Henkemeyer v. Boxall
| Decision Date | 05 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. C2-90-1796,C2-90-1796 |
| Citation | 465 N.W.2d 437 |
| Parties | Patricia HENKEMEYER, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Peter C. Jansky, Deceased, Appellant, v. David W. BOXALL, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
A physician who gives a workers' compensation claimant an adverse medical examination is not liable to the claimant for failure to diagnose claimant's medical condition because no physician-patient relationship exists.
Roger J. Nierengarten, Hall, Byers, Hanson, Steil & Weinberger, P.A., St. Cloud, for appellant.
Donna J. Blazevic, Bassford, Heckt, Lockhart, Truesdell & Briggs, P.A., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Considered and decided by SHORT, P.J., and DAVIES and POPOVICH *, JJ.
Appellant commenced what appeared to be a medical malpractice action for failure to discover and advise decedent Jansky of the presence of an acute aneurysm. Appellant conceded no physician-patient relationship existed, but argued application of ordinary negligence principles precluded dismissal. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding lack of a physician-patient relationship barred appellant's claim as a matter of law. We affirm.
On August 3, 1987, Peter Jansky was injured driving a truck for Brian Brix Excavating Company. Twenty months later, Brix and its workers' compensation carrier required Jansky to undergo an adverse medical examination to determine the extent of his injuries. Respondent Dr. David Boxall conducted an orthopedic evaluation of Jansky's spine, shoulder, and hip on April 27, 1989. At no time was respondent retained by Jansky, his employer, or its workers' compensation carrier for any medical treatment. After obtaining Jansky's medical history, examining medical and hospital records, and reviewing X-rays he ordered, respondent Boxall concluded Jansky's orthopedic problems were the same in April 1989 as they were before the August 1987 accident. Respondent made a report to that effect to the workers' compensation carrier on May 3, 1989. On May 6, 1989, Jansky died of an acutely expanding abdominal aortic aneurysm.
Appellant Patricia Henkemeyer, as trustee for the heirs of Jansky, commenced this action, alleging respondent failed to exercise the requisite care and skill of a physician by not identifying the aneurysm on the April 1989 X-ray and warning Jansky of its danger. Appellant made an offer of proof that the aneurysm is clearly detectable on the X-ray.
On April 26, 1990, respondent moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, claiming no physician-patient relationship existed between Jansky and respondent. The trial court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and on June 4, 1990, dismissed the case. The trial court concluded appellant's claim of negligence against respondent was barred as a matter of law because no physician-patient relationship existed.
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of respondent in the absence of a physician-patient relationship?
On appeal from summary judgment the reviewing court determines whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn.1989). The existence of a legal duty is a question for the court to determine as a matter of law. Larson v. Larson, 373 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn.1985).
As a preliminary matter, a procedural issue arises whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment sua sponte. Respondent moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; the trial court, however, entered summary judgment in respondent's favor. Minn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(e) provides that if the trial court accepts matters outside the pleadings, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be treated as one for summary judgment. Here, appellant conceded in her memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss that no physician-patient relationship existed. Hence, the trial court properly treated the motion as one for summary judgment.
Generally, a physician is liable for malpractice only where there is a physician-patient relationship. McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442, 445 (Minn.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1989). Minnesota appellate courts have not faced the issue of a physician's duty to a claimant who is examined adversely to determine eligibility for workers' compensation benefits, but those jurisdictions that have addressed the issue are uniform in holding that under such circumstances a physician-patient relationship does not arise and therefore no claim for medical malpractice exists. See Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal.App.3d 308, 313-14, 138 Cal.Rptr. 3, 7-8 (1977); Rogers v. Horvath, 65 Mich.App. 644, 647, 237 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1975); Craddock v. Gross, 350 Pa.Super. 575, 581, 504 A.2d 1300, 1303 (1986), app. denied (Pa. Sept. 23, 1986). In the absence of a physician-patient relationship, the doctor's only duty is to conduct the examination so as to not cause harm to the patient. Keene, 69 Cal.App.3d at 313, 138 Cal.Rptr. at 7. There is no claim that respondent injured Jansky during the April 1989 medical examination.
We conclude that, based on Keene, Rogers and Craddock, the trial court properly found that no physician-patient relationship existed between respondent and Jansky. Accordingly, we hold the trial court's grant of summary judgment was correct as a matter of law.
Appellant's argument that her cause of action rests on ordinary negligence principles and does not constitute a medical malpractice claim is appealing, but it is without precedential support. The logic of appellant's position derives some support from Minn.Stat. Sec. 604.05, subd. 1 (1990). This statute, enacted in 1983, now reads:
Subdivision 1. Duty to assist. Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
This provision requires a stranger to come to the aid of a person "exposed * * * to grave physical harm." Although respondent did not have a duty to Jansky based on a physician-patient relationship, appellant would not offend common sense by saying he at least had the duty of a stranger.
We note, of course,...
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