Henlopen Landing Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Vester
| Decision Date | 19 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Action No. 12-308-RGA-CJB |
| Parties | HENLOPEN LANDING HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. RUSSELL H. VESTER and JAKARA VESTER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
This matter arises out of an action filed by Plaintiff Henlopen Landing Homeowners Association, Inc. ("Plaintiff" or "Association") against Defendants Russell H. Vester and Jakara Vester ("Defendants" or "Vesters") in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware (the "state court action"). Plaintiff filed a Petition in the Court of Chancery seeking relief against the Vesters, pursuant to Del. Code tit. 10, § 348, for enforcement of certain restrictions contained in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Henlopen Landing ("Declaration"). Defendants removed the state court action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), asserting that the state court action violated their federal rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (D.I. 2) Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand this action to the Court of Chancery for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (the "motion to remand"), filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447. (D.I. 10) For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the motion to remand be GRANTED.
Plaintiff is a non-profit Delaware corporation that is responsible for, inter alia, enforcing the terms, rules and restrictions of the Declaration. (Petition at ¶¶ 1, 3; D.I. 11 at 1) The Declaration, in turn, contains certain terms, rules and restrictions to which all persons owning property in the Henlopen Landing community are subject. (Petition at ¶ 4; D.I. 11 at 1) Henlopen Landing is a subdivision located in Lewes, Delaware. Defendants, a married interracial couple with four minor children, one of whom is autistic, reside in the five-bedroom home that they own in Henlopen Landing. (D.I. 5 at 5, at ¶¶ 2-3; D.I. 9 at 1, at ¶ 3)
On February 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed the state court action in the Court of Chancery, seeking relief pursuant to Del. Code tit. 10, § 348, a statute relating to disputes involving deed covenants or restrictions. (See Petition) This state court Petition sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as costs, expenses and attorney's fees, against Defendants for alleged violations of the Declaration relating to an enlargement to Defendants' existing driveway, the planting of trees, and the storage of garbage receptacles. (See id.) On March 14, 2012, Defendants removed the action from the Court of Chancery to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1443(1) and 1446. (D.I. 2) Specifically, Defendants argued that the state court action violates their federal rights under the FHA, and thus removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 10-14) On March 19, 2012, subsequent to removal, Defendants filed their Answer, Defenses and Counterclaims, alleging violations of certain of Defendants' rights underthe FHA and Delaware Fair Housing Act, Del. Code tit. 6, § 4600 et seq., and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages and costs and attorney's fees. (D.I. 5) On April 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed the motion to remand. (D.I. 10)
On May 2, 2012, this matter was referred to me by Judge Richard G. Andrews to hear and resolve all pretrial matters, up to and including the resolution of case-dispositive motions. Plaintiff's motion was fully briefed as of May 23, 2012, (D.I. 14), and on October 22, 2012, the Court heard oral argument regarding the motion, (D.I. 16).
In November 2010, Defendants purchased their home in Henlopen Landing, and moved into it approximately thirteen months later. (D.I. 5 at 6, at ¶ 3) In their Counterclaims, Defendants allege that the Association and related entities have treated them differently from other community residents because of their familial status (i.e., the fact that they have children), their child's disability and their race, through the selective enforcement of Declaration restrictions and Association bylaws.1 (Id. at 5-13, at ¶¶ 4-36) Defendants contend that such treatment began even before they moved into their home, when they began to receive notices and handwritten notes regarding alleged violations of the Association's bylaws. (Id. at 6, at ¶ 5) The receipt of these notices and notes are alleged to have continued after Defendants moved into their home, and related to: (1) a trailer Defendants used during their move; (2) Defendants' on-street parking, and (3) complaints about Defendants' children. (Id. at 6-7, ¶¶ 5-9) When Mrs. Vester asked a representative of Premier Property Management ("PPM"), the Association's propertymanagement company, why she was being singled out in regard to cars parked on the street (when several other residents are alleged to have done the same), the representative's response was that the family's children were a factor (because many in the community believed that it "should be a 55 and older community"), as was the family's race. (Id. at 6-7, at ¶ 7)
On or about June 24, 2011, Defendants submitted an application to the Architectural Review Board ("ARB") for the Association2 requesting approval to make several modifications to their home. (Petition at ¶ 5 & ex. B at 1; D.I. 5 at 7-8, at ¶ 11) These modifications consisted of the installation of an irrigation well, a gazebo, a six foot high fence that would enclose the exterior door to the garage, and an extension to the Defendants' existing driveway. (Petition, ex. B at 1; D.I. 5 at 8, ¶ 12) Defendants' application explained that their request relating to the fence height was made because of their autistic son's special needs, and the request relating to the fence location would allow them to let their dog outside in inclement weather without snow and mud being tracked through their home. (Petition, ex. B at 1) Notwithstanding this latter explanation, however, Defendants now allege that during a July 1, 2011 meeting with ARB members regarding their application, Mrs. Vester explained that both requests related to the fence were necessary in light of her child's autism. (D.I. 5 at 8-9, ¶¶ 14—15)
Ultimately, the modifications concerning the well, gazebo, and height of the fence were approved, while the request to extend the fence to enclose the garage door was denied. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16) The ARB postponed its decision regarding the driveway extension, pending its receipt of additional documentation it had requested from Defendants regarding the slope of the driveway.(Petition at ¶ 6; D.I. 5 at 9, at ¶ 16) Upon receipt of the ARB's rulings on these requests, Mrs. Vester notified PPM that she would be appealing the decision regarding the fence location; she requested that the decision be reconsidered in light of the ARB's approval of similar requests from other homeowners, and she also provided a new proposal regarding the driveway extension. (D.I. 5 at 9, at ¶¶ 17-18) Defendants claim that they subsequently received approval for the driveway extension request, and accordingly proceeded with that modification. (Id. at 9-10, at ¶¶ 19-20)
On August 6, 2011, Mrs. Vester and her child were denied access to the community swimming pool. (Id. at 10, at ¶ 21) PPM informed Mrs. Vester that her keycard had been deactivated because Defendants did not, in fact, have approval for the driveway extension. (Id.)
On August 11, 2011, Mrs. Vester submitted a "Housing Discrimination Complaint (Intake)" ("HUD Complaint") against Plaintiff, Plaintiff's Board of Directors and PPM, via the website of the Delaware Division of Human Relations ("Division"). (Id. at ¶ 23) By letter dated August 22, 2011, an attorney representing the Association demanded that Defendants take corrective action regarding the driveway modification within ten days of receipt of the letter, and noted that failure to comply with the terms of the letter "may, and likely will, result in the initiation of litigation" against Defendants.
On November 23, 2011, Mrs. Vester's HUD Complaint was officially filed. Defendants alleged in the HUD Complaint that Plaintiff, Plaintiff's Board of Directors, and PPM "engaged in unlawful discrimination in the conditions, terms, services or facilities of sale because of race, disability and family status," and "intimidated, interfered or coerced [Defendants] to keep [Defendants] from the full benefit of the Federal Fair HousingLaw." By letter dated December 21, 2011, the Division served the Association with a notice of the filing of the HUD Complaint. (D.I. 5 at 11, at ¶ 27; D.I. 9 at 5, at ¶ 27; D.I. 11 at 3) The Association's commencement of the state court action and the removal of that case to this Court occurred thereafter. (See D.I. 2 & Petition)
Generally, in order for a state court action to be removable to a federal district court, the federal court must have original jurisdiction pursuant to either a federal question or diversity of citizenship. Parker v. Parker, Civ. No. 10-744-LPS, 2010 WL 4627648, at *1 (D. Del. Nov. 8, 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1441). '"Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.'" Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)); Parker, 2010 WL 4627648, at *1. '"The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.'" Kline, 386 F.3d...
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