Henok v. Kessler

• Decision Date: 29 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–1114 PLF
• Parties: Araya Henok, Plaintiff, v. Gladys Kessler, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

78 F.Supp.3d 452

Araya Henok, Plaintiff

v.Gladys Kessler, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14–1114 PLF

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed January 29, 2015

Araya Henok, Washington, DC, pro se.

Gregory F. Linsin, Henry Frederick Schuelke, III, Blank Rome, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on two motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, the District of Columbia (“the District”) and the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure (“the Commission”), and on plaintiff Henok Araya's motion to amend his complaint.¹ Dr. Araya, proceeding pro se, asserts that the defendants failed to maintain proper oversight of a judge who sits on the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and who adjudicated Dr. Araya's divorce proceedings in that court.² Dr. Araya contends that the judge brought the “Catholic Bible” into the courtroom and forced him to swear upon it, and he also asserts that the judge suffered from a hearing impairment that interfered with the judge's ability to conduct fair trial proceedings, in addition to various other allegations.

Dr. Araya seeks damages and injunctive relief, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, as well as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The District and the Commission respond that Dr. Araya's claims for retrospective relief are untimely and that he fails to state a claim under Section 1983. The defendants also contend that Dr. Araya lacks standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief. Upon careful consideration of the parties' arguments, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in this case, the Court will grant the defendants' motions and will dismiss this action.³

I. BACKGROUND

Dr. Araya was a party to divorce proceedings before D.C. Superior Court Judge John H. Bayly, Jr. A trial was held over several days between July 28, 2010 and January 6, 2011, and on August 24, 2011 Judge Bayly issued a 44–page ruling in the case. See Araya v. Keleta, 65 A.3d 40, 43–44 (D.C.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 426, 187 L.Ed.2d 282 (2013). Judge Bayly granted the petitions for divorce filed by Dr. Araya and his wife; awarded joint legal custody of the parties' children; awarded Dr. Araya's wife sole physical custody of the children; granted Dr. Araya visitation with the children; awarded Dr. Araya's wife ownership and possession of certain real properties; and ordered Dr. Araya to pay child support, as well as spousal support for a limited period. Id. Dr. Araya appealed Judge Bayly's decision, which was affirmed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. at 59.

The present action is Dr. Araya's third lawsuit filed in this federal District Court relating to his divorce case. See Henok v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 13–1621(PLF), 2014 WL 3542121, 58 F.Supp.2d 93, (D.D.C. July 18, 2014) (dismissing Dr. Araya's Fifth Amendment takings claims, premised on Judge Bayly's award of real properties to Araya's wife, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman doctrine); Araya v. Bayly, 875 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.2012), aff'd, No. 12–7069, 2013 WL 500819 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 18, 2013) (per curiam), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 266, 187 L.Ed.2d 150 (2013) (dismissing under Rooker–Feldman numerous other claims arising from the divorce proceedings). In his complaint and proposed amended complaint in this case, Dr. Araya sets forth a variety of allegations, including that: (1) Judge Bayly improperly possessed and used the “Catholic Bible” in the courtroom, see Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 19, 22, 33, 42, 44; (2) Judge Bayly forced Dr. Araya to swear an oath on the Bible, see id. ¶¶ 12, 17, 19, 22, 38, 44; (3) Judge Bayly forced Dr. Araya to pray in the courtroom, see id. ¶¶ 9, 16, 34, 37, 42; (4) Judge Bayly was biased in favor of the Catholic faith, shared by himself and Dr. Araya's wife, see id. ¶¶ 32, 44, 46; (5) Judge Bayly suffered from hearing loss, which interfered with his ability to conduct a fair trial, see id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 29, 35, 36, 42; and (6) Judge Bayly frequently cancelled scheduled court dates without notice, causing Dr. Araya to miss work and to incur substantial financial losses. See id. ¶ 30.⁴

Based on these various allegations, Dr. Araya asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), as well as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The premise of these claims is that the defendants—the District of Columbia and the Commission—breached a duty to ensure that judges of the Superior Court act in a manner that affords litigants fair trials and that does not violate litigants' rights under the First Amendment or the DCHRA. Dr. Araya demands compensatory, punitive, special, statutory, exemplary, and treble damages, as well as an award of litigation costs. Proposed Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1–5, 7–8. In addition, Dr. Araya seeks an injunction restraining the defendants from “carrying, placing, [or] using ANY [B]ible or anything religious” in the D.C. Superior Court, as well as an order “to remove any and all religious paraphernalia” from the grounds of that court. Id. ¶ 6. Alternatively, Dr. Araya seeks injunctive relief that would permit him and other citizens to place their own preferred religious materials on the grounds of the Superior Court. Id. ¶ 11.

The District maintains that all of Dr. Araya's claims for retrospective relief—relating to the injuries that Araya says he suffered during the trial proceedings—are barred by applicable statutes of limitations. District MTD Mem. at 5–7. The District also argues that Araya's Section 1983 claim fails on its merits because he has not set forth factual allegations that plausibly demonstrate his asserted injuries were caused by a custom or policy of the District. Id. at 7–8. With respect to Dr. Araya's claim for an injunction requiring the removal of all religious materials from the D.C. Superior Court's grounds, the District responds that Araya lacks standing to assert such a claim. Id. at 9–10. The District adds an additional argument for dismissal in its opposition to Dr. Araya's motion to amend his complaint, contending that Araya's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on the prior decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals affirming Judge Bayly's ruling. District Opp'n Mot. to Amend at 4–5. The Commission joins in the District's untimeliness arguments, see Comm'n MTD Mem. at 2 nn.2–3, as well as in the District's standing argument. See Comm'n Opp'n Mot. to Amend at 4. It further argues that Araya's Section 1983 claim against the Commission fails because the Commissioners' purported fiduciary duties do not arise by virtue of state law. Comm'n MTD Mem. at 3.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Amend the Complaint

Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it, or if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). In all other circumstances, the Court “will freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and “[i]t is common ground that Rule 15 embodies a generally favorable policy toward amendments.” Howard v. Gutierrez, 237 F.R.D. 310, 312 (D.D.C.2006) (quoting Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1134, 1136–37 (D.C.Cir.1989) ). Leave may be denied, however, due to “undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or futility.” Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548–49 (D.C.Cir.1999) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) ). Where the proposed amendment would not survive a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave may be denied on the grounds of futility. See Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C.Cir.1996) ; Elliott v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 521 F.Supp.2d 41, 49 (D.D.C.2007) ; Black v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 87 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.2000).

B. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows dismissal of a complaint if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the “grounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). On such a motion, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint “is construed liberally in the [plaintiff's] favor, and [the Court should] grant [the plaintiff] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.”

Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994) ; see also Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C.Cir.2012). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions. Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d at 476 ; Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,...