Henn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1902
• Citation: 51 A. 689,67 N.J.L. 310
• Parties: HENN v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

51 A. 689

67 N.J.L. 310

HENN

v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 24, 1902.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to supreme court.

Action by Caroline Henn against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Crouse & Perkins, for plaintiff in error.

Vredenburgh, Wall & Van Winkle, for defendant in error.

FORT, J. The defense in this case was based upon an alleged breach of warranty. The effort on the part of the defendant was to show that the insured had answered certain questions in such a way as to cause the breach. Forfeitures are not favored in the law, and if, by any intendment, a ground can be found to defeat them, the court will apply it. Hampton v. Insurance Co., 65 N. J. Law, 265, 47 Atl. 433, 52 L. R. A. 344.

The main contention for reversal is that the trial court refused to direct a verdict for the defendant. The application for such direction was based on the alleged falsity of certain answers made by the insured to these questions: "(1) Have you ever had: Dizziness or vertigo? A. No. Disease of the heart? A. No. Bronchitis? A. No. Enlarged veins? A. No." "(6) Name and residence of your usual medical attendant? A. Have none. (7) Have you consulted any other physician; if so, when and for what? A. 1870; smallpox. (8) Have you ever used * * * tobacco to any extent; and, if so, when and for how long? A. No." The statements of the insured are by the policy made warranties.

There is a question raised in this case, which, if the decision were to be otherwise than it is to be, should first be determined, and that is whether the medical examination, and the answers to the questions therein, are a part of the contract; but as the learned trial justice ruled that they were, we shall so treat them, although not passing upon the correctness of that ruling, because not necessary for this decision.

Where there is a conflict in the evidence, or lack of conclusive and unquestioned proof of the falsity of a warranty, the question is one for the jury. There must exist no rational theory upon which the Jury might find the nonfalsity of the answers of the insured, before the court can direct a verdict for the defendant if there be a rational doubt of the falsity of the statement, the case is for the jury. If the question asked relates to a matter upon which the insurer should know that the insured could not have the knowledge to fully answer, the warranty will not be held to be more than a warranty in the fair sense of the question, namely, to the belief of the insured. The warranty of a physical fact in answer to such a question as, "Have you ever undergone any surgical operation?" if answered "No," is absolute; and if it be uncontradicted on the proof that the insured, prior to that statement, had been operated on for appendicitis, or for the removal of a tumor or a part of the jawbone, then a direction of a verdict would be imperative. Lippincott v. Royal Arcanum, 64 N. J. Law, 309, 45 Atl. 774. The present chief justice in voicing the opinion of this court in the case just cited, declared "that it is only when the unimpeached testimony of the case is conclusive upon the point, and a verdict for the plaintiff cannot be supported without disregarding it, * * * that it is the duty of the trial court to control the jury in its action, and direct a verdict for the defendant." In the supreme court of the United States, in Moulor v. Insurance Co., 111 U. S. 335, 4 Sup. Ct. 466, 28 L. Ed. 447, the language of the warranty was: "It is hereby declared and warranted that the above are fair and true answers to the foregoing questions. And it is acknowledged and agreed by the undersigned that this application shall form a part of the contract of insurance, and that if there be in any of the answers herein made any untrue or evasive statements, or any misrepresentation or concealment of facts, then any policy granted upon this application shall be null and void." The question asked in that case was: "Have you ever been affected with any of the following diseases: Insanity, gout, rheumatism, palsy, scrofula, convulsions, dropsy, smallpox, yellow fever, fistula, rupture, asthma, spitting of blood, consumption, and abscesses of the lungs, throat, heart and urinary organs?" The answer was, "No." The court, through Mr. Justice Harlan, say: "If those who organize and control life insurance companies wish to exact from the applicant, as a condition precedent to a valid contract, a guaranty against the existence of diseases, of the presence of which in his system he has and can have no knowledge, and which even skillful physicians are often unable, after the most careful examination, to detect the terms of the contract to that effect must be so clear as to exclude any other conclusion." The policy before us recites that it is issued "in consideration of the answers and statements contained in the printed and written application for the policy, * * * all of which answers and statements are hereby made warranties, and are hereby made a part of the contract." By the third condition indorsed on the policy, it is provided: "If any answer or statement in the application herein referred to is not true, * * * this policy shall be void." Condition ninth declares: "The contract between the parties hereto is completely set forth in the policy and the application therefor taken together." And the application contains this clause: "That the answers and statements contained in the foregoing application, and those made to the medical examiner, together with this declaration, shall be the basis and become part of the contract of insurance with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; that they are full and true, and are correctly recorded; * * * that any false, inaccurate, or untrue answer, any suppression or concealment of facts in any of the answers, * * * render the policy null and void." It would be difficult to distinguish between the terms of this warranty and that in Moulor v. Insurance Co., or to fail to discern the force of that decision upon the question before us. An opinion of...