuit Court at the December term, 1890, for the murder of one Edmond Caulkins. Upon a trial by jury he was found guilty of murder in the second degree, and, over a motion for a new trial, he was sentenced to imprisonment in the State prison for the period of his natural life.

Among the many reasons urged here for a reversal of the judgment there is but one, we think, properly presented by the record, and that is that the circuit court erred in refusing to permit the appellant to defend as a poor person, and to assign him counsel for his defence.

Section 260, R. S. 1881, provides that "Any poor person, not having sufficient means to prosecute or defend any action, may apply to the court in which the action is intended to be brought, or is pending, for leave to prosecute or defend as a poor person. The court, if satisfied that such person has not sufficient means to prosecute or defend the action, shall admit the applicant to prosecute or defend as a poor person, and shall assign him an attorney to defend or prosecute the cause, and all other officers requisite for the prosecution or defence, who shall do their duty therein without taking any fee or reward therefor from such poor person."

As to whether a person shall be permitted to prosecute or defend an action, as a poor person, and shall have counsel assigned him for that purpose, under this statute, is, of necessity, largely in the discretion of the trial court, but the exercise of such discretion is subject to review by this court. Keyes v. State, 122 Ind. 527, 23 N.E. 1097; Hoey v. McCarthy, 124 Ind. 464, 24 N.E. 1038.

The application in this case to be permitted to defend as a poor person was supported by the affidavit of the appellant, and discloses the following facts: The appellant was arrested and confined in the jail of Elkhart county on the 10th day of January, 1891, where he had remained until the time of making the application. The indictment upon which he was tried was returned by the grand jury on the 19th day of the same month. The appellant was a married man, twenty-six years of age, and at the time of his arrest resided in the city of Chicago. He and his parents formerly resided in Elkhart county, Indiana, but had recently removed to the city of Chicago. Neither the appellant nor his wife had any property, of any kind, except wearing apparel, which was scarcely enough to keep them comfortable. The father and mother owned real estate in Elkhart, Indiana, jointly, of the probable value of $ 5,000, were on good terms with the appellant, but refused to aid him in his defence or furnish any means for that purpose. He was wholly unable to employ or procure counsel by reason of the fact that he had nothing with which to pay.

The State was represented by the prosecuting attorney and his deputies, and by Hon. John H. Baker, the latter having been appointed by the court to assist in the prosecution. It was further shown that Mr. Baker was a lawyer of thirty years' experience in criminal practice, and possessed much influence with the jurors of the county.

The appellant in his affidavit in support of his application protests his innocence of the crime charged against him.

The facts set forth in this application, so far as they relate to the appellant's pecuniary condition, are not denied.

The ground upon which the court refused the application appears by its written opinion filed in the cause.

It appears that the court reached the conclusion, that, by reason of the fact that the parents of the appellant possessed means with which they could employ counsel, he was not a poor person, within the meaning of the statute.

In this conclusion we think the learned court erred.

The appellant had reached his majority, had married, and had a family of his own. If his parents refused to contribute of their means to aid in defence of their son, the result, as to him, was the same as if they had been penniless. If the parental affection was not sufficiently strong to induce them to come to his aid, there was no process by which they could be coerced, and his condition was as hopeless as if he had been an orphan. Their means, if they refused to place them at his disposal, could not aid him in procuring counsel to assist him in the defence of a charge the most serious known to the law; and, if they refused to aid him, the property possessed by them should not have been considered in determining whether he was, in fact, a poor person within the meaning of the law. The showing made by the application in this case, uncontradicted and not disputed, as it seems, clearly brought the appellant, we think, within the letter and spirit of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT