Henry Clay Pierce v. Edmund Creecy
Decision Date | 01 June 1908 |
Docket Number | No. 357,357 |
Citation | 210 U.S. 387,28 S.Ct. 714,52 L.Ed. 1113 |
Parties | HENRY CLAY PIERCE, Appt., v. EDMUND P. CREECY, Chief of Police of the City of St. Louis |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This is an appeal directly to this court from a judgment of the circuit court upon a writ of habeas corpus, remanding the petitioner, now appellant, to the custody of the respondent, now appellee. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus alleges that the petitioner was 'imprisoned, detained, confined, and restrained of his liberty, at the city of St Louis, within the district aforesaid, by Edmund P. Creecy, the chief of police of said city of St. Louis, in violation of the laws and Constitution of the United States.' There is no dispute about the facts, which, as they appear in the petition and the return, are as follows. The governor of the state of Texas made a requisition upon the governor of the state of Missouri, which is as follows:
To the Governor of the State of Missouri:
Whereas, it appears by the annexed documents, which are hereby certified to be authentic, that H. Clay Pierce stands charged with false swearing, committed in the state of Texas, and information having been received that the said H. Clay Pierce has fled from justice and has taken refuge in Missouri.
Now, therefore, I, T. M. Campbell, governor of the state of Texas, have thought proper, in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States, to demand the surrender of the said H. Clay Pierce as fugitive from justice, and that he be delivered to G. S. Mathews, who is hereby appointed the agent, on the part of the state of Texas, to receive H. Clay Pierce.
Given under my hand and seal of the state, affixed at the city of Austin, this 11th day of February, A. D. 1907, and of the independence of the United States of America, the one hundred and thirty-first, and of Texas the seventy-first year.
T. M. Campbell, Governor.
To this requisition was attached a certified copy of an indictment against the petitioner. The indictment is as follows:
'In the name and by the authority of the state of Texas.
'The grand jurors of Travis county, in said state, duly empaneled, sworn, and charged as such at the September term, A. D. 1906, of the district court of said county, in and for the fifty-third judicial district, upon their oaths, in said court, present: That Henry Clay Pierce, in said county and state, on or about the 31st day of May, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred, and before the presentment of this indictment, did then and there present himself and make his personal appearance before N. H. Nagle, a duly and legally qualified and acting notary public within and for the county of Travis and state of Texas, who was then and there duly authorized by law as such officer and notary public to administer an oath; and the said Henry Clay Pierce, having been duly sworn by the said N. H. Nagle, acting in her capacity as such officer and notary public, did then and there unlawfully, deliberately, corruptly, and wilfully, under the sanction of the oath so legally administered to him by the said N. H. Nagle, acting in the capacity aforesaid, make his voluntary false statement and declaration in writing, as follows:
'Affidavit.
'The State of Texas, County of Travis:
'I, Henry Clay Pierce, do solemnly swear that I am the president (president, secretary, treasurer, or director) of the corporation known and styled Waters-Pierce Oil Company, duly incorporated under the laws of Missouri, on the 29th day of May, 1900, and now transacting or conducting business in the state of Texas, and that I am duly authorized to represent said corporation in making this affidavit; and I do further solemnly swear that the said Waters-Pierce Oil Company, known and styled as aforesaid, has not, since the 31st day of January, 1900, created, entered into, or become a member of, or a party to, and was not, on the 31st day of January, 1900, nor at any day since that date, and is not now, a member of or a party to any pool, trust, agreement, combination, confederation, or understanding with any other corporation, partnership, individual, or any other person or association of persons, to regulate or fix the price of any article of manufacture, mechanism, merchandise, commodity, convenience, repair, any product of mining, or any article or thing whatsoever or the price or premium to be paid for insuring property against loss or damage by fire, lightning, storm, cyclone, tornado, or any other kind of policy issued by the parties aforesaid; and that it has not entered into or become a member of or a party to any pool, trust, agreement, contract, combination, or confederation to fix or limit the amount of supply or quantity of any article of manufacture, mechanism, merchandise, commodity, convenience, repair, or any product of mining, or any article or thing whatsoever, or the price or premium to be paid for insuring property against loss or damage by fire, lightning, storm, cyclone, tornado, or any other kind of policy issued by the parties aforesaid; and that it has not issued, and does not own, any trust certificates for any corporation, agent, officer, or employee, or for the directors or stockholders of any corporation, has not entered into, and is not now in any combination, contract, or agreement with any person or persons, corporation or corporations, or with any stockholders or directors thereof, the purpose and effect of which said combination, contract, or agreement would be to place the management or control of such combination or combinations, or the manufactured product thereof, in the hands of any trustee, or trustees, with the intent to limit or fix the price, or lessen the production and sale, of any article of commerce, use, or consumption, or to prevent, restrict, or diminish the manufacture or output of any such article; that it has not entered into any conspiracy defined in the preceding sections of this act, to form or secure a trust or monopoly in restraint of trade; that it has not been, since January 31, A. D. 1900, and is not now, a monopoly by reason of any conduct on its part which would constitute it a monopoly under the provisions of §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11 of this act, and is not the owner or lessee of a patent to any machinery intended, used, or designed for manufacturing any raw material or preparing the same for market by any wrapping, baling, or other process, and, while leasing, renting, or operating the same, refuses or fails to put the same on the market for sale; that it has not issued and does not own any trust certificates, and has not, for any corporation or any agent, officer, or employee thereof, or for the directors or stockholders thereof, entered into, and is not now, in any combination, contract, or agreement with any person or persons, corporation or corporations, or with the stockholders, director, or any officer, agent, or employee of any corporation or corporations, the purpose and effect of which combination, contract, or agreement would be a conspiracy to defraud, as defined in § 1 of this act, or to create a monopoly, as defined in §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11 of this act.
Henry Clay Pierce,
(President, Secretary, Treasurer, or Director.)
'Subscribed and sworn to before me, a notary public within and for the county of Travis, this 31st day of May, 1900.
(Signed) N. H. Nagle,
Notary Public.
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