Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees

• Decision Date: 21 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. C1-83-1897,C1-83-1897
• Citation: Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1984)
• Parties: Norman HENGEMUHLE, Relator, v. LONG PRAIRIE JAYCEES, uninsured, Respondent, and State Treasurer, Custodian of the Special Compensation Fund, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 54

358 N.W.2d 54

Norman HENGEMUHLE, Relator, v. LONG PRAIRIE JAYCEES, uninsured, Respondent and State Treasurer, Custodian of the Special Compensation Fund Respondent.

No. C1-83-1897.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 21, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The standard of review of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals of findings of the compensation judge, as provided by the 1983 legislative amendments, applies to cases pending on July 1, 1983, the effective date of the amendments.

2. Under the 1983 amendments, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals may no longer disregard the findings of the compensation judge. Instead, the court of appeals determines whether those findings are "unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted."

3. In this case, the findings of the compensation judge, although affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals, are, on review by the Supreme Court, found to be manifestly contrary to the evidence and are reversed. The case is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals for further proceedings on the issue of permanent total disability.

Paul A. Weingarden, Harlan G. Sween, Minnetonka, for relator.

Long Prairie Jaycees pro se.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Thomas G. Lockhart, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

SIMONETT, Justice.

We review on certiorari the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals affirming the findings and order of the Compensation Judge denying the relator-employee permanent total disability benefits. We reverse and remand, and, in so doing, set out the scope of review of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals under the 1983 appellate review amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act.

On November 15, 1973, the employee, Norman Hengemuhle, injured his back while working for his uninsured employer, respondent Long Prairie Jaycees. On September 16, 1974, following a hearing, the employee was awarded temporary total disability benefits. He also received supplementary and retraining benefits. These benefits were paid by the State Treasurer, as custodian of the Special Compensation Fund, until February 24, 1981, when benefits were discontinued because of the 350 week limitation. Thereafter, the employee petitioned for permanent, total disability and for 20% permanent partial disability of the back. This petition was heard before Compensation Judge John E. Jansen in September 1982. On June 3, 1983, the compensation judge issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying permanent total disability benefits, but requiring payment of permanent partial disability benefits, based on his finding of 10% permanent partial disability attributable to the 1973 injury.

On July 1, 1983, employee appealed the compensation judge's decision to the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals. On October 31, 1983, the court of appeals unanimously affirmed. The employee now seeks further review in this court by certiorari. The Long Prairie Jaycees have defaulted in these proceedings, but the State Treasurer appears in opposition to the employee.

I.

The 1983 legislature made major revisions in the appellate review provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, see 1983 Minn.Laws, ch. 301, and the effect of these revisions seems to be in some doubt. The pertinent statutes as amended are set out below. ¹

A.

The employee first argues that the new appellate review standards may not be applied retroactively to his case. He cites the established rule that the workers' compensation law in effect at the time of injury governs, absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary. See Leahy v. St. Mary's Hospital, 339 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn.1983); Kahn v. State, University of Minnesota, 327 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn.1982) (even a new "procedure" for recovery of attorney fees will not be applied retroactively). See also Minn.Stat. § 645.21 (1982) (a law will not be construed to be retroactive unless clearly so intended by the legislature). Here, however, the legislature has clearly stated its intent:

Sections 146 and 148 to 152 [the changes here involved] are procedural changes and are effective for all cases pending on July 1, 1983, regardless of the date of injury, date of hearing, or date of appeal and all decisions of workers' compensation judges and the workers' compensation court of appeals issued on or after July 1, 1983, shall apply the provisions of those sections.

1983 Minn.Laws, ch. 301, § 236. Nothing could be clearer. Mr. Hengemuhle's case was pending before the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals as of July 1, 1983, when he filed his appeal. The 1983 amendments, effective July 1, 1983, apply to his case.

The employee next argues that even if the legislature intended the 1983 amendments to apply to pending cases, to implement this intent would be an unconstitutional deprivation of his vested rights. The employee's argument seems to be that he has a vested contractual right in the standard of appellate review that was in existence at the time of his injury in 1973. There is no merit to this contention. The 1983 amendments do not impose any new liability, burden or obligation on either party, nor do they deprive or alter the employee's right to collect benefits upon presentation of adequate proof of entitlement. The amendments do not change the kind of evidence required to make out a claim. See Manikowske v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 338 N.W.2d 823 (N.D.1983). We hold that the 1983 appellate review provisions are applicable to cases pending on July 1, 1983, and that this application impairs no vested rights.

B.

Employee suggests that the 1983 appellate review amendments are only cosmetic and that the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals operates under these amendments essentially as it did before. We disagree.

Prior to July 1, 1983, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals was not required to defer to the judgment of the compensation judge. The court of appeals could disregard the compensation judge's findings and substitute its own findings. Dotstry v. Radisson Hotel, 266 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn.1978); Townsend v. Nelson, 308 Minn. 374, 376, 242 N.W.2d 607, 609 (1976) ("may reverse the compensation judge even on questions of credibility"). In other words, the court of appeals was as much a trier of fact as the compensation judge.

The 1983 amendments change the old procedure. The ground for appeal to the court of appeals is no longer whether the findings and order are "unwarranted by the evidence" but whether they are "unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted." Minn.Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3) (Supp.1983). Significantly, the old provision, allowing the court of appeals to "disregard the findings of fact which the compensation judge has made," has been stricken, although the provision giving the court of appeals the power to substitute its own findings remains. Minn.Stat. § 176.421, subd. 6 (Supp.1983). Inconsistencies in the law as amended are not hard to find, but the thrust of the amendments is clear. The legislature intends the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals to be just that, an appeals court, operating as an appellate review body and leaving the basic factfinding to the compensation judge who presides at the evidentiary hearing.

Under the prior practice, as relator's counsel explained at oral argument, if a case had any substance, it would be appealed to the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals for, in effect, a kind of de novo hearing. The hearing before the compensation judge was treated as only an initial fact-gathering proceeding. Under the 1983 amendments, the court of appeals no longer may disregard the compensation judge's findings and substitute its own but it instead performs an appellate review function. This should result in fewer appeals to the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals, with resultant savings in time and cost to the workers' compensation system. We think it may be of some significance that the legislature added the appellate review amendments, not to its then pending bill for general revision of the workers' compensation law, but to House File No. 1290, an appropriations bill dealing with budget considerations. See DeRoche v. American Hoist & Derrick, 36 W.C.D. 116, 122-23 (1983) (where the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals also recognizes its role has been changed by the 1983 amendments).

With this background in mind, we construe the 1983 amendments to provide that the standard of review by the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals is as follows: The court of appeals can no longer disregard the compensation judge's findings and order. The court of appeals, instead, determines if the findings and order are supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. If the findings and order are so supported, the court of appeals affirms. If not, then, in that event only, the court of appeals may substitute its own findings, or it may remand to the compensation judge for a rehearing.

The standard of review--whether the findings and order are supported by substantial evidence--means the findings are to be affirmed if, in the context of the record as a whole, they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966); Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 342 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Minn.1983) ("such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," quoting Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 [Minn.1977].

In applying this standard, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals looks not only at the evidence which supports the compensation judge's findings, but also at...