Henriquez v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 05-30289-KPN.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-30289-KPN.
• Citation: Henriquez v. Astrue, 482 F.Supp.2d 50 (D. Mass. 2007)
• Parties: Cynthia A. HENRIQUEZ, Plaintiff v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

482 F.Supp.2d 50

Cynthia A. HENRIQUEZ, Plaintiff v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,¹ Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-30289-KPN.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 30, 2007.

Edward M. Pikula, O'Connor, Martinelli, Cullinan & Pikula, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff.

Karen L. Goodwin, United States Attorney's, Springfield, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVERSE OR REMAND and DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER (Document Nos. 7 and 10)

NEIMAN, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) which provide for judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") regarding an individual's entitlement to Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits. Cynthia A. Henriquez ("Plaintiff') claims that the Commissioner's decision denying her such benefits — memorialized in a February 23, 2005 decision by an administrative law judge — is not supported by substantial evidence and is predicated on errors of law. Plaintiff has moved to reverse the decision or remand the matter for further review. The Commissioner, in turn, has moved to affirm.

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(b). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs motion will be denied and the Commissioner's motion will be allowed.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may not disturb the Commissioner's decision if it is grounded in substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion. Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1981). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Thus, even if the administrative record could support multiple conclusions, a court must uphold the Commissioner's findings "if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion." Ortiz v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir.1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A denial of benefits, however, will not be upheld if there has been an error of law in the evaluation of a particular claim. See Manso-Pizarro v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir.1996). In the end, the court maintains the power, in appropriate circumstances, "to enter ... a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the [Commissioner's] decision" or to "remand[] the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who was born on October 4, 1962, alleges disability due to headaches and depression as well as back, neck, shoulder and ankle pain. (Administrative Record ("A.R.") at 172, 183.) She has worked as a machinist and quality assurance technician, has recently earned an associates degree in civil engineering, and currently works as a project engineer. (A.R. at 33-34, 184, 189.)

A. Medical History

Plaintiffs medical history is as follows. On January 15, 1998, Dr. R. Scott Cowan, an orthopedic surgeon, determined that Plaintiff had a herniated disk with neck and arm pain. (A.R. at 258-59.) He also noted. that Plaintiff had previously undergone an anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion but determined that her prognosis was good. (Id.) At about the same time, Dr. Ronald Paasch, Plaintiffs treating physician, recommended physical therapy for Plaintiffs neck and scapular pain and noted that she could perform clerical activities. (A.R. at 274.)

By May of 1998, physical therapy had improved Plaintiffs mobility. (A.R. at 273.) In addition, between June of 1998 and January of 1999, aggressive myotherapy and trigger point injections had reduced Plaintiffs back pain and headaches and increased her range of motion. (A.R. at 266-72.) By January of 2000, Plaintiff reported that her headaches were about "50% percent" better and she was tolerating her work activities "reasonably well." (A.R. at 264.) One year later, however, in her SSDI application (see infra), Plaintiff alleged that she became "disabled" — and hence unable to work — beginning on February 13, 2001. (See A.R. at 172-74.)

On August 7, 2001, Plaintiff was treated for neck pain as a result of a car accident; cervical spine x-rays showed no evidence of acute injury, but there were signs of instability. (A.R. at 280-84.) Later in August, Plaintiff was diagnosed with cervical, thoracic and lumbar strain, post-traumatic cephalgia and right shoulder sprain; over the next few months, however, therapy and treatment had improved Plaintiffs condition significantly. (A.R. at 276-86.)

Following the car accident, Dr. Anthony Kusiak oversaw Plaintiffs care through approximately September of 2002. (A.R. at 285-88.) In a letter to Plaintiffs attorney dated September 21, 2002, Dr. Kusiak opined that Plaintiff was "disabled from most occupations" between August 7 and November 13, 2001, "partially disabled" between November 14, 2001, and June 1, 2002, and "at risk of remaining partially disabled" after June 1, 2002. (A.R. at 287.)

In some contrast, Dr. William Straub, a state agency physician, stated on May 6, 2002, that, based on his review of the medical records, Plaintiffs exertional capacities were consistent with "light" work. (A.R. at 374-79.) He opined further that Plaintiff was limited only in her ability to perform overhead tasks. (Id.)

On May 17, 2002, Dr. Michael Bohnert completed a consultative psychiatric examination for the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission's Disability Determination Services ("DDS"). (See A.R. at 380-84.) He indicated therein that Plaintiff had finished her first semester of college, achieved "excellent grades," no longer took Klonopin, and experienced some moodiness and sadness. (Id.) He further noted that Plaintiffs activities included household chores, gardening, attending college, shopping, and socializing. (A.R. at 383.) Dr. Bohnert diagnosed an adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features, moderate, chronic, and secondary to pain. (A.R. at 384.)²

On October 9, 2002, Dr. Jose Azocar completed a consultative physical examination for DDS. (See A.R. at 400-03.) In his report, Dr. Azocar found no evidence of sensory or motor deficits; normal gait and deep tendon reflexes; occipital tenderness and limited range of motion of Plaintiffs neck and left ankle with flexion; normal strength; and no pain on straight leg raises. (See id.) He indicated that foot and ankle x-rays showed that Plaintiff suffered from diffuse osteopenia without significant abnormality, secondary osteoarthritic changes in her right ankle joints, and primary osteophytosis of her left ankle. (Id) In Dr. Azocar's view, Plaintiff was limited only from repetitive neck bending and walking long distances. (A.R. at 403.)

On October 23, 2002, Dr. M. Douglass Poirier, a state agency physician who also reviewed Plaintiff's medical records, stated that she could: (1) lift and carry ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally; (2) stand and walk for at least two hours; and (3) sit for about six hours. (A.R. at 406-13.) Dr. Poirier also stated that Plaintiff could occasionally climb and crawl but could not use foot pedals or perform overhead work. (Id.)

According to records from the Pain Management Center at Baystate Medical Center ("PMC"), Plaintiffs headaches and back pain were relieved for four and one-half months from facet injections she received in December of 2002. (A.R. at 419.) In January of 2003, however, Plaintiff assessed her pain at a "4" (out of 10) at "best" and an "8" (out of 10) at "worst." (A.R. at 421.) Accordingly, a physician at the PMC recommended further pain management and a work hardening program. (Id.) Thereafter, in June of 2003, Plaintiff received additional injections which provided "excellent pain relief' for another four months. (A.R. at 417-19.)

Dr. Charles Weston, Plaintiffs primary care physician, completed a functional capacity assessment on February 17, 2004. (A.R. at 422-24.) Dr. Weston stated that Plaintiff could stand for six hours in an eight-hour workday, walk one hundred yards, occasionally lift fifteen pounds, sit for one hour at a time, and sit for six hours total in an eight-hour workday. (A.R. at 423.) He opined, however, that Plaintiff could not engage in frequent lifting and was "not likely" able to work more than six hours a day. (Id.) Dr. Weston's opinions were "mostly" based on Plaintiffs statements which he considered "reasonable" based on the medical evidence. (A.R. at 423-24.) Dr. Weston repeated these opinions in a second assessment dated December 1, 2004, but added therein that Plaintiff could only stand between one and two hours. (A.R. at 447-48.)

B. Procedural History

On March 13, 2002, in the midst of these medical developments, Plaintiff applied for SSDI benefits alleging, as indicated, disability as of February 13, 2001. (A.R. at 172-74.) Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on reconsideration, whereupon she filed a request for a hearing. (A.R. at 123-25, 130-35.)

At a March 5, 2004 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had been attending college full-time with classes five days a week. (A.R. at 59-62.) Plaintiff further testified that, in the 2003 spring semester, she tutored students for up to twenty-four hours a week but did not continue thereafter due to her heavy course load (A.R.61-62.) While in school, Plaintiff continued, she took Tylenol with codeine twice a day for pain. (A.R. at 63.) She also testified that she could stand for two hours, walk for an hour on a flat surface, and sit for an hour at a time. (A.R. at 66-68.) According to P...