Henley v. City of Johnson City
| Decision Date | 09 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:12-CV-263,2:12-CV-263 |
| Parties | ERIC HENLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF JOHNSON CITY, TENNESSEE et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
This civil action is before the court for consideration of "Defendant State of Tennessee's Motion to Dismiss" [doc. 10] and "Defendant Johnson City's Motion to Dismiss" [doc. 15]. Plaintiffs have responded to the motions [docs. 18, 17], and defendants have submitted reply briefs [docs. 21, 22]. Oral argument is unnecessary, and the motions are ripe for the court's determination. For the reasons that follow, both motions will be granted, and this case will be dismissed.
According to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiffs are residents of Gray, Tennessee. Certain of the plaintiffs have already had property annexed by the City of Johnson City, Tennessee, while plaintiff Eric Henley owns property that is in an areaintended to be annexed by Johnson City.1 Plaintiffs have brought their complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the annexation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-58-111, as being unconstitutionally vague, and they also seek injunctive relief. In addition, plaintiffs ask the court to declare null and void the annexation of plaintiffs' property that has occurred.
Defendants' motions are brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In resolving a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). "The factual allegations, assumed to be true, must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief." League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
"[T]he plaintiff must allege facts that, accepted as true, provide sufficient 'factual enhancement' to 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Shaughnessy v. Interpublic Grp. of Cos., Inc., No. 11-1764, 2012 WL 5870131, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff's pleading for relief must provide 'more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Bowman v. United States, 304 F. App'x 371, 374 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
The State of Tennessee's motion is also brought pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for a lack of jurisdiction. Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) fall into two categories, a facial attack or factual attack. See United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the pleading itself. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a facial attack, a trial court takes all material allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ritchie, 15 F.3d at 598; Ohio Nat'l, 922 F.2d at 325.
In its motion, the State of Tennessee initially argues that there is no jurisdiction because the State is not a "person" liable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the State as well. "[A] State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Further, "[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing suit against the citizen's own State in federal court. . . ." Welch v. Texas Dep't or Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987) (citations omitted).
In their response, plaintiffs concede the State's argument concerning jurisdiction and consent to the dismissal of the State. Plaintiffs then contend in their response that the State of Tennessee is not a proper party and it has no standing to assert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to the claims plaintiffs assert. However, the State Attorney General for the State of Tennessee is authorized pursuant to Tenn. Code Annotated § 8-6-109(9) to defend the constitutionality of state statutes and is permitted to intervene in a federal lawsuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. In the present motion, the State argues the merits of the claims alleged in the complaint in the alternative to its jurisdictional argument. In its reply, the State reserves the right to intervene should it be dismissed as a party and should plaintiffs' unconstitutionality claims be permitted to proceed.
The court finds that there is no jurisdiction over the State of Tennessee based upon the Eleventh Amendment's bar to suit and the fact that the State is not a "person" under 42 U.S. § 1983. However, as will be discussed below, plaintiffs' claims will not withstand the motion to dismiss, and the entire case will be dismissed. The State will not need to intervene at a later time.
With the exception of the arguments concerning the Eleventh Amendment, defendant Johnson City adopts the arguments made by the State of Tennessee in its brief for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. Thus, reference to defendants' argument refers to an argument made by both of these defendants.
Defendants argue inter alia that plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983 because they have not identified a constitutional right that has been violated. Plaintiffs assert that they are attacking the statute itself, not the annexation and that their claim for unconstitutional vagueness is sufficient to state a cause of action. A reading of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs reveals that plaintiffs are attempting to assert a claim of unconstitutional vagueness as to Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-58-111(a) and that based upon such a declaration seek to have the court enjoin further annexations and void the annexation that has already taken effect in relation to plaintiffs' property. However, for the reasons that follow, plaintiffs have not stated a claim for unconstitutional vagueness; thus they are not entitled to any relief, and their complaint will be dismissed.
Under count one, plaintiffs allege that Tenn. Code Ann. § 101 et. seq. does not define the terms "reasonable," "well-being," "health," "safety," and "welfare" as those terms are used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-58-111(a)(1)-(2). Plaintiffs also allege that those terms are vague and ambiguous and therefore they ask the court to declare Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-58-111(a) unconstitutionally vague. The court declines to do so. Section 6-58-111 provides in relevant part:
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses provide the underlying foundation for the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1999). Pursuant to the requirements of due process, "an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). "An ordinance is void for vagueness if a person of ordinary intelligence cannot reasonably interpret what is prohibited." In re: Tenn. Pub. Indecency Statute, Nos. 96-6512, 96-6573, 97-5924, 97-5938,1999 WL 55276 at *4 (Jan. 13, 1999) (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108).
"[I]t must be kept in mind that for a statute to be vague it must contain 'terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its common meaning.'" Id. (quoting Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 US. 385, 391 (1929)). Id. (internal citations omitted).
In ascertaining whether an ordinance is void for vagueness, the court "must extrapolate its allowable meaning while relegated, . . . to the words of the ordinance itself, to the interpretations [other courts have] given to analogous statutes, and, perhaps to some degree, to the interpretation of the statute given by those charged with enforcing it." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110 (citations and footnotes omitted). In the process of extrapolation, the court must keep in mind that it does not have the "power to construe and narrow state laws." Id. (footnote omitted). Also, "in determining whether a statute is impermissibly vague, courts generally look to the common usage of statutory...
To continue reading
Request your trial